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WEST EUROPE REPORT

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GREENS INCREASINGLY INFLUENTIAL IN PARLIAMENT, LOCAL AREAS

Helsinki HELSINGIN SANOMAT in Finnish 9 Nov 84 p 36

[Commentary by Antti Vahtera]

[Text] Belgium--Belgium's Green Party is perhaps the most successful of similar European parties. It was the first of these new parties to field successful candidates -- eight members in the Belgian parliament, there are approximately 100 Greens in city and local councils, and in addition the party has two representatives in the parliament of the European Community.

The success of Belgium's Greens is, to a great degree, based on the same reasons as in West Germany: a densely populated country in which there is much polluting industry and in which protective measures have been neglected for a long time, and environmental problems will become acute sooner or later and actions will become unavoidable.

The fact that Belgium's Green movement has become "politicized" more quickly and forcefully than in Holland, in which conditions are very similar, is explained by the fact that independent environmental organizations in Holland have had clearly more support and influence during the postwar era. In Holland the need was not as great as in Belgium for the establishment of a green party.

A particular problem for Belgium's Greens is the party split, which is not the result of ideological reasons but administrative reasons. According to the new constitution that went into effect in 1980, the country is governed according to a federal system so that the Flemish-speaking northern section of Flanders and the French-speaking southern section of Walloon have their own government in addition to the central government. In addition, bilingual Brussels forms its own administrative entity.

Thus the Green Party is also divided into two sections, the Flemish-speaking Agalev and the French-speaking Ecolo, between which, indeed, rather good cooperative relations prevail. Ecolo is slightly more successful: it has five seats in parliament, Agalev has three. Ecolo also has about 10 more municipal council positions than Agalev, which has 44.

In the City of Liege Ecolo participates in the municipal government together with the Socialists and the so-called Regionalists. Cooperation is said to be somewhat difficult.

The Greens representing both language groups in parliament form a unified faction, which is unique in Belgium. All the other parties are divided into Flemish- and French-speaking sections.

According to Agalev's Political Secretary Leo Cox, the party was established in the winter of 81--82, to a great degree in accordance with the example set by West Germany's Greens. The party was in a way a continuation of the environmental movement of the early 1970s, which grappled primarily with traffic and other urban problems.

The party is operating on a much broader base in that it is not merely satisfied with improving the environment, which is, indeed, given precedence in its platform. The party is also pacifist while strongly opposing nuclear weapons, in particular, and it has declared its solidarity with the Third World.

In practical politics the Greens strive to experiment with local democracy and to develop new forms of production and consumption.

Dirk van Melkebeke, who directs the Flemish-speaking cover organization of environmental associations, says that the success of the Greens is, to a great degree, the result of the fact that Belgium's forgotten segments of the population, immigrants, and its "own" poor and unemployed see that the Green Party is promoting their interests. The established parties have grown too large and have become alienated from the fundamental strata of the population.

This, according to Melkebeke, especially applies to the Christian Democrats, the country's largest party, which generally receives approximately 40 percent of the votes. "Many Christians no longer see any kind of Christian message in their party. Thus the Greens are taking away many votes from the Christian Democrats."

The primary task of the organization led by van Melkebeke is to pressure the government into making its policy more favorable to the environment. He is working together with the Greens as well as with the other parties while, however, avoiding excessive identification with the Greens. He disapproves of the division of the administrative structure, which also complicates work on behalf of the environment.

"The Flemish-speaking government cannot talk, for example, to the Dutch Government about the pollution of the Maas River, but the matter must first be taken up with the central government. Frequently, we do not know who is responsible for acid rain, for example," he says.

Another bad disadvantage is the unequal development of the country's various sections with respect to environmental policy, adds Melkebeke. It was not possible to determine the division of responsibility in the 1980 constitutional reform. Thus in waste treatment as well as in city planning the Flemish have completed legislation, the Walloons have not.

J. M. Pierlot, who is the general secretary of the Ecolo Party, the French-speaking Greens, for his part, disapproves of Belgium's present right-wing government and the close ties with "big money". Thus financial circles, which have close ties with big industry, such as nuclear power, are well represented in the government.

"This often results in the fact that the government is readily inclined to be silent or evasive when sensitive environmental questions are brought up. For example, it gave conflicting information on the Mont Louis incident."

The government's representatives in turn emphasize that the obligation of officials is to determine the facts before they can give any information, and a determination of the truth often takes time.

M. Renson, the office chief of the central government's Environmental Ministry, adopts a businesslike attitude toward the Green Party. In his opinion, with few exceptions Belgium's Greens do not represent extreme elements. The government is trying to work with them even though it considers the environmental organizations that represent the "people's voice" to be a better alternative.

Belgium's environmental situation is not so bad in Renson's opinion. Indeed, there are some difficult local problems, such as in Brussels where air pollution exceeds the permissible standards in some places.

"However, looked at as a whole the situation has improved. In a period of 10 years we have made some rather large investments in the environment."

Water pollution represents some of the more difficult environmental problems in Belgium. A map of the Flemish area shows that the overwhelming majority of Belgium's rivers are either badly or very badly polluted. Only short segments of rivers primarily in the northeastern part of the country can be classified as "clean or only slightly polluted".

The compiling of the above-mentioned map is the first step in a 10-year program to clean up the rivers in Flanders. It will entail the construction of purification plants and the requirement that industrial plants must pay a tax if they contribute to water pollution.

But even here the solution of the problem is complicated by political and administrative problems. Approximately one-third of Flanders' drinking water is from Walloon where a corresponding program has not yet been compiled. Part of the pollution in the rivers originates in France.

Belgium's environmental problems are, in general, the same as or similar to those in Holland. A highly concentrated dairy and livestock farming, which is frequently situated too close to population centers, pollutes the environment and causes the eutrophication of water systems.

The problem of waste has taken on vast proportions in a densely populated and highly industrialized country: domestic households produce 1.6 million tons of waste annually, industry produces 6 million tons.

10576

CSO: 3617/18

LEFT SUFFERED MOST SIGNIFICANT LOSSES IN MUNICIPAL ELECTIONS

Helsinki HUVUDSTADSBLADET in Swedish 24 Oct 84 p 2

[Editorial by Jan-Magnus Jansson: "Quite Stable Despite Everything"]

[Text] In this commentary on the elections, Jan-Magnus Jansson says that the exceptionally low voter turnout was the most important fact in those elections. In second place is the fact that political stability was greater than had been expected and that the three "old" nonsocialist parties in particular held up well.

The results of the municipal elections were commented on immediately after the fact in some our editions for yesterday. Actually, the main trends were already so clear yesterday that there is no need for substantial changes in the conclusions that could be drawn then. Since only some of this newspaper's readers could be reached with that commentary, however, it is being presented here in expanded form.

In commenting on an election, it is well to rank things in their order of importance. The thing that is standing out more and more clearly as the most remarkable feature of these elections is the low voter turnout. Just over 73 percent of the registered voters cast their ballots. This should be viewed against the background of the fact that voter participation in every municipal election since 1960 has exceeded 75 percent--in 1980 it reached 78.1 percent. In Helsinki, where trends usually show up first, voter turnout fell below 66 percent.

When so many voters stay away from the polls, their absence cannot be blamed solely on the bad weather on election day. Weather does not discourage people from voting if an election is considered important. The fact that the "Abstention Party" was the biggest in these elections carries a political message that ought to be interpreted correctly. Now that the elections are over, it will be up to researchers to map out the reasons for these voter attitudes. In our first commentary, we used the expression "a protest by yawning," and perhaps that is worth repeating here. Many of those who had cast their ballots in the immediately preceding elections by voting first for one protest party and then for another demonstrated this time by staying home. At this point, it is impossible to decide for certain whether the chief reason was outright distrust

of politics and politicians or, instead, a more diffuse indifference to the whole thing.

The second most important fact is that stability in our political life is nevertheless greater than had been expected before the elections. It is even probable that the low voter turnout favored the "old" parties, whose voters are more intensely aware politically than the "floating" voters, who for the most part support the protest parties.

This stands out very clearly in the case of the three traditional parties that took part in the elections. The Conservative Party did well in these elections, achieving the same level that it had in its big victory in the municipal elections of 1980. In comparison with the parliamentary election of 1983, in which it suffered a setback, the party has now gained almost 1 percent.

The figures for the Center Party contain certain pitfalls. On the face of it, the party's share of the vote declined in comparison with the preceding municipal elections. But that is primarily a kind of optical illusion, since the Liberals, who of course have now merged with the Center Party, participated previously as an independent and not insignificant party. The figures for the 1980 municipal elections [for comparison purposes] were obtained by adding together the votes obtained separately in those elections by the Center and Liberal People's Parties. But if we compare the Center Party's current share of the vote with the latest parliamentary election--the only way to determine the political trend--we see that the party has advanced by almost 2.5 percent. The Center Party must therefore be seen as the winner in these elections.

As has already been noted, the Swedish People's Party did very well in the elections. "The Finno-Swedish election" is the subject of comment in today's other editorial, so we will limit ourselves to a few general thoughts. One of the interesting things about the progress made by the Swedish People's Party is that it occurred all down the line and in very dissimilar municipalities: both in purely Swedish-speaking areas and in bilingual areas--and indeed, in purely Finnish-speaking localities as well. It seems, therefore, that several different factors contributed to the party's strengthened position, including those that influence the party's traditional voters and those that affect primarily bilingual and Finnish-speaking voters.

In comparison with the latest parliamentary election, the three traditional nonsocialist parties combined advanced by almost 4 percent. That, along with the low voter turnout, is the most important observation about these elections.

The loser in the elections was without a doubt the Left, although its losses were not as great as certain forecasts had anticipated. The leftist parties dropped by 2 percent in comparison with their standing in the parliamentary election. But each followed its own pattern. The Social Democrats reached a peak in the 1983 parliamentary election, when the Koivisto wind was still blowing. On the other hand, their results this time are not much different than in the 1980 municipal elections, although a slight drop is also noted in that connection.

The Finnish People's Democratic League came off pretty well with no more than a scare. It is true that in comparison with the preceding municipal elections, they lost considerably, but when compared to the parliamentary election, their setback was minimal. It was not a disastrous election for them.

Now we come to the many odd groups which played a kind of leading role in the public debate preceding the elections. When examining them, one must keep in mind that such groups very quickly swell up, shrink, and then swell up again. The roller coaster performance of the Finnish Rural Party over the past few decades is a good example. This time the party was the most outstanding loser in terms of the parliamentary election, while in terms of the 1980 municipal elections, it gained a great deal of ground. Its relatively poor results can probably be blamed partly on the lack of local talent. But they can also be viewed as a sign that the tactic of having one's cake and eating it too--being in the government while engaging in a kind of opposition out in the field--does not pay off in the long run.

Lastly, we come to the Greens. Their successes were unquestionably spectacular in such big cities as Helsinki, Espoo, Vantaa, and Turku and also in a number of smaller cities. Their results nationwide (close to 3 percent) were not very significant, since they ran candidates in only a few municipalities. It is too early at this point to state an opinion on the Green phenomenon. In a way, their most interesting feature is not their "green interests," which they share with many outside their circle. Instead, their attitude toward the position of an elected representative is something new--or perhaps a revival of something old. They have no party organization and no group discipline. Instead, it is taken for granted that each individual representative of the Greens will vote his convictions while at the same time listening to his constituents. One could say that the Green group represents Rousseau's philosophy not only by "returning to nature" but also by being close to his views on democracy.

What the Green groups will be able to accomplish in practice remains to be seen. There are many indications that their extreme individualism may make their contribution a divided and confused one and that the Green groups will be marked by a number of schisms and defections. Perhaps they will make their biggest contribution by influencing behavior by all the other groups on environmental and similar issues, and that is not something to be despised.

11798
CSC:3650/40

CP MODERATES CONTINUE DRIVE AGAINST LEFT ON DISTRICT LEVEL

Establish 'Parallel' Kuopio Organization

Helsinki HELSINGIN SANOMAT in Finnish 13 Nov 84 p 10

[Article: "Finnish CP Majority Has Own Organization in Kuopio Also"]

[Text] Kuopio--The Communist minority controlled Kuopio District Organization of the SKP [Finnish Communist Party] is acquiring a majority district organization as a competitor.

At a meeting held over the weekend representatives of 19 party sections established the Pohjois-Savo Party Committee of the SKP, which according to its declaration will commence to function in accordance with party regulations and the decisions of the party congress and the Central Committee.

The Kuopio District Organization has been under the control of the minority wing for a long time. In the 20-member district committee there are only five who belong to the majority faction. According to the majority faction, the district's activities have been exclusively subordinated to serve the needs of the Tiedonantaja Association.

Vice-Chairman Raimo Laulainen of the new party committee's working committee stated that the goal is to get Communists to work together in Kuopio Province. According to him, the situation will soon be clarified as to whether there are any possibilities for cooperation. Unless a negotiating meeting can be held with the district organization, the party committee will consider further actions. In practice this will mean the birth of a new district organization.

The conflict in the Kuopio District appears to be irreconcilable. District Secretary Seppo Kortelainen considers it comical if not regrettable that the majority faction is intending to establish its own parallel district.

According to Kortelainen, a disruptive organization not belonging to the party does not have any business at the negotiating table. On the other hand, if the primary organization has something to say, the district organization is ready to listen. The doors to the majority members are open, but they seem to be unwilling to participate in the work of the district organization, states Kortelainen.

The founders of the new party committee consider that the majority faction was wasting its time since it had no voice in the district organization.

The SKP's majority leadership is establishing a new district organization in Varsinais-Suomi. KANSAN UUTISET, the chief organ of the SKDL/SKP, stated on Monday that the minority controlled Turku District has until 15 November to comply with the directive to observe the instructions of the party leadership.

If the district does not comply, the supporters of the majority leadership intend to hold a meeting to establish a district organization. The party leadership has also demanded an explanation from the Uusimaa District as to why it is not observing the instructions of the party leadership.

Minority Resists in Turku

Helsinki HELSINGIN SANOMAT in Finnish 15 Nov 84 p 13

[Article: "Uncompromising Answer from SKP's Turku District"]

[Text] The Turku District Organization, which is under the control of the Finnish Communist Party's Taistoite [Stalinist] minority, is accusing the majority party leadership of creating a psychological atmosphere for dissolving the party.

The Turku District's accusation is contained in a letter, in which the district answers the majority leadership's request for an explanation. The leadership wanted to know whether the district intends to withdraw the instructions it sent out to the sections on activities contrary to the will of the party leadership.

In its answer the district disputes that it violated any party rules or the "unanimous decisions" of the 20th Congress -- not all congress decisions have been unanimous. As expected, no signs of compliance are even otherwise found from the letter.

The negotiating committee of majority Communists in Turku District have threatened to establish a new district organization even before the end of the current year if the minority does not disengage itself from the Taistoite front and begin to observe the directives of the Central Committee by the middle of November.

The majority leadership mounted its first attack against the Turku and Uusimaa districts where it commenced the establishment of its own organizations last summer.

The majority has also extended its activities to several other minority controlled districts, of which there are a total of eight. The most recent area committee was established in Pohjois-Karjala [Northern Karelia].

New party sections have been established at an especially fast pace in the District of Uusimaa, which promotes the strictest minority policy line and from

which the party leadership has requested the same kind of explanation as from the District of Turku. The Uusimaa District has not sent an answer.

The working committees of the minority districts will convene on Saturday in Helsinki to polish up their policy line. The manner in which the minority responds to the spread of the majority will be uppermost at the meeting -- the issue is complicated by the fact that the majority's rate of expansion fluctuates by districts with apparent deliberateness.

One possibility is the expansion of the minority into majority districts as a countermove, which is not, however, considered to be probable. The minority has already refused to participate in preparations for an extraordinary congress as long as the majority establishes its own structures in minority districts.

Turku, Uusimaa Takeover

Helsinki HELSINGIN SANOMAT in Finnish 16 Nov 84 p 3

[Article: "SKP Majority Establishes Two New Districts"]

[Text] According to current information, the majority leadership of the Finnish Communist Party will establish district organizations to be under the control of its own supporters in two minority districts by the middle of December. According to majority sources, "it would be a wonder" if new district organizations do not appear in the next few weeks in the areas of Turku and Uusimaa, which are promoting the strictest policy line of the Taistoite minority.

The building of a majority organization has progressed the furthest in the districts of Turku and Uusimaa, which did not comply to the will of the party leadership within the stipulated 2-week time limit.

The majority has incited activity in other minority districts also, but there the readiness to establish new district organizations is not sufficiently developed. The majority's activities will soon be expanded to the minority districts of Kymenlaakso and Lahti also.

The SKP Central Committee will convene in December when it will approve two new districts as members. The party leadership has emphasized that it will dissolve competing party organs if the minority districts comply with its directives, which is considered to be unlikely.

SKDL MP Denounces Communists' Infighting

Helsinki HELSINGIN SANOMAT in Finnish 15 Nov 84 p 14

[Article: "Pursiainen Ready to Dissolve SKDL"]

[Text] MP Terho Pursiainen (Communist) is proposing to the SKDL membership a debate on dissolving the organization and joining its forces with the Finnish Communist Party, which is now under the control of the majority faction. He

is also declaring his availability in the search for a new chairman for the SKDL.

Pursiainen, who is numbered among the background supporters of the SKP's majority leadership, urges that first a clarification be made as to whether there is a desire to continue the activities of the SKDL.

In Pursiainen's opinion it is self-evident that the SKDL's role will change radically in the current situation even of necessity compared with what it has been during the internal dispute of the SKP when the making of policy belonged, to a great degree, to the SKDL.

"This obstacle no longer exists. I am also willing to discuss the cessation of the SKDL," stated Pursiainen on Wednesday. In his opinion SKP under Arvo Aalto also fulfills the goals of the SKDL's membership majority.

Pursiainen presented his views in Wednesday's edition of KANSAN UUTISET, the chief organ of the SKDL/SKP. In the article he thinks that the SKDL's position has become more critical than before since the the 20th Congress of the SKP in May. At this congress the majority occupied all the party's leadership positions as the minority refused to accept the posts it was offered.

According to Pursiainen, the other alternative is that the SKDL's position will be strengthened and that the political tension which will accompany the independent development of the SKDL alongside of the SKP will be tolerated.

On the other hand, he considers that the debate on the replacement of Chairman Kalevi Kivistö (People's Democrat), who will become a governor, has gone astray especially because of the SKDL's Socialists. They consider that the post of chairman belongs to their ranks.

"My Name Can Be Discussed"

A number of SKDL Socialists and SKP members have been mentioned as successors to Kivistö. Pursiainen himself has been mentioned as one of the candidates.

Pursiainen announces in KANSAN UUTISET that in speculations regarding the chairmanship his name "can, for the time being, be discussed in this connection". However, he considers former Communications Minister Jarmo Wahlstrom (Communist) as the strongest of the candidates mentioned so far.

10576
CSO: 3617/30

PAPER REACTS TO 'WARNING' FOR FINLAND IN ROMANOV SPEECH

Helsinki HUFVUDSTADSBLADET in Swedish 16 Oct 84 p 2

[Editorial by Jan-Magnus Jansson: "Romanov's Speech"]

[Text] Finland chose its political priorities long ago and will not allow them to be modified, writes Jan-Magnus Jansson in this commentary on the words of warning, combined with a markedly positive assessment of Finnish-Soviet relations, that were part of the speech delivered by Politburo member Grigory Romanov the day before yesterday.

People had been awaiting with interest the speech that would be delivered at the Finland-Soviet Union Society's 40th annual festival and, especially, the views that would be expressed by Grigory Romanov, member of the Politburo and secretary of the Central Committee. Romanov's political base has long been Leningrad, and it is well known that while people in Leningrad are especially interested in Finland and are familiar with the country, their interest has been sharpened by a degree of continuing suspicion, or perhaps one should say watchfulness, concerning Finland.

Romanov is especially well acquainted with our communist party's sensitive internal affairs. He attended two congresses in a row at the head of the Soviet delegation, and among other things, he was a witness when the party majority chose its own path and ignored the Soviet party's "advice" at the latest congress.

Romanov's speech was marked, however, by the same positive spirit which has recently characterized all statements concerning our relations and which naturally also colored Koivisto's speech at the special anniversary. It was a wholehearted acknowledgment of the bilateral relations between Finland and the Soviet Union. The framework was indicated, and this should be stressed, in the brief and generally formal but extremely cordial greetings sent by Chernenko in connection with the 40th anniversary of the armistice.

Not only political, economic, and cultural relations but also--considering that this was the Finland-Soviet Union Society's anniversary--civic activity to strengthen relations received the highest possible marks. Noted in the look back at history was the enumeration of "progressive and democratic" forces

which supported the new policy after 1944. Among them--in the order adopted by the speaker--were the Communists, the Center Party, and the Social Democrats as well as "representatives of other parties." It is noted with satisfaction that no party was stigmatized, although attention to those outside the circle of the big three was fastened on individuals--Paasikivi's own roots, of course, were in the Conservative Party. The fact that considering its size, the Swedish People's Party played an exceptional role in the transition from war to peace should be noted in passing--although perhaps the party is included retroactively, so to speak, with the groups in the center.

The thing that did attract some attention, however, was that while noting all those positive facts, Romanov strongly stressed the dangers which he sees threatening Finnish-Soviet friendship and peace in the Nordic region from the direction of NATO and especially the United States. Romanov pointed out that jointly acquired wisdom decrees that the foundations of those neighborly relations be constantly strengthened and safeguarded. This is especially true now, he said, when some quarters in the West, and especially in the United States, are trying to cast a shadow over relations between Finland and the Soviet Union. What is more, Romanov continued, they are also trying to instill in Finns the idea of "the danger from the East."

It is completely natural for people in Finland to ask themselves what it was that induced the Soviet guest to use such exceptionally strong language. Finland has long experience, of course, with criticism directed against Finnish-Soviet relations, especially criticism in the form of the debate on so-called Finlandization. But that is scarcely what the speaker was thinking of. What he very probably had in mind, at least primarily, were the controversial statements made by U.S. Deputy Secretary of Defense Richard Perle during Perle's visit here late last summer. Perle--following in General Rogers' footsteps--took up the question of Finland's ability to defend itself against the Soviet Union and also touched on technology exports to the Soviet Union. Perle's quite hawkish statements astounded the Finns primarily, and they probably did not meet with universal approval in American quarters, either. They were the target of attacks in the Soviet press and have now been answered in the Finnish forum as well.

It can be mentioned that in the joint communique prepared when Sorsa visited the Soviet Union recently, there was a passage in which the parties declared themselves in favor of "the elimination of artificial obstacles and discrimination in the field of trade relations." That can be interpreted as an allusion to the embargo measures adopted against the Soviet Union even though, because of its general wording, it can also be viewed as being directed elsewhere. It is clear that the obstacles to technology exports are also of concern to the Finns. But that is an issue on which we find ourselves caught as tightly as can be between a rock and a hard place.

When one notes the harsh tone in the above-cited passage from Romanov's speech (a tone that also appeared in a number of other connections), it is also well to emphasize what the speech did not contain. The point of the criticism is not aimed at Finland--at "circles" here or against expressions of opinion in our country--as it sometimes has been in past decades. Instead, the criticism

is directed at the superpower opponent and the consequences of steps taken by that opponent.

The warning that perhaps should be seen in Romanov's remarks is naturally noted in Finland and reminds us that the tense situation between the big powers does not leave us totally unaffected. As far as Finland itself is concerned, it long ago chose its political priorities and will not allow them to be modified. In an open society, statements and assessments wash in and out without hindrance, but what this also means is that our public has acquired a certain immunity to possible attacks on the foundations of our foreign policy and knows how to assess correctly that which has been the basis of all our security for 40 years.

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SORSA COURTING GREENS FOLLOWING LATTER'S ELECTION GAINS

Helsinki HUVUDSTADSBLADET in Swedish 25 Oct 84 p 2

[Editorial by Bjorn Mansson: "Sorsa Goes Courting"]

[Text] Party chairman Sorsa's courting of the Greens and the SMP [Finnish Rural Party] is a logical ingredient of the Social Democratic strategy and a consequence of the decision to include the SMP in the government, writes Bjorn Mansson, who wonders, however, whether those being courted will allow themselves to be enticed into a "new popular front." His editorial also examines the situation in Helsinki following the elections.

The day before the municipal elections, Prime Minister Kalevi Sorsa, acting in his capacity as leader of the Social Democratic Party [SDP], took a step which caused some surprise but which, on the other hand, must be seen as a completely logical feature of Social Democratic strategy just now. In an interview with the SDP's press, he offered to cooperate with the Greens and the Finnish Rural Party in the municipalities after the elections.

It is not hard to guess what Sorsa's motive was. The very timing of his offer shows that in part, it was purely an election tactic. Reacting to a state of public opinion in which the Greens and the SMP were expected to be the big winners in the municipal elections (bigger, in fact, than they actually turned out to be), Sorsa was making a last attempt to court hesitating voters. The election results show that the tactic paid off very marginally at best. It is true that there was no landslide victory for the Greens (from the standpoint of their nationwide results) and the SMP, but the Social Democrats are still where they were before.

It is obvious, however, that there was also a deeper motive behind Sorsa's move. The defeat of the Finnish Democratic People's League [SKDL], which was expected, weakens the position of the entire Left and, as an indirect consequence, that of the SDP as well. One can say, in fact, that the SDP has lost more on the deal than the SKDL itself has. The Left lost its majority in about 15 municipalities, among them Vantaa and (when compared to the preceding municipal elections, and disregarding later party switches) even Turku, and it was

the SDP--not at all the SKDL--that had been the dominant political power in the leftist municipalities.

The SKDL's losses mean that as a result of these elections, the SDP is also weaker in municipalities with a nonsocialist majority, since the Social Democrats no longer have as strong a supporting force to back them up, so to speak.

Sorsa's reasoning now, obviously, is that this loss by the Left must be offset in some way--in the municipalities to begin with, but eventually the same need may arise in national politics. So the most immediate possibility is to woo the Greens and the SMP. The Greens, of course, who incidentally took many of their votes precisely from the Left, have declared their freedom in the matter of political alignments and are therefore "lawful prey." The Finnish Rural Party, on the other hand, has already proven that it sometimes vacillates between the blocs. As part of the government coalition, it has occasionally provided supporting troops for the Social Democrats.

Sorsa's move can therefore be seen as a logical consequence of the decision to bring the Finnish Rural Party into the government following last year's parliamentary election. If the intention in doing so was also to weaken the SMP's support base, the strategy succeeded, at least if we judge by the results of the municipal elections. But if another intention was to weaken the Center Party by keeping the SMP under its own wing, that effort failed completely.

But back to Sorsa's newest courtship. He proposed a "coalition of the SDP, the SKDL, the SMP, and the Greens" in municipalities where conditions make that possible and put his offer in concrete form by talking in favor of "seating the Greens with the SDP in the local governments."

Although Sorsa himself is not a municipal politician, he must be well aware that local governments are not put together the way national governments are--that is, after agreements are reached between parties willing to work with each other. Instead, they are chosen by proportional representation, which means, for example, that the Greens--like everyone else--are represented when they are entitled to be. And that, incidentally, is the case only in a few municipalities that can be counted on the fingers of one hand--among them Helsinki and Espoo.

In all likelihood, therefore, Sorsa's wording must be interpreted as meaning that where necessary, the Social Democrats are willing to help the Greens obtain representation in local governments in cases where the proportional voting system does not assign them a place. That is an interesting "election promise." It remains to be seen how many Social Democratic municipal organizations will let themselves be convinced of the political advantages of relinquishing a seat in favor of the Greens in case of need.

If we completely ignore for a moment the Finnish Rural Party's possibilities for playing the crucial role in forming majorities in the municipalities, it can be noted that the Greens alone hold the balance in about a dozen municipalities, including Vantaa, Turku, Oulu, Hameenlinna, Jakobstad, Hyvinkaa, Kerava, and Forssa. This applies, however, to situations where a "simple" majority is

required. There may also be municipalities where a two-thirds majority will depend on the Greens.

The Greens will be subjected to strong pressure from both nonsocialist and socialist quarters in municipalities where there is equilibrium. So far, the preferences of the Greens themselves are still a mystery. "Chief ideologist" Osmo Soininvaara has stated (with reference primarily to the capital) that they are willing to cooperate with everybody except "the most neurotic Communists and members of the Finnish Constitutional People's Party." For his part, former Liberal People's Party minister Paavo Nikula, elected as a Green in Espoo and a possible candidate for chairman if the Greens eventually form a party, has made the symbolic statement that the Greens naturally cannot sit in the grandstand in the municipal councils, but must be placed on the political map and "in the middle, in the background."

Those statements provide no more information than the Greens' work in Parliament does about which side they will choose if (or when) they are occasionally forced to make a choice. The Greens are a particularly heterogeneous and--for better or for worse--markedly individualistic group whose activist ranks include people with a past in the political parties. The latter in particular may have sympathies and antipathies. The groups are surely going to split on individual issues.

Even if the Greens are claiming at this stage that they do not intend to start trading on their key role, one cannot rule out the possibility that they may "sell themselves" to the highest bidder--that is, to the one who can guarantee them representation on boards and committees and--naturally--support on specific issues. Sorsa has realized that.

If we then add in the Finnish Rural Party as a potential key party between the blocs, the number of "uncertain" municipalities rises considerably. It is natural that the Left, especially where it has lost ground in the elections, should try to make up for that by looking to the SMP. But what kind of "coalition" will come out of all this? Populist features can easily get the upper hand in a policy around which a united constellation consisting of the Left, the SMP, and the Greens is attempted.

The Social Democrats would then be renouncing not only a more orthodox Social Democratic policy but also, for example, a responsible economic policy in the municipalities. All of that just to safeguard their own positions of power. Will the SMP and the Greens let themselves be enticed into such a thing--into a "new popular front"?

Helsinki is in a special situation as far as key parties are concerned. The Left has 30 of the 85 seats as a result of the elections. On the other hand, the traditional nonsocialist parties--and in Helsinki proper, that means only the Conservative Party, the SFP [Swedish People's Party], and perhaps the Finnish Christian League--have between 34 and 37 seats. The remaining 18 seats are divided as follows: seven for the Greens, four for Liisa Kulhia, three for the SMP, two for the Center Party, and two for the Finnish Constitutional People's Party. This means that the Left will have to establish cooperation with

at least--as an example--the Greens, Kulhia, and the SMP if it is to achieve a simple majority.

It is more probable, though, that despite Sorsa's advice to his people, cooperation in the capital will continue along the same lines as before: between the Conservative Party, the SFP, and the Social Democrats (which will provide a safe simple majority, with 53 seats out of 85) and--when a two-thirds majority is needed--the majority's flank consisting of the Finnish Christian League and the People's Democrats.

But one thing is clear: the main cooperating group will do itself a disservice if it tries to squeeze out the Greens completely. This could only mean that the Green advance would continue in the next election.

Especially because of that, the Greens--and also the Finnish Rural Party--will have many suitors out in the municipalities. Kalevi Sorsa got there first by making a false start before the elections were even held. It remains to be seen when the middle parties will approach the Greens with an offer to cooperate. As far as the actual substance of a Green policy is concerned, the conditions for agreement with the middle parties ought to be better than they are in the direction of the Social Democrats. And after all, is it not true that specific issues are the most important thing to the Greens?

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MITTERRAND ROLE IN EEC, GOALS FOR EUROPE EXAMINED

Paris POLITIQUE INTERNATIONALE in French Autumn 84 pp 289-299

[Article by Pascal Fontaine, assistant to Jean Monnet from 1973 to 1977. Since 1980, political adviser of the European Peoples Party group (Christian-Democrat) of the European Parliament. Author of "The Action Committee for a United States of Europe," European Research Center, 1974; "Euroshima: Building a Europe for Defense" (with G. Doly and R. Cagnat), Media, 1979; "A No-Return Course," European Research Center, 1980. The present article is entitled: "A Europe 'At Different Speeds?'"]

[Text] The president of the republic could have been somewhat satisfied when he finished his term as president of the EEC on 30 June 1984. The European Council of Fontainebleau, held 1 week earlier, showed all signs of success.

The unresolved disputes¹ were the subject of an overall agreement and progress seemed possible in the negotiations for the memberships of Spain and Portugal. A new impetus was given to "the citizens' Europe" through the creation of an ad hoc committee that is to develop concrete proposals. That said, excess jubilation would be as out of place in Paris as elsewhere when one realizes how tedious it was to accomplish this result, which should have been achieved 6 months earlier at the European Council of Athens. This latter meeting ended in a fiasco without precedent in the annals of this type of summit. Beyond the political and national aspects of the campaign for the European elections on 17 June, public opinion could not escape from the evidence submitted by those most involved in the European ballots. They found it quite easy to demonstrate the extraordinary gap that has not stopped growing between the needs of solidarity and joint action of European countries to counter foreign challenges and the practical paralysis in the areas of decision and action that EEC institutions and national governments seem to accept complacently.

Must the Myth of Fontainebleau Be Broken?

Without judging the results of the French presidency [of the EEC] needlessly severely, we must cut down to size the originators of an agreement which, although it does have the merit of temporarily reestablishing the operation of the Communities, seriously attacks heretofore untouchable principles (such as refusing to consider a country's own resources as a national contribution subject to reimbursement).

It must be added that the agreement will be costly for French agriculture, faced with increased competition from Germany which, contrary to the Commission's

recommendation, was granted by the EEC a 5 percent lowering of the VAT [value-added tax] on agricultural products for 4.5 years.

The explicit recognition of the "British case," followed by a second case, that of West Germany, which wants a dispensation from paying part of the contribution it will have to make to compensate for the dispensation granted to Great Britain, has placed the EEC in a zone of dialectic upheavals. The price to be paid to keep alive a community that has fallen prey to the exacerbation of national egos during a period of crisis must not surpass certain limits, beyond which the very structure of the European edifice would be jeopardized.

The Slow Deterioration of Community Mechanisms

Were such concessions to the basic principles of European law necessary? It must be noted that the practice followed for almost 20 years following the "statement of disagreement" (drawn up on 30 June 1965 by the six founding states) as to the mode of operation of the Institutions favored a type of relation within the Council of Ministers dominated by the use of the abusive veto. A veto invoked not to defend an objectively vital national interest but an accumulation of isolated demands of minor importance.

As the Commission gradually lost its role as a mediator and initiator and Parliament was confined by its limits as a consultative and supervisory power which its direct election since 1979 has been unable to change significantly, the Council became as the years went by an entity that was both all powerful in its ability to block and impotent in its function as a legislator of the European communities.

The paradox of the discussions since the beginning of the seventies in European circles comes from the number and scope of reforms proposed by certain Institutions.² These suggestions are the result of sensible analyses on the nature of the blockages and the almost pathological inaptitude of these Institutions to concretely undertake these reforms. The president of the republic, speaking before the European parliament on 24 May 1984, noted that "the life of EEC institutions is marked by many imperfections, none of which is, strictly speaking, intolerable. But their buildup creates a permanent and diffuse constraint for which we are constantly paying the price." However, he refrained from naming the precise source of these constraints, where they sit and linger with impunity, namely within national governments which eagerly try to transform the brilliant proclamations at the summit into a list of carefully dodged wishful thoughts. Did the founding fathers perhaps underestimate the force of inertia and blockage of bureaucracies run by men trained to defend national interests or even the interests of their particular offices? Certainly not, because European institutions separate from the states, such as the Commission, the Court of Justice and, to a lesser degree, the European Parliament were established in order to organize with the member states represented in the Council a subtle but balanced dialogue that would preserve both national realities and the goals of integration. What worries the "reformers" today is the slow deterioration of the system set up since 1951 and 1957 by the Treaties of Paris and Rome and the need for the institutions to adapt to the new internal and external environment of the European states. Will

they have more chance of being heard than their illustrious predecessors? Under what conditions will a revival of European construction respond to the needs of solidarity and effectiveness that are constantly being felt? Under what conditions will this recovery allow the 300 million Europeans to escape the decline and to play a role equal to them in the world?³

A New Spaak Committee

Francois Mitterrand's speech in Strasbourg on 24 May 1984 gives a number of indications as to the French government's intentions regarding the European issue. Pointing out "that it is indispensable to strengthen the major treaty which links the European countries to each other and constitutes their basic law, the Treaty of Rome," especially as regards limiting the use of the veto within the Council to specific cases, the president went further: "For a new situation there should be a new treaty which should not, of course, be a substitute for existing treaties, but which would extend them to areas they do not cover. This is true of political Europe." He then referred to the Treaty on the European Union adopted by the European Parliament last 14 February at the instigation of the very active Italian federalist Altiero Spinelli, as well as to the solemn declaration of Stuttgart adopted in June 1983 by the European Council.

It cannot be denied that the French president has fulfilled his commitments because the legacy left to his Irish successor Garret Fitzgerald calls for (Point 7 of the Fontainebleau conclusions) the creation of "an ad hoc committee for institutional questions." The task of this committee, which should be made up of personal representatives of heads of state and government, is singularly lacking in ambition. It consists of "making suggestions to improve the operation of European cooperation in the area of the community as well as in the area of political cooperation or other areas." The choice of words and the absence of any reference to the draft Treaty on the European Parliament are a measure of the difficulties encountered by the Ten in agreeing to a document which could bind the political future of Europe beyond the ritualistic and faint-hearted statements of the chancelleries.

But by explicitly referring to the Spaak Committee, the European Council wanted to reawaken the hopes of traditional advocates of a united Europe, for whom the allusion to the Belgian prime minister who in 1955⁴ was charged with building the foundation of a European recovery is particularly significant. The possibilities remain open and the prospect of a real revival of the political unification of Europe appears better today than in the past few years.

So that the high spirits that the leaders of some member countries seem to have toward a new institutional advance can be best used to help rebuild Europe, two conditions must be fulfilled, one of which involves the method and the other the actual contents of this recovery.

Use Political Forces in the Recovery

First of all, the procedure that will be used to implement the Fontainebleau commitments will be a determining factor; European history swarms with examples of aborted projects and initiatives returned to committee which reappear only

as diplomatic documents covered with marks expressing the reservations of some or footnotes explaining the limited interpretation of others of this or that portion of the text. In the hands of senior civil servants guided by the instructions of their government every political project tends to be reduced to the lowest common denominator and the greater the number of participants the smaller this denominator is. It would be a long shot to think that without the vigilant pressure of the democratic forces coming from either the European Parliament or the national political parties or the association and union movements the experts making up the ad hoc committee for institutional questions will be innovative enough to recommend a profound change in existing treaties to the governments of the ten countries. Once again, the reference to the Spaak Committee could be an affectation. Aware of the need to institute a real public debate about the revival begun in Messine, a handful of European political and union leaders united around Jean Monnet formed an action committee whose first task, on 18 January 1956, was to submit to the vote of the six national parliaments a resolution defining the major fields of activity to be developed within the ad hoc committee. The effectiveness of the method used and the lucid obstination of its originators did result in the parliamentary involvement of each of the Assemblies, which helped complete negotiations and paved the way for ratifying the two new treaties.

This same function of stimulation and democratic supervision could be exercised today by the European Parliament, which has renewed its legitimacy through the elections of 17 June and which has made its Treaty on the European Union one of the major points of the European campaign. Because of its supervisory powers over the Council and the Commission and its ability to keep the progress of the ad hoc committee's work from confidentiality and obstruction, the Parliament must also be involved in developing proposals for institutional reform. The way in which this cooperation will take place should be defined at the earliest as part of the inter-institutional cooperation and should take into account the upcoming membership of Spain and Portugal which, as of 1986, must consider the progress made in the negotiations on political renewal as an integral part of the EEC.

Europe at Different Speeds: A Concept To Be Used Prudently

The underlying condition calls for a reflection on the very nature of the European unification process begun after the Second World War and which should now be aggressively continued.

A diagnosis of the crisis of the European Institutions is relatively easy to make: the Treaties of Paris and Rome set up community entities that represented both the national interest and the community interest. The goals of the EEC were gradually attained from 1958 to 1970 by the six founding states, which benefited from a good economic situation which favored developing an economic and agricultural common market.

This community, which was a coherent whole despite some divergences in political approach between Gen deGaulle's France and its partners, expanded in 1972 to include Great Britain, Denmark and Ireland and then Greece in 1980. However, the international economic crisis was to radically change the situation in which the community of 10 would evolve.

For almost 10 years the enlarged community has been suffering from a crisis of growth and homogeneity, to such an extent that more and more voices are calling for a redefinition of its operating principles in order to overcome the obstacles springing from the more or less obstructionist behavior of this or that state. To be more precise, the exasperation engendered by Margaret Thatcher's litany ("I want my money back") has led some to imagine scenarios of a Europe "at different speeds" which would have the effect of putting a recalcitrant Great Britain on the sidelines.

Europe "at different speeds" or an "a la carte" or "variable geometry" Europe are expressions which all cover a single preoccupation: overcome the faults in coherency to which a community of 10 (and soon 12) seems condemned. An EEC which, from Denmark to Greece, from Portugal to Germany, can no longer make states which are more and more different as to traditions, ambitions and degree of economic development live together under the same system of common rules.

These expressions are somewhat seductive. Since some EEC countries, present or future, have shown either ill will by blocking the Community's operation or an inability to participate in common policies because of their weak economic structure, why not go on, or simply continue, with a smaller number of countries?

In support of this system the European Monetary System (which Italy participates in only loosely and which Great Britain has not joined) and Airbus, an aerospace venture limited to a few countries, are cited.

In France the discussion has been renewed by both those who see in this method a way to overcome the blocking by the United Kingdom (which does not seem to have the same idea of Europe's future as its partners) and by those who hope to avoid the shock of Spanish competition in the area of agriculture.

However, there are several objections to be made.

A Europe at different speeds would represent a mortal threat to the Community, which was conceived as early as 1950 as an enterprise reflecting a "shared destiny," balancing over the long term the joint limitations and benefits of solidarity. The temptation of an immediate profit, made possible in an "a la carte" Europe, would cancel the effects of the large market and the equalization that operates spontaneously through the fact of belonging to an open unit that is a coherent whole from the outside.

As for the common Institutions (the Council, Parliament, Commission, Court of Justice) they could not survive if each state has a special status. Can you imagine a Parliament consisting of deputies obliged to leave the floor when a report did not concern their country? In addition, how would a Council "at different speeds" meet?

European political cooperation, successfully implemented since 1970, will not be credible in the eyes of other countries unless the joint diplomacy continues to be based on a joint economic, monetary and commercial reality. The Lome Agreements and the policies that are part of the GATT will no longer apply to the EEC if it becomes fragmented.

And can we fling into the outer darkness Great Britain and Spain, who would be the main targets of the proposed system? The former deserves to be both understood and firmly kept at a respectful distance and the latter must be helped. Although in different areas, they both have a considerable potential that the Community cannot deprive itself of.

Spain obviously expects its membership in the EEC to bring it concrete advantages of an economic nature and it would hardly be satisfied by merely participating in political cooperation.

Is it right to add that France would be ill-advised to make suggestions that would be to its detriment? Its current monetary weakness and its increasing debt could cause some of its partners (on the basis of coalitions of interest that would make this type of grouping possible) to place it in a secondary economic zone with Italy or Spain.

The "recapture of the domestic market" advocated by the Communist Party and some of the Socialist leaders would have quickly thrown it into the "slow speed" category.

But the greatest danger of a solution which, instead of smoothing out the regional disparities of member states as recommended in Article 2 of the Treaty of Rome would approve and encourage them, lies in the irreversible nature of the results that would follow.

Abandoned on the path to integration, the weakest countries would have no way to catch up with the countries that decide to go forward.

Europe would be divided for good. By unwisely implementing a method based on the easiest alternative, Europeans will have encouraged an irreducible fracture of the West European continent.

The idea of a Europe "at different speeds" is actually ambiguous, because it is used both by convinced Europeans, who are tired of the blockages and want to advance within the Union, and by skeptical Europeans who have therein found an easy way to escape from the constraints of solidarity and joint effort.

So this idea should be used with a lot of reservations and only as a "dissuasive weapon" towards governments that think they can block the process of integration with impunity. If, when the first difficulty arose, everyone had decided not to look for a unanimous agreement, would a solution to the problem of the British contribution that would be valid for all the countries have been found at Fontainebleau?

Can it not also be maintained that with a "club" of 10 to 12 members it becomes more and more difficult for each member to have his own identity and to escape from the combined pressure of the others (with these "others," in the Council, able to turn the vote to the real majority or even to resort to the arbitration of the Court of Justice)?

The debate opposing these two sides cannot be resolved unless the political actors upon whom the future of European construction depends find a boldness which they are now singularly lacking.

By looking at all the challenges and needs of unity which the states of Western Europe are facing and without subscribing to any preconceived notions, immediate progress could be possible if the following were differentiated:

--The "central core" of integration which all member states must accept: the domestic market, which is part of the customs union and which implies the principle of Community preference, adherence to joint policies and rules and joint action toward outside countries. The PAC [Common Agricultural Policy] is obviously part of this central core, which means that the English problem must be solved within the community framework.

--The possibility of initiating new policies by resorting to community decision methods that are under the supervision of the Institutions, in the areas of electronics, transportation, aerospace and nuclear energy. Such actions could, depending on the specifics, involve only certain states. For example, the tunnel under the English Channel would clearly involve the Greeks less than the French and the British.

--Intergovernment cooperation, which could continue in the area of defense and would not necessarily fall under community auspices, as long as substantial progress has not been made toward the European Union. Could Denmark object to the initiation of a nuclear dialogue between France, Great Britain and Germany? This would be counter to the interests of Europe. Should the attempts to reactivate the Union of Western Europe, made during the parliamentary session of June 1984, be considered one of the paths to be explored so that two types of institutions designed to gradually evolve until they are joined as part of the European Union can temporarily co-exist?

The approach adopted by the European Parliament is inspired by such pragmatism because it proposed, in the final provisions of its draft treaty of February 1984, a procedure calling for the treaty to be implemented when at least half of the states representing two-thirds of the total EEC population will have given their consent.

On the basis of a renewed contract the European states will give themselves the possibility of continuing their progress. It could be wagered that under these conditions the "recalcitrant" states will not risk staying outside the movement.

The common interest that links the democratic countries of Europe appears more evident every day. To preserve their common values as a whole, to allow a global power to emerge, a partner of the United States within the Western world, the European states have no other choice than a constantly strengthened union. The rate at which this regrouping will take place and the form of this European union are currently being openly debated. Let us wager that the lessons of recent history will be able to inspire the builders of tomorrow's Europe and that none of them will be tempted by the melody of the easy way out and renunciation.

FOOTNOTES

1. Such as the reimbursement of Great Britain for part of its contribution to the 1984 budget, the setting up of a permanent financial correction system that would benefit London, the agreement on removing the ceiling on a country's own resources, the dismantling of positive compensatory amounts in Germany.
2. To cite only the most important of the documents made public:
 - Werner Report on the Monetary and Economic Union (1970)
 - Vedel Report on the Jurisdiction of the European Parliament (1972)
 - Resolution of the Paris Summit on the European Union (Oct 1972)
 - Tindemans Report on the European Union (Dec 1975)
 - Report of the "Three Wise Men" on the Institutions (Oct 1979)
 - Chandernagor Memorandum on the European Recovery (Oct 1981)
 - Resolution of the European Parliament on the European Union (Feb 1984)
3. Read "A Challenge for Europe," Michel Albert, 1984
4. Following the failure of the EDC (European Defense Community) on 30 August 1954, the ministers of foreign affairs of the 6 member states of the ECSC (European Coal and Steel Community) met in Messine on 1 June 1955 and asked P. H. Spaak to present to them a recovery project. The Spaak Committee, make up in particular of P. Uri, W. Hallstein, P. Delouvrier, M. Gaudet, Von der Groeben, colleagues of Jean Monnet at the High Authority of the ECSC, submitted its recommendation on 21 April 1956. On the basis of this document, which proposed the creation of two new communities, the EEC and Euratom, an intergovernmental conference was held in Venice on 29 May. On 25 March 1957 the two treaties were signed.
5. On the idea of "Europe at different speeds," see:
 - "In Favor of a Multilevel Architecture," P. Bernard-Reymond, LE MONDE, 12/14/1983.
 - Jacques Chirac's statements at Beziers on 4 June 1984: "The idea of a Europe at different speeds or with variable geometry is making progress."
 - Raymond Barre's interview with AFP on 5 June 1984: "A variable geometry Europe, which I have talked about since 1979.... This method cannot be used everywhere because it would be liable to dilute the community whole, but it can be used to overcome certain complex problems."
 - Francois Mitterrand's speech to the European Parliament on 24 May 1984: "Some have spoken of a 'Europe at different speeds' or 'with variable geometry.' This approach, which reflects a reality, is necessary. We will be careful to make it complementary to and not competitive with the central structure which remains the Community."

See also:

- "A New Approach," Paragraph 2 of the third part of the Tindemans Report on the European Union (Dec 1975)
- "The European Community: Decline or Renewal?" Report of the IFRI, Thierry de Montbrial and others, 1983, Points 5-12 to 5-16

CHIRAC ON EAST-WEST RELATIONS, DEFENSE, FOREIGN POLICY

Paris POLITIQUE INTERNATIONALE in French Autumn 84 pp 9-28

[Interview with Jacques Chirac, mayor of Paris, president of the RPR [Rally for the Republic], prime minister from 1974-1976, and author of "Treatise for France at the Moment of Choice," Stock, 1978; "The Glimmer of Hope," La Table Ronde, 1978; and "Yes to Europe," Albatros Publishers, 1974, among other works, by POLITIQUE INTERNATIONALE editor Catherine Clessis and Patrick Wajsman]

[Text] POLITIQUE INTERNATIONALE: Jacques Chirac, do you think it will be possible to turn communism back?

Jacques Chirac: I believe that communism has reached its apogee, and that over the long term, it is bound to ebb. This trend will be accompanied by tensions, risks and dangers, but it will inevitably come about. This is because there is a basic contradiction between the requirements of modern man, who needs more and more freedom and dignity, and the concrete expressions of communist totalitarianism. This ebb is being seen in the democratic countries. It is also evidenced in the nations subject to Marxist-Leninist dictatorship, as can be seen in Poland, where a national determination to reject this type of dictatorship, that is to say the will for independence and liberty, is being forcefully expressed.

POLITIQUE INTERNATIONALE: Could you explain the reasons that, in your view, communism is bound to lose force, in greater detail?

Jacques Chirac: Communism lives and prospers on the basis of a pole, which is the USSR. Now the fact is that this pole is seen ever decreasingly to be a model, for two reasons. The first is that thanks to the advance of the media, the international public today is much better informed than in the past about the true nature of the Soviet regime. This can be noted in our country in particular. The second reason is that the totally centralized and state-controlled system implemented in the Soviet Union leads to disastrous economic results, in particular with regard to the standard of living of the people. This too is realized throughout the world. From the example it represented in the eyes of many, the Soviet regime has become the very symbol of counterproductive effort.

One is naturally led to wonder if such a state of affairs will, one day or another, lead to consequences within the USSR itself. The existence of an

ever larger intelligentsia, the demographic growth among peoples of non-Russian origin, particularly the Moslems, scientific and technological advance (entailing a profound decentralization of the decision-making process), the penetration of foreign news sources, thanks to the satellites--won't all of this have the effect of forcing the Soviet regime into profound changes, whether desired or tolerated? This question, as you can see, involves too many diverse and complex factors to permit a certain answer. Do not forget that the Russian people have never experienced the democratic freedoms, and that because of this, their capacity for tolerance is considerable. This is the main trump the dictatorship established in the Kremlin holds.

POLITIQUE INTERNATIONALE: Is it a correct interpretation of your thinking to say that, even in Eastern Europe, you foresee a drastic upset in the long run?

Jacques Chirac: Absolutely. Europe today is cut in half, and the Berlin wall is the shameful symbol of this unnatural division. But I think it would be a most serious mistake to regard this division as irreversible, because the forces attracting Eastern Europe toward Western Europe will in the end triumph over those which keep it in the communist system. The Eastern European peoples are a part of the same civilization as we are. They have the same roots as we do. I do not believe that their forced allegiance to Moscow can be anything but an accident of history. But it is an accident which, because of the strategic rivalry between the two superpowers, may still last a long time. This is why free Europe must have a policy which takes the existence of Eastern Europe into account, and which is designed to develop dialogue with this temporarily captive part of Europe. Only dialogue can strengthen initiative and sustain the hopes of those behind the Iron Curtain who would like to rejoin Western Europe.

POLITIQUE INTERNATIONALE: Do we not risk psychological demobilization if we content ourselves with speculation on this development and continue calmly to believe in the virtue of detente with Moscow?

Jacques Chirac: That is a different problem. I am in favor of detente with the Soviet Union. But that is not conceivable unless the West shows itself to be strong and determined, which in the past has not always been the case. This is why I approve, among other things, of the deployment of the Pershing and cruise missiles in certain parts of Western Europe, as a response to the Soviet SS-20s, and I am pleased, as I have already said, that France has given its support to this step. This is also why I fervently hope that we will increase our own deterrent resources. Faced with the gigantic Soviet rearmament effort, the West has no choice but to obtain the means of reestablishing the balance of forces.

POLITIQUE INTERNATIONALE: Unless we misunderstand, you do not seem much in favor of the theses of Samuel Pisar, who claims that East-West exchange, East-West trade, will suffice to liberalize Soviet society by imbuing it with our values.

Jacques Chirac: No, I do not believe in that theory. I think that these are angelic concepts marked with the stamp of innocence. This is true despite

the fact that they are often intellectually attractive. In speculating on the ideological development of the USSR, one overlooks two basic factors.

First of all, there is no free body of public opinion which can influence the government leaders in the USSR. Therefore, one should not, in the foreseeable future, invest too much hope in the idea that the base level, influenced by Western values, can exert decisive pressure on the summit and force it to change.

Secondly, the basic benefit the Soviet government leaders derive from their trade with the West goes to the military sector. The defense industry, because it is disciplined and has a hierarchic structure, is the only one in the USSR which "works" properly.

In short, the increase in exchange with Moscow results in the strengthening, rather than the weakening, of the communist system. But understand me clearly: I am not on principle opposed to trade with the East. I simply note that it is an illusion to expect political results from these economic relations, which they are by their nature incapable of producing.

As you can see, I do not espouse the theses defended by some in Ronald Reagan's entourage either. They urge that all economic relations with the East should be interrupted. This would be absurd from the point of view of development of international assets, and it would on top of that work against the detente which I have urged, because it would deprive the Eastern European countries of the aid we can give them. It is necessary simply to be sure that this exchange does not provide the USSR with the means, particularly in terms of advanced technology, of strengthening its military potential. Nothing more and nothing less.

POLITIQUE INTERNATIONALE: Are you then opposed to sanctions?

Jacques Chirac: Tell me of a single case in which they have been effective! Foreign relations should not be impassioned or emotional. Economic relations are inevitably influenced by political relations, but a drastic suspension of economic relations is hard to contemplate in today's world. The USSR exists and its regime is what it is: this must indeed be taken into account! Moreover, sanctions are never strictly implemented. Didn't the United States increase its exports of grain to the USSR at the very time it was urging Europeans to withhold advanced technology from the USSR?

POLITIQUE INTERNATIONALE: At the most, this is a condemnation of the American attitude in this specific case. But not sanctions in general....

Jacques Chirac: In any case, this is a condemnation of the ability of the democratic West to decree sanctions in an effective way. I would add that even if we were in a position to enforce such sanctions, it would be wrong for us to do so. Far from weakening the central Soviet power, it would strengthen it, by making of it a martyr in the eyes of its own people. A people banished from the international community always tends to rally around its leaders.

But do not misinterpret my thoughts: in no way do I challenge the well-founded Western policy of refusal to supply Soviet Russia, within the framework of the COCOM, with equipment or technology contributing to the modernization of its weaponry.

POLITIQUE INTERNATIONALE: What then, with all the errors already committed, should the West do to resist the USSR?

Jacques Chirac: There are two types of situation. In Afghanistan, for example, the USSR will only be forced to retreat with great difficulty, and as a last resort. All that we Westerners can do is to provide direct or indirect aid to the resistance movements, but without placing too much hope therein.

POLITIQUE INTERNATIONALE: We should aid them and make this known?

Jacques Chirac: That is not a certainty. There are some actions which benefit from secrecy. Where the countries which are not adjacent to the USSR are concerned, whether it be in Latin America, the Middle East or Africa, the situation is different. There the USSR pushes its pawns, taking advantage of local conflicts and the expansionist desires of certain nations, and indeed the errors sometimes committed by the Western nations. Now in these countries, the Soviets see the possibility of failure, and are prepared for it. Therefore, the West should oppose their expansionist maneuvers there much more vigorously than it is doing. In all these parts of the world, the West should take a firm attitude. In other words there must be vigorous and consistent diplomacy, backed by effective means of intervention.

POLITIQUE INTERNATIONALE: Let us be specific. Let us take the case of Lebanon, for example.

Jacques Chirac: The case of Lebanon is special and complex in nature because of the fact that this country has been the victim both of a civil war and of two foreign interventions in its territory. The situation of this unfortunate country had already for a number of years been steadily deteriorating, and the Western nations, including France, watched that deterioration without taking action when there was still time to act effectively. When they decided to send troops it was already too late. The presence of these so-called intermediary forces may indeed be a useful response to humanitarian demands, but it certainly could not reestablish the independence and integrity of Lebanon. Then these contingents were withdrawn under rather shameful conditions, and not, moreover, before substantial losses had been suffered. The result for the West, and for the United States in particular, has been a loss of prestige in the Middle East as a whole. This loss of prestige is very obviously to the advantage of the Soviet Union, which is supplying Syria with modern weaponry.

Let us not be dreamers. The Western powers involved, and France in particular, could not have sent a powerful expeditionary corps to Lebanon, capable of forcing the withdrawal of foreign troops and establishing peace in the country. None of these Western governments would have had the support of

public opinion for thus embarking upon major and costly military operations. And there is the proof that time lost is never regained. Let us learn the lesson thus taught.

POLITIQUE INTERNATIONALE: Now let us take, if you will, the example of another theater of operations, one which is also located very far from the USSR--Indochina. What can and should the Western camp do to make the Soviets and Vietnamese cease to make use of the Indochinese peninsula?

Jacques Chirac: I am indeed afraid that there the situation is irreversible. Why? Because the Tripartite Front (Son Sann, Sihanouk, the Khmer Rouge) is faced with major difficulties. What can be done, however, is to continue to support the moderate faction of the tripartite anti-Vietnamese government, and also, to strengthen the defense capacity of the frontier countries in the ASEAN. That having been said, I have difficulty seeing the West intervening directly on the Indochinese peninsula, and I do not believe that China has the means to do so.

POLITIQUE INTERNATIONALE: In the light of this rather pessimistic analysis, what according to you should be the nature of our relations with communist Vietnam?

Jacques Chirac: Here again the extremists suggest interrupting all relations with Hanoi. For my part, I would be more cautious. Vietnam is a country in which we have interests and in which there are still numerous French-speaking people. I do not believe that with regard to them, a worst-case policy should be pursued. But these political relations with Hanoi should come within a context which does not create difficulties with Beijing.

POLITIQUE INTERNATIONALE: What do you think of the thesis of the French socialists who say that French aid to Vietnam gives it a means of releasing itself from the grip of the USSR? Don't you fear that on the contrary, by offering inadequate aid to the regime in Hanoi, one might be contributing to legitimizing it?

Jacques Chirac: We have interests to safeguard in Vietnam, as I have just reminded you, and I continue to think that we should maintain political relations with the regime in Hanoi.

POLITIQUE INTERNATIONALE: The socialists also justify their aid to the revolutionaries in the Third World by the statement that revolutions are not the product of Soviet manipulation, but quite simply the fruit of a miserable economic environment. Is that your feeling?

Jacques Chirac: Where Central America is concerned, in any case, two factors exist: the revolutions there are the result both of the many-faceted intervention of the Soviets and human misery. There is no incompatibility between these two factors. Quite the contrary. And if the Americans had not so often supported regimes in the Caribbean region which are hardly reputable from the point of view of respect for the rights of man, Marxist revolution would not have developed there as easily, either.

This does not mean that one should underestimate Soviet-Cuban intervention in Central America.

POLITIQUE INTERNATIONALE: Agreed. But don't you think that it is often difficult for the West to find "made-to-measure" allies? Don't you believe that in this imperfect world in which we live, it is still better to support pro-Western autocratic regimes rather than leave the door open for Marxist revolutions?

Jacques Chirac: That kind of thesis is too schematic, if only because there are, in the Latin American countries, Christian democratic forces which the Americans have never really supported. It was often more convenient for Washington to support the dictators in power. That being the case, Central America is in a way the "back yard" of the United States, its fourth frontier, its sphere of influence, and a basic factor in its security. And it is for the United States to decide what it should do there, not for us.

POLITIQUE INTERNATIONALE: Don't you think, however, that Europe is more interested than it appears to be in what is happening in this region? In reality, it seems that the Soviets are seeking by their maneuvers to destroy stability, to "focus" American power in the Caribbean, such as to hinder Washington's freedom of action everywhere else in the world, particularly in Europe.

Jacques Chirac: I do not share that view for the following reason. The intervention the United States may be led to adopt in the Caribbean region is very different in nature from the type of intervention which might be undertaken to come to the aid of Europe, should that be necessary.

POLITIQUE INTERNATIONALE: In a military sense, you are right. But politically, ~~one might fear that on the day when the Americans have to take up arms to fight for their own security south of the Rio Grande, Europe will no longer be of much interest to them.~~

Jacques Chirac: If you are referring to the development of isolationist or unilateral tendencies in the United States, I must tell you that they do not concern me excessively. This is because on the one hand they remain a minority phenomenon, and on the other, because they only involve politicians, and not the American government leaders. Any president of the United States, be he a Democrat or a Republican, knows that a strong and respected America cannot be sustained if Western Europe is subjugated.

POLITIQUE INTERNATIONALE: A moment ago you said that the United States would have been well-advised to play the Christian democratic "card" in Latin America more often. That may be. But how would you answer those who point out to you that in black Africa, France has rarely raised these ethical issues, and has never ceased to support tyrants just as disreputable as those in the Caribbean region?

Jacques Chirac: I am not very certain what regime you mean, at least where French-speaking Africa is concerned. Frankly, I do not think that one can

find there regimes as oppressive as that of Somoza in Nicaragua was, for example. And that is true even in the single-party countries.

POLITIQUE INTERNATIONALE: Bokassa was not particularly reputable.

Jacques Chirac: Bokassa was a kind of accident, it is true. But in a country like Gabon, for example, you will not find a single political prisoner, while torture and executions proceed blithely in Ethiopia! Be that as it may, I think that, beyond these particular cases, it is wrong to seek to impose democratic systems, from outside, on countries which are not ready to assimilate them.

POLITIQUE INTERNATIONALE: Let us turn to the Persian Gulf crisis. But first of all, tell us what country in the Middle East seems to you the most important from a geopolitical viewpoint.

Jacques Chirac: I do not think one can say there is one single key country. There are in reality several countries essential to the free world in this zone. Without any doubt, Turkey, and another important country is Iraq. It goes without saying that a victory for Khomeyni's Iran over Iraq, which I do not for my part regard as likely, would deal a harsh blow to the liberal camp. This is because of the threat to oil supplies, but also because of the risk of instability in the whole region which such an outcome would entail. But can one overlook the importance of Syria, Saudi Arabia or Israel? And what can we say about Egypt?

POLITIQUE INTERNATIONALE: Do you not however have the feeling that, entirely apart from its present regime, Iran as such as such represents the geopolitical pivot of the region?

Jacques Chirac: You know, since geopolitics was discovered, one hears of nothing else! The truth is that there are also men, passions and tangible realities. You will remember that when Imam Khomeyni sought asylum in France, ~~the majority of the geopoliticians~~ failed to realize the depth of the commitment of the people of Iran to the Khomeyni doctrine. And this blindness was the more reprehensible since the competent "Iranologists" had warned against what might happen and against what was, in the final analysis, a serious error on the part of France. (I mean the fact that it offered its hospitality to Imam Khomeyni on French soil, while allowing him freedom of expression, contrary to the rules governing the right of asylum.)

POLITIQUE INTERNATIONALE: In the conflict between Iran and Iraq, what specifically should the West do? Should it continue to arm Iraq? Should it try to unseat Khomeyni? Should it intervene directly?

Jacques Chirac: The best attitude should without a doubt be one avoiding direct interference, paralleled by both moral and material support of Iraq. This is, moreover, the attitude adopted by the majority of the Arab countries. And it is also the wise and realistic attitude the French government has chosen.

POLITIQUE INTERNATIONALE: Does it seem to you that the main danger hovering over the Gulf is the "pincer" operation in which the Soviets are engaging (Afghanistan, South Yemen, Ethiopia, Lebanon), or is it instead the fundamentalist Shiite deployment?

Jacques Chirac: Two dangers which are different in nature but which nonetheless pose a threat to the vital interests of the West in a politically and economically very sensitive region cannot be compared. The important thing is to see both the one and the other clearly, to do what is necessary to limit their effects and to direct future developments.

POLITIQUE INTERNATIONALE: But what in your view is the precise plan the Soviets are pursuing in this zone?

Jacques Chirac: Nothing would be more risky than to try to state what the goals of the Soviet Union in this region are, and I would refrain from engaging in guessing games or gratuitous statements. What one can say with something like certainty is that the Soviets regard the Middle East as sufficiently close to their frontier to require their presence and action there. Also, in their eyes, no settlement of the problems arising in this region should be made without their participation, and they are pushing their advantages there, with greater or lesser success, moreover, whenever the opportunity arises.

The question is what role is played in the decisions made by the Kremlin by defensive concerns inspired by a kind of siege mentality; what role is played by expansionist intentions; and finally, what role is played by the desire to offset the diplomatic actions and the military presence of the Western nations, in particular the United States. For it does indeed seem to me that all of these play a part in the policy pursued by the USSR in the Middle East and Afghanistan.

In connection with Afghanistan specifically, one might claim that the Soviet military intervention has no purpose other than to protect the Muslim republics of the USSR from the effects of the Islamic wave. The fact nonetheless remains that we are witnessing a campaign for conquest and subjugation which, if it succeeds, would enlarge the Soviet empire, would bring its frontiers closer to the Indian Ocean and would increase the weight of the influence of Moscow and its potential for exerting pressure on neighboring countries, in particular Iran and Pakistan. This is thus a very serious matter and one likely to have very serious future consequences. However I make all this conditional, for nothing is decided, so much remains to be seen.

POLITIQUE INTERNATIONALE: Let us return to the Gulf. Do you believe that a blockade of the Strait of Hormuz would constitute a *casus belli*?

Jacques Chirac: If such a step were taken, the Western nations should proceed with a joint military action to guarantee the free passage of vessels through this strategic strait. It is in no way certain that this action would lead to real hostilities with anyone at all.

POLITIQUE INTERNATIONALE: Two questions: First, do you favor the establishment of a European rapid intervention force in the Gulf, and second, are you among those who urge the installation of permanent Western land bases in this region?

Jacques Chirac: I am absolutely opposed to the establishment of permanent Western bases in the Gulf region. This would create useless risks for the countries accepting such bases. The battle for influence in which the Russians and the Americans are opposed in this region should not lead either one or the other into uselessly provocative acts of a sort which would lead to chain reactions, reactions which would likely be difficult to control.

As to your first question, it seems to me highly desirable for the major Western European nations who so desire and who have the means to act jointly and, if necessary, in cooperation with our allies on the other side of the Atlantic, to guarantee the defense of their vital interests. Moreover, this is not true only for the Gulf region, because there are other parts of the world in which the European nations to which I refer have an obligation to intervene.

POLITIQUE INTERNATIONALE: What do you think of the Israeli thesis to the effect that the West should maintain its "leverage" in Iran in order to prepare for the post-Khomeyni era?

Jacques Chirac: To speak frankly, I am not convinced that the Israelis are helping Iran today for the sole purpose of preparing for the post-Khomeyni era! I believe that this is dictated above all by an impassioned instinct which leads them to aid the enemy (Iran) of their enemy (Iraq). In my opinion, this is a historical error.

Unfortunately, it is not only the Israelis who are contributing aid to Iran. There are also Syria, Libya and even European countries which thus hope to "situate themselves" for the post-Khomeyni era. It seems to me that instead of building castles in the air and dreaming of the post-Khomeyni era, these countries would do well to concern themselves with the Khomeyni movement! Good sense demands that one be able to establish priorities. On that basis, we should devote ourselves to making it clearly understood that we feel no hostility toward the Iranian nation and its people, with whom we hope, when the time comes, to be able to reestablish trusting and friendly relations such as those which have traditionally existed between our two nations in the past.

POLITIQUE INTERNATIONALE: Let us turn now to the Palestinian question. In this connection we would like to ask you two simple questions. First, do you favor a real Palestinian state, and next, can one conceive of such a state which would not be dominated by the PLO?

Jacques Chirac: I think first of all that the Palestinians have a right to self-determination, and that they have the right to have a fatherland. This has always been the position of France, and it seems to me just and wise.

That being the case, it seems to me that an error has been made in regarding everything which was not the PLO, in terms of representation, as nonexistent. For in this way, the possibility of negotiation and compromise was cut off. Moreover, too often the nature of the PLO has been viewed schematically. In reality it is a complex organization which includes various factions and is by nature a confederation.

No one can challenge the representational aspect of the PLO, but in my view, it should not be regarded as exclusive representation. The proof is that the King of Jordan recently reactivated another representational group, that of the Palestinian parliamentarians in the occupied territories, whose qualification to speak on behalf of the Palestinians is also beyond challenge.

In order to answer your question more specifically, I would say that what has been called the "Reagan plan"/* opened the way toward realistic objectives, despite the fact that it did not, most unfortunately, include the concept of self-determination for the Palestinians.

I am sorry that Israel blocked any possibility of realizing the potential of this "Reagan Plan." But I note that despite this, a positive development can increasingly be seen in the Arab world. There is no lack of indications of this development: the Fez summit meeting, in which Yasser Arafat participated, almost recognized the de facto existence of the Jewish state. As to the King of Morocco, you will recall that he organized a great symposium several months ago for the Moroccan Jewish community, to which numerous Israeli notables representing various sectors, including the Likud, were invited. All of this shows that things "are moving" and that we must not limit ourselves to fixed schematics.

POLITIQUE INTERNATIONALE: You have noted that the PLO is not a monolithic organization. That is true. But the "moderates" in the PLO are still being eliminated politically or liquidated physically.

Jacques Chirac: It is in the nature of a revolutionary movement to continue eliminating its own moderates! And this is not true only for the Palestinian movement.

The fact nonetheless remains that the present leading faction in the PLO seems to be moving toward greater realism than was the case in the past.

POLITIQUE INTERNATIONALE: Don't you have the feeling that the present moderation of the PLO derives basically from its weakened state? Plainly speaking, don't you think that this moderation is more "tolerated" than "desired?"

Jacques Chirac: That is not impossible.

* In the "Reagan Plan," the President of the United States urged "self-government for the Palestinians on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip in association with Jordan."

POLITIQUE INTERNATIONALE: One sometimes gets the impression that the Arab states talk more about a PLO state which they do not really desire, some because they fear the development of a "new Cuba" in the Middle East, and others because the existence of such a state would be a threat to their regional ambitions. Do you share this impression?

Jacques Chirac: One cannot speak as you do of the "Arab states" as a single entity expressing a common desire. The Arab nations are divided. Each defends its interests. As to the position of each of these states on the problem of a sovereign Palestinian entity, I think as you do that there are at least reservations. From this point of view, the attitude of King Hussein of Jordan seems to me entirely realistic, as was that of King Fahd at the time of the Fez summit meeting.

POLITIQUE INTERNATIONALE: If the Arab leaders were at least "somewhat in favor" of a Palestinian nation, they would not be conscientiously massacring the PLO combatants every 10 years.

Jacques Chirac: It is true that this Palestinian problem is not that of Israel alone! But in this bloody confrontation, I see an additional reason for giving the Palestinians their own land.

POLITIQUE INTERNATIONALE: A land or a veritable state?

Jacques Chirac: Please let us not get entangled in the semantic argument which has already been mainly responsible for the cooling of positions on both sides. I only hope that the Palestinian people can enjoy self-determination and have a land in which they can truly feel at home. As to the juridical-political form which this national phenomenon should eventually take, that is something else. But what I am certain of is that this inevitable development will require an agreement with Jordan.

The Israeli-Palestinian issue is complex and impassioned. Why attempt at all costs to reduce it to a quarrel of words? Personally, I believe in a more pragmatic approach. It is out of a sociological rapprochement among the various actors in this drama that the solution will arise, and certainly not out of foreign intervention seeking to impose concepts or theories on the local reality.

POLITIQUE INTERNATIONALE: How do you see the reaction of the Israelis, who refuse to negotiate with a PLO whose charter calls for the physical liquidation of the Jewish state?

Jacques Chirac: Here again we do battle with words. To be sure, the assertion that the state of Israel--like Carthage!--must be destroyed is an absurdity which no one could tolerate. And from this point of view, this provision in the national Palestinian charter must be condemned. But I believe that it is a question here in reality of a completely obsolete element. The proof is that in the Fez summit statement, to which I have just referred, the right of all the states in the region--and thus Israel as well, was recognized.

POLITIQUE INTERNATIONALE: If this provision in the charter is really as obsolete as you suggest, why do the PLO leaders stubbornly insist on reasserting, at regular intervals, that the destruction of the Jewish state remains their sacred goal?

Jacques Chirac: It is entirely evident that as soon as a reconciliation process is initiated, this clause in the PLO Charter will have to be solemnly rejected by the Palestinians and replaced by official recognition of the state of Israel, in good and proper form. And if you want me to tell you my frank opinion, well then, I am convinced that the Palestinians will do this!

The persistent denial of the state of Israel is the last card the Palestinians have to play. They will certainly abandon it within the framework of an overall agreement.

POLITIQUE INTERNATIONALE: It would not be because of solemn recognition of a state that one would promise never to declare war on it.

Jacques Chirac: I recognize the sound basis of your comment.

POLITIQUE INTERNATIONALE: The PLO did not wait until the Israelis occupied Arab territories in 1967 to make the destruction of the Jewish state one of its official goals. Ought one not fear, under such conditions, that the thesis of "liquidating Zionism" is more, in the minds of the Palestinian leaders, than a propaganda tool or a simple diplomatic "card"?

Jacques Chirac: No. It is normal for each party to set forth its goals and ambitions. The whole problem is whether subsequently one can achieve a viable compromise. The Herut, which is the active faction of the Likud, has always said that Judea and Samaria are integral parts of Israel, and that there could be no question of surrendering them to anyone at all. Does this mean that no Israeli government will ever alter these assertions? I do not think so. It is classic for each of the parties involved in a conflict, aware that it must negotiate at some future time, to begin by setting the bar rather high. This is true for both the Herut and the PLO. To take the maximalist assertions of either party literally would be unreasonable.

POLITIQUE INTERNATIONALE: Do you think that the USSR should necessarily be involved in any peace settlement in the Near East?

Jacques Chirac: It is very obvious that the best solution would be for the nations in the Middle East to find the path for peace among themselves. This is hard to imagine, because of their divisions and their weaknesses, which make all of them the clients of the great powers, neither one of which can be unconcerned about so vital a region. In addition, one can wonder if the USSR does not have an interest in seeing the conflicts in this region prolonged. This is to show you that I am not very optimistic in the short run.

POLITIQUE INTERNATIONALE: Let us change the subject. You have often come out in favor of truly European defense. What concrete content do you assign such a proposal?

Jacques Chirac: Here we are dealing, as you know, with a subject which is taboo. One must first be very cautious. Within what context is this problem situated? Western Europe makes a major contribution to its own defense, but its security nonetheless depends to a very great extent on American conventional and nuclear forces, as the Euromissile business in particular reveals. In addition, some European countries are making an inadequate military effort. And finally, the armies of the various European nations are too often equipped with disparate weaponry. Thus priority attention must be focused such as to make what is called the European pillar of the Atlantic alliance more solid. Put in another way, the Western European nations must participate more effectively and more consistently in their own security than they are currently doing.

POLITIQUE INTERNATIONALE: How should this be done?

Jacques Chirac: In order for Western Europe to become a power with greater mastery of itself in terms of defense, three paths should be explored. I will only sketch them.

First of all, all the countries of Western Europe which are members of the Atlantic alliance, without exception, must demonstrate their will to defend themselves by devoting a greater part of their budgetary allocations to the improvement of their defense capacity.

Secondly, it is essential that the Western European nations produce more and more weapons jointly.

Thirdly, in the dangerous world in which we live, political agreement and military cooperation are inseparable. Thus if what is wanted is to strengthen the European pillar of the Atlantic alliance, it seems to me essential that the Western European nations, beginning with the leading ones, make it a habit to consult closely on all matters affecting their basic interests, which very obviously include defense problems, whether within or outside Europe. The objective they should pursue is to make their joint concerns felt, with increased authority, in the definition of the major strategic choices on which the future of the free world depends and which, for the time being, depend to an excessive extent on the desires and responsibility of our American allies. Let us not forget, in fact, that the defense of Europe is a part of a worldwide strategy concerning which the Europeans have had, in my opinion, too limited a right of inspection, which should be broadened. I am convinced that this is the real direction for strengthening the political and military cooperation of the European nations. What I suggest, therefore, is a rebalancing of responsibilities within the framework of the defense of the free world. The problem will be to persuade the Americans that it is quite as much in their interest as in that of the Europeans to undertake this rebalancing. The Western European nations will be the more successful in so doing, the more united and determined they show themselves to be in this context.

POLITIQUE INTERNATIONALE: Does the idea of a purely European nuclear force seem conceivable to you?

Jacques Chirac: Given the current state of affairs, no. To make this feasible, it would be necessary to have made such progress on the political level that the idea seems to me inconceivable now.

POLITIQUE INTERNATIONALE: Particularly since such a force would necessarily have to have as its point of departure nuclear cooperation between the only two European powers which already have atomic weapons--France and Great Britain. Now such cooperation would meet with considerable obstacles.

Jacques Chirac: That is true. That being the case, an increase in the French and English nuclear capacity might make it possible to imagine, within the European context, a concept of the use of atomic weapons different from that we know today, one which would allow us perhaps to participate in the security of the Old Continent more effectively. But we are not there yet.

POLITIQUE INTERNATIONALE: What do you think of the thesis which holds that the United States should withdraw the military personnel stationed in Europe in order to make the Europeans face up to their responsibilities?

Jacques Chirac: I absolutely do not believe this theory is well-founded, and I do not think that any American government, whatever it might be, could take the risk of espousing it.

POLITIQUE INTERNATIONALE: What in your view is the main threat hanging over the members of the alliance today? Accidental nuclear war? A fatal chain reaction which might start in a peripheral theater? A conventional war on the Old Continent?

Jacques Chirac: The real danger is that our old Europe, situated in the shadow of Soviet military superiority, might find itself gradually pushed toward excessive diplomatic docility toward the Kremlin. This is probably what the Russians hope for in trying to separate Europe from its allies on the other side of the Atlantic, without having to conquer it physically.

In my view, the SS-20s have no other purpose but this.

POLITIQUE INTERNATIONALE: A word about Germany. Do you think that the Germans can accept a certain sort of neutralization in exchange for the hope of reunification? In short, do you believe in the possibility of a neutralized and reunified Germany in the heart of Europe?

Jacques Chirac: That the Germans hope for reunification is undeniable. But from that to believing that a German government would accept self-neutralization in order to realize that hope there is a step which I cannot take.

POLITIQUE INTERNATIONALE: Do you favor the broadening of the geographic field of the alliance? And in particular, do you believe that Japan should be affiliated with this alliance?

Jacques Chirac: As I have just said, I favor taking the overall nature of the security of the free world into account when it comes to the role that the European nations should play in the establishment of the strategic

choices governing that overall nature (of which the defense of Europe is a basic element). On the other hand, I oppose an extension of the Atlantic alliance, whether of its zone of implementation or membership for a country like Japan, which has nothing to do with the Atlantic. Our commitments should remain what they are, for the obligations they involve for the Western European countries are too heavy (if these countries want, as I hope they do, to meet them fully) to add to the weight. Not to mention the cases in which these same European countries might have to intervene outside of Europe, in order to deal with situations directly affecting their vital interests, as I have already mentioned.

POLITIQUE INTERNATIONALE: Do you think that, in order to strengthen its position with regard to the USSR, Europe should play the Chinese "card" more boldly?

Jacques Chirac: I think that the development of links between Paris and Beijing is very desirable for all sorts of reasons, of which the establishment of a just balance of forces in the world is not the least.

POLITIQUE INTERNATIONALE: The idea of arming China, then, does not seem unreasonable to you?

Jacques Chirac: This is obviously not the only aspect to the cooperation which should be established with People's China. It is a matter of the circumstances and methods chosen.

POLITIQUE INTERNATIONALE: Henry Kissinger says that the threat of Soviet expansionism hovers more over China than over Europe. Is that your feeling?

Jacques Chirac: I am in principle very cautious about this kind of comparison, and as I have already told you in connection with the Middle East, I refuse to engage in guessing games or gratuitous statements about the deeper intentions of the Kremlin.

POLITIQUE INTERNATIONALE: Would it be a corollary to this analysis to state that you believe that the antagonism between Moscow and Beijing will be eternal?

Jacques Chirac: Yes, I believe it will. The conflict is first and foremost a clash of empires, which is dictated by history and geography. There may be ups and downs but in my view it will inevitably endure. And this eternal nature should, it seems to me, further clarify our view of the triangular Washington-Moscow-Beijing interplay.

POLITIQUE INTERNATIONALE: Do you have the feeling that your view of the international reality has changed or developed in the past 10 years?

Jacques Chirac: The changes in the international reality require that men with a sense of responsibility adapt their view of the world to these changes. I am no exception to this rule. Now the world has profoundly altered in the course of recent years. The giant Soviet rearmament effort,

the awakening of the United States, the multiplication or aggravation of conflicts in the Middle East, in Asia, in Africa and in Central America, the stagnation of the building of Europe, the world spread of economic relations of all sorts within the free world--this is a series of events and phenomena which have led me to see that we are living in a world which is both invisible and dangerous.

I draw two conclusions from this realization. The first is that France must be strong and determined, Europe more united and the relations with our allies and partners in the free world raised to their proper level. The second conclusion is that there could not be any real detente in the world without a balance of forces, most particularly in Europe.

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REPORT ON PCF VISIT TO JAPANESE COMMUNIST PARTY

Paris CAHIERS DU COMMUNISME in French Oct 84 pp 67-71

[Article by Max Zins]

[Text] A political delegation from the PCF [French Communist Party], headed by Maxime Gremetz, member of the Politburo and secretary of the Central Committee, visited Japan from 26 to 29 August 1984, at the invitation of the Japanese Communist Party*. The last visit by a political delegation from the PCF to Japan took place in 1976, when Georges Marchais went to Japan. At this time, when there is a great deal of talk about the emergence of Japan and of the entire Pacific area on the world scene, we can say that this visit had at least three major objectives: to help to expand relations between the PCF and PCJ [Japanese Communist Party]; to establish contacts between French communists and Japanese peace movements; and to obtain a better understanding of the real situation in Japan.

A Feeling of Similarity

One full day was spent in discussions with the PCJ delegation led by Hiroshi Tachiki, member of the permanent presidium of the Central Committee, who is in charge of the foreign policy section of the PCJ**. There was a meeting with the top official of the PCJ, Tetsuzo Fuwa, chairman of the presidium of the Central Committee, who met at length with the PCF delegation; and a

* The PCF delegation also included Max Zins, member of the foreign policy section, and Laurent Ballouhey, L'HUMANITE correspondent in China.

** The PCJ delegation also consisted of the comrades Shoji Nihara, member of the presidium of the Central Committee, and Yasuo Ogata, member of the Central Committee.

series of meetings with the federal leadership of the Hiroshima prefecture. In 3 days, the two parties "worked overtime" in order to enhance their understanding of their situations and reciprocal policies, and to share their experiences, thus filling in gaps in the period during which there were no opportunities for such high-level and indepth talks. To use the expression of Tetsuzo Fuwa, the visit by the PCF delegation gave a new impetus to the development of relations between the two parties. The warmth of the discussions, and the fraternity and quality of the welcome given by the Japanese communists to their French comrades were shown throughout the entire visit. And at the end of the PCF delegation's visit, the chairman of the presidium of the Central Committee of the PCJ accepted the invitation from the PCF leadership to visit France.

We must say that a French communist going to Japan for the first time finds a sort of feeling of similarity between the Japanese party and his own party. There are many things distinguishing Japan from France, but the existence in both countries of a highly developed form of capitalism certainly leaves a strong enough imprint so that the two parties are fighting in an economic, political, and ideological environment with many analogies.

From this point of view, a day spent in Hiroshima accompanied by communists from the federation, and in particular the first secretary, a metalworker from the Mazda automobile plant, left us with the memory of a party that, on a day-to-day basis, operates in a way relatively close to our own. This came as no small surprise in a country located almost at the opposite end of the earth from France!

The PCJ, founded in 1922, now has slightly fewer than 500,000 members. Of its members, 47 percent are women, which speaks volumes about Japanese women's desire for change. Women in Japan suffer more from the economic crisis and from inequalities in male-female relations than do Frenchwomen. A large part of the activities of the Japanese communists is devoted to the dissemination of the PCJ's central organ: AKAHATA. Every morning before work, 4 million copies are slipped under doors or in mailboxes of subscribers by teams of party workers, neighborhood by neighborhood, street by street. To use the example of the Hiroshima federation, which is roughly comparable in demographic terms to our largest federation, about 20 full-time workers devote much of their time to the organization of this distribution. In addition to the members' dedication which this supposes, we can use this as a yardstick to measure the

real party organizing role of the PCJ's central organ, and the importance which the Japanese communists assign to this activity. We should note, though, that this work takes place in an environment much more conducive to reading than exists in France. In Japan every day people read many more newspapers, magazines, and books than in France, which lags behind the rest of the advanced capitalist countries in this area.

Political Trends

In terms of its impact on elections, the PCJ receives 10 to 11 percent of the votes. The rightist party in power, Mr Nakasone's liberal party, represents about 50 percent. The socialist party, 20 percent; and the Buddhist party (Komei), 10 percent. The remainder is shared primarily by several small reactionary and social-democratic parties. But beyond the figures, it is amazing to see the degree of similarity between some Japanese and French political trends.

The PCJ, which started from a very low level right after World War II, became more important at the end of the 1960s. At the start of the 1970s, the other political forces could no longer pretend to ignore it. As a comparison, just as in France when the bourgeoisie was confronted by the events of May 1968 and began to wonder how best to deal with the situation, in Japan in the early 1970s, the dominant social class and groups had to deal with the communist phenomenon. It was at this time that their counter-offensive strategy began to be used. At this point we have to be struck by the similarities between the situations of the two countries; we must remember that in Japan, just as in France, a number of western leaders have been meeting, exchanging views, and comparing their experiences. They have met either secretly or publicly, and must certainly have made use of the most diverse opportunities presented to them, ranging from the Socialist International meeting in Vienna in 1972 to the Trilateral Commission meetings in 1975 and 1984, to share their views and methods of action.

In an early phase, the socialist party in Japan decided to ally itself with the PCJ in a leftist coalition. That lasted until 1976. That year, right after the legislative elections in which the right emerged victorious, the socialist party decided to break up the coalition--as the PCJ delegation explained to us--and moved toward a new alliance on their right, in this case with the Komei party. Since that time, according to the Japanese communists, this movement has further amplified, and is now beginning to involve relations between the socialist party and the liberal-democratic party.

Today, as our Japanese comrades explained to us, the PCJ is up against the attempts of all the other major parties, either to reduce it or to force it to abandon its class positions. To do this, the Japanese delegation told us, any weapon seems to be considered good and suitable for use:

- a. There has been a campaign of disparagement directed against the party's policy and its leaders. Malicious and slanderous accusations were made against the person of the former party leader, Kenji Miyamoto. He had to go to court, which decided in his favor, but still the air of falsehood and rumor lingers on.
- b. There has been systematic distortion of the party's positions by the media. The PCJ is accused of "sectarism" or dogmatism, in both its internal and external positions.
- c. There has been an upsurge in authoritarianism (the upper levels of the Japanese bourgeoisie, which does not have the marvelous political tool of the French-style presidential system, gerrymanders election districts, revises election laws by banning door-to-door canvassing during election campaigns, limiting the dissemination of political leaflets, restricting the number of cars carrying loudspeakers that candidates may use, etc.).

The Memory of Hiroshima

This slow rightward drift in Japanese politics, this attempt to isolate the PCJ, are accompanied in external affairs by a policy that is more and more coming to be aligned on U.S. policy in matters of defense. The Williamsburg summit held in 1983 made this clear; it has led to a sort of integration of Japan in the western defense system. Increasing pressures are being exerted by the United States to induce Japan to expand its military participation, develop weapons (in violation of its Constitution), and to serve as a sort of regional policeman. The Nakasone government, our comrades told us, is inclined to go along with this. This is certainly a highly dangerous phenomenon for this part of the world, one which seriously threatens a number of countries in the area.

The Japanese government, though, has run into the obstacle of public opinion, which is strongly influenced by the memory of the atom bombs dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. The PCF delegation was able to see this during its trip to Japan.

The PCF delegation wanted to visit Hiroshima. The delegation was greeted at the mayor's office by the city's deputy mayor. He apologized for the mayor's absence, who was away on a trip, thanked the PCF delegation for its visit, for the wreath of flowers it had placed at the memorial to the more than 100,000 victims killed in the flash of a second, and for the support its actions have given to the cause of peace and the campaign against nuclear weapons. We should note that the mayor of Hiroshima is a member of the Japanese conservative party.

Still in Hiroshima, with the same significance, the head of the hospital where over 100 victims of radiation sickness are still being treated wanted to accompany our delegation when it went to greet a patient. One of the hospital's staff, Dr Kuramoto, who specializes in the treatment of nuclear-related illnesses, told us that he views his work as closely linked with the need to take action so that never again can such a thing happen. "If not, what's the use of being a doctor?" he asked. And this doctor, like others on the hospital staff, is not a communist.

The same thing happened at the city's museum, which contains the atrocious photographs of the martyrdom of Hiroshima. Some of these photos were taken barely 3 hours after the explosion. (We should add here that the museum exhibit makes it very clear that the Americans dropped the bombs not for military reasons, but for political purposes. Above all else, Washington wanted to prevent any possibility of a Soviet military victory in the region). The museum director accompanied us during our visit.

Of course, Hiroshima and Nagasaki can never, ever forget. But everywhere in Japan, thousands of men and women are working so that this can never happen again. Our delegation had a very warm and lengthy meeting in Tokyo with the Bonze Bikkhu Shojun Mibu, executive president of the National Council of Believers for Peace, and with Mme Yako Yamagushi, a writer and president of the Japanese Conference against the A and H Bombs (Genshikiyo). This coming together for peace by millions of people all over the world, with their differing religious, philosophical, or moral convictions--these meetings, like those we had with various leaders of the Japanese socialist party, showed us--is not only necessary, but possible.

The Japanese "Model"

In addition to the contacts we have already mentioned, our delegation had a long meeting with the secretary general of the Sohyo union, E. Magara. The leadership of this union, the largest in Japan with the Domei plant, whose allegiance is liberal-democratic, is socialist. "The PS is actually the driving

force for Sohyo, rather than the other way around," E. Magara told us, smiling. This close political affiliation on the part of a trade union, although traditional in Japan, does nonetheless seem to create some problems, based on the talks we had with socialists and communists. At the Japanese Diet, the equivalent of our National Assembly, we also met with the socialist vice president of the Diet. Along with all the meetings we held on our trip, which our readers will see covered a broad political spectrum, we also combined the practical experience of our visit to the Mazda automobile plant, where 27,000 workers are employed.

There was one surprise here: while much of the work is done by robots, there are still a great many people working on assembly lines. And one point was confirmed: the pace of work seems very fast. The car--four different models are assembled on the same production line--stays in the hands of each worker for only 50 seconds. During this time he has to perform all the movements, repeating the same ones for 8 hours. The line never stops, and he has to hurry around the car, before running back to take up the next one coming along.

Even a very short account of the living and working conditions of the Japanese worker lays to rest the idea of the exemplary nature of the so-called Japanese "model" for a French worker. First of all, at a comparable standard of living, the Japanese salary is definitely lower (by about a third) than a French worker's salary. And it is even worse for a woman (one in three women in Japan works). Unemployment is on the rise. According to the Japanese communists, there are about 4 million people unemployed (with a population of 120 million). According to Sohyo, unemployment now stands at over 3 million. And the government figures, which are falsified, list about 1.5 million people out of work.

Since 1981, industrial production has been stagnating, public spending--except for the military budget--has been declining, while the country's debt is growing. Business closures are rising steeply. In 1984, there were over 19,000 bankruptcies of small and medium businesses.

Social benefits offered workers are almost nonexistent. Vacations are extremely short, and workers generally don't even use the average of 1 week of leave they have a year, as management pressures are so strong. Three to four days of leave, in a world in which the pace of life seems much more stressful than in France, seems to be the maximum that the Japanese workers and employees allow themselves. And in some companies in Japan, they even chant "Thank you, boss" before starting to work.

We didn't hear that refrain during our visit, but its echo was certainly there, in the remarks of the comrades we met in Hiroshima, in the comments of the union members we saw in Tokyo, and in the behavior of the federal secretary who was able to return to his Mazda plant for the first time while accompanying the PCF delegation. He discreetly greeted his old assembly line comrades, being careful that no one could see the signs of greeting being exchanged.

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PCF DRAFT RESOLUTION FOR 25TH PARTY CONGRESS

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[Text] I. Preamble

Over the past two years, the great hope expressed in the spring of 1981 has gradually given way to marked discontent. The reverses suffered by the French Socialist and Communist parties in the June 1984 elections revealed their depth.

With the fact that the government emerging from the 1981 elections did not respond to the expectations of those who had elected it and that it refused to take into consideration the significance of their votes in the European elections when it came time to form a new government, a new situation has been created in the country. Communists have drawn the conclusions and decided in July no longer to participate in the government. A period in French political life is coming to an end, not only that of the three years that have gone by since 1981, but a much longer one -- a quarter of a century -- during which the projected victory and later the victory itself of a leftist government were gradually built around the idea of a common government program.

The policies of unemployment, social stagnation and industrial decline led the right and management to the failure of 1981. It is the return to that policy of austerity, turning one's back on the people's hopes, that is now giving rise to disappointment and anger. The reactionary forces are arrogantly rejoicing over the results of their pressure on the government and now affirm their plan for revenge.

The observation that the policies of the current Socialist Government are aggravating the crisis and leading to failure if pursued, and the observation of the decline in influence of the French Communist Party call forth several questions: How did we get to this point? What lessons must our party learn from this experience in order to move forward? In the light of events, how is one to evaluate the policies drafted by the French Communist Party at its latest congresses? Are there positive prospects for the people's movement?

To answer these questions is the entire significance of the 25th Congress of the French Communist Party. The ground has been laid. Throughout recent years, French communists have not only measured the causes of their difficulties, but have established the bases for a new policy for France and its people.

There is a prospect: The crisis is calling for a transformation of our society. France needs socialism based on its traditions, its individual characteristics, the times and the world in which we live: French-type socialism. In order to reach it, the most effective path is the rallying in a majority movement of all forces determined to transform our society through struggle in order to come out of the crisis by universal suffrage.

This approach represents a considerable innovation. One question must therefore be asked: How is one to explain that it is precisely in a period when we thoroughly renewed our policies that we have experienced a tangible election failure, a failure suddenly accentuating the downward trend appearing at the very time when we were slow to define those new policies? Must we give up the new path upon which we have embarked?

On the contrary, it is on the continuation of that path that we propose to reflect. Essentially, we believe that the persistence of our difficulties is explained in this way? Many of those who want social and democratic progress are still marked in their ideas and action by the political strategy of agreement at the top between socialists and communists on a program.

Overcoming this obstacle depends on the action of our party, but also the experience of people themselves. Action and experience -- in failure and success -- must be combined.

Naturally, we must reflect on what we have said and done through the past three years. But could we have avoided the difficulties when we had constantly reminded people for so many years that a common program and a leftist government with communist ministers would resolve the problems of the people and the country, which in the end turned out not to be so? Could we have prevented our presence in the government from appearing to be in contradiction with our criticisms, our appeals to fight, to intervene and implement the policies drafted at our latest congresses, new policies for everyone, including the communists?

Actually, recent experience confirms the need to respond positively to the question of the 25th Congress: Should we or should we not continue along the path outlined by our recent congresses? We say we must. We must confirm that new political orientation, take it further in the light of the lessons of the last period and make it more specific through action to be taken starting now.

Hope does exist. There is definitely profound and understandable disappointment, but it does not justify despair or passiveness or retreat. The door of change has not been condemned.

In all the crucial periods of its history, France has always found in itself the strength to ensure its rebirth. Today, the crisis has hit the country hard and deeply. It calls for new, unusual solutions. There is nothing fatal about it. The solutions exist and the forces exist to promote them.

To every one of us who wonder, worry and suffer, the French Communist Party says: Let us reflect together on what we have just experienced. Let us lucidly

and courageously learn our lessons. Let us build together a new majority people's rally in order to emerge from the crisis and take the path of French-type socialism.

For communists, this prospect is neither expediency nor a refuge, but a major political move. They have decided to propose it to the country and to place its fulfillment at the heart of their action.

II. The Crisis and a Way Out

Any reflection on the current situation, the solutions to be advanced and the difficulties facing our party must be based on what is at the root of France's problems at this close of the 20th century: the crisis of French society, a crisis which, in the course of the period ranging from 1981 to 1984, has finally worsened, for the possibilities offered by the positive initial reforms have not been used.

Current Capitalism in a Crisis

What is the nature of the crisis?

The supporters of capitalism have given a whole series of simplistic responses to this question, the only coherence being in their determination to sow confusion and conceal their responsibilities. That is how they first of all denied the very existence of a crisis. Then, confronted with the evidence, they accused the "consumer society" and preached zero growth. Starting in 1973, they found in the rising price of oil the sudden cause of all the evils afflicting the country. Having exhausted this argument, they advanced another thesis in the 1980's: All the difficulties stemmed from the technological revolution. All these successive arguments were presented as inevitable and justifying policies of layoffs, reduced buying power, a questioning of social and democratic rights and submission to the law of the multinationals and the dollar.

In the guise of modernization, the Socialist Government openly resumed this vision of things and since the middle of 1982, embarked upon such a policy.

The French Communist Party reaffirms that the policy, far from leading the country out of the crisis, can only plunge it further in, for it fuels the underlying causes. Starting with the second half of the 1960's, the communists detected the first manifestations of the crisis and embarked upon an analysis of its causes. In a coherent approach, observing the development of the crisis, they made their analysis and showed its nature.

Deteriorating living conditions, growing unemployment and declining growth are all engendered by the crisis of capitalism, the crisis of its system of world domination, the type of work productivity, social life and management peculiar to it.

The crisis continues to develop while capitalism faces basically new stakes: the demands of wide-ranging technological, social and human changes. The

accumulation of knowledge, the scientific and technical revolution offer unheard-of potential and mark personalities. Aspirations to live a freer life, to be able to choose one's work, to be an integral part of a richer social life, have greatly developed.

This potential is wasted and these aspirations led astray because of the domination of structures, criteria of management, of the institutions of capitalism in a crisis.

In the final analysis, it is a profound, lasting, overall crisis affecting all domains of life in the country, expressing the inadaptation of capitalism at present, the growing blockage of its structures, its mechanisms, its policies vis-a-vis the thrust of productive forces and the human needs of the modern world.

Recent developments of the crisis particularly concern enterprise, institutions and political life, social life and international relations.

Enterprise

One can thus observe that the main economic and social choices are made in enterprises in negation of the workers' aspirations, their freedoms and rights.

Only their struggles can break the locks and modify decisions, which implies the workers' conquest of the terrain of business management from which there is now an attempt to exclude them. It is indispensable in order to protect and improve the standard of living and employment. This also expresses a modern conception of economic development, a higher concept of freedoms, citizenship and the country's interest.

Despite the obstacles, the number of workers who understand its interest is growing, both in the private and public sectors.

Workers accept less and less the fact that nationalized enterprises should remain oriented by a management based on capitalistic criteria: The exportation of capital, low productive investments in France, the elimination of activities and personnel characterize the management of enterprises in the name of financial profitability, short-term competitiveness, in the guise of a so-called modernization.

On the one hand, they break up a private industrial firm, while on the other, they nationalize enterprises. Efficiency and democracy remain outside.

And yet, it is becoming essential for employment, skills, initiative and the reflection of workers become decisive factors of modern production.

While competitive production responding to needs implies cooperation between French enterprises in order to effectively rally the means of achieving objectives of national development, we are witnessing uncontrolled competition and the largest ones among them are allied with American or Japanese enterprises or set up elsewhere.

While the country's financial resources must be mobilized in order to seek out, train and invest in France in an effective way, capital tries at any cost to increase its financial profitability by attacking employment and the lives of workers. The mass of capital accumulated and overaccumulated cannot find enough solvent and financially profitable outlets and thus is increasingly oriented toward speculation and financial investment.

Banking credit is used for everything but the development of national production. The result is another decline in the French production apparatus, increased indebtedness of the country and the government. Here again, strong struggles can reduce this financial waste and promote fiscal and banking reform.

While men and women aspire to solidarity and new responsibilities, to choosing their lives freely, owners and management try to pit them against one another and responds by unemployment, splitting work, deprivation.

The very fact that owners and management in all enterprises challenge the right of workers to intervene on these questions and, consequently, in the key domains of management -- in order to change the criteria -- confirms the importance of the stakes in the crisis.

The use of new technologies gives more value to such intervention. It requires high spending on training, research and productive investments with suitable resources and a reorganization of financial management.

True modernization of enterprises calls for a change of angles in management. It is a question of starting from jobs, an increase in their numbers and training in order to competitively create new resources responding to increased needs. For the same purpose, it is also a question of establishing new relationships at work, breaking down the opposition "between those who think and those who put the screws on."

Henceforth, many of the struggles of laborers, workers, technicians, white-collar workers and upper-level personnel will be oriented in that direction, confirming the need.

Institutions and the National Political Debate

The worsening of the crisis affects the political domain and institutions.

The forces of capital have made government excesses their war-horse. Actually, they have used and intend to continue to use for their exclusive service the institutions, economic and financial levers of government and public monies. They are targeted public service. They want an even more authoritarian, more bureaucratic state that will meddle in the lives of citizens even more. They demand more freedom for the dominating power of money.

The principles governing the role and operation of national institutions and practices that have continued to develop since the 1962 reform, instituting the election of the president of the republic by universal suffrage, have

concentrated power at the top level of government in the hands of a single man. The government sees its status reduced to a role of carrying out the political choices of the chief of state. Parliament now has only a practically nonexistent role. Decentralization has a very limited scope. Institutional mechanisms and the election system exercise continuous pressure on a bipolarization that is fatal to true pluralism.

The extraordinarily paltry political debate revolves around the activities of a few "leaders" presented by the media as "presidential timber." Voters would have to stake their fate on a change in providential men, betting on the most likely winner.

In the current period, an attempt is made to limit reflection on the country's future to political combinations labeled as "relaxation" or "cohabitation."

Under such conditions, political life may look to some French people as foreign to their concerns and inaccessible to their intervention.

At the same time, a systematic anticomunism is developed as one of the essential means of demobilizing the people's forces.

All of this expresses, not the strength, but the weakness of a system that fears a political life truly close to the people, one that is democratic and truly decentralized.

That is why, demagogically exploiting this situation that they have created, the forces which defend the established order generally accuse political parties, those elected by universal suffrage, meaning those who express the pluralism of opinion of the citizens and represent them.

This harmful enterprise must alert all democrats. It may serve as a pretext for new reinforcements of the antidemocratic nature of the institutions and their operation and encourage all kinds of adventures.

The French Communist Party fights all these endeavors and speaks out for a true democratization of institutions and political life.

Social Life

In the crisis, social and human relationships undergo serious deterioration.

Unemployment not only has material consequences, but a social and moral impact as well. It affects conduct, especially among young people, and leads to dramatic situations. Although school attendance has increased, social segregation and school failure have a great effect because of the inadaptation of schools to the needs of the modern world and the lack of means. Unequal, unplanned urbanization of recent decades results in a deterioration of the standard of living, especially in the larger cities, with the concentration in particular areas of all those suffering from all the social and cultural handicaps, including the immigrants. Neighborhood problems and conflict arise out of all these difficulties and reactionary forces set about whipping them up.

In all society, the lack of security and tensions increase. The use of drugs becomes widespread.

The major means of disseminating information and culture, used as veritable instruments to manipulate the masses, are often used as the vehicles for standardized products subjected to prefabricated modes from across the Atlantic, fighting revolutionary ideas and the forces of progress in the world through systematic use of lies and slander. The media feed discouragement, subversion and despair.

Aspirations to new values and ways of life that are developing clash with the limitations of the degenerating bourgeois society and call for new responses. Instead, the leaders of this society have found nothing other to propose than the updating of the old capitalist law of the jungle: that the strongest and richest win! Too bad for all those who pay for this success with their mutilated, destroyed lives!

Everything shows that the stakes of the fight against the crisis is, in the final analysis, the future of the human race, the coming of a new society.

International Relations

The developments of the crisis characterizing the situation in France do not spare the other capitalist countries, each having its own characteristics.

That is the case of the United States. The forces of capital, taking their references outside of our country, its realities and potential, recommend Reagan's policies as their model. But the position that the American recovery would constitute a way out of the crisis is a lie. That recovery is fragile and unhealthy. It has dealt harsh blows to the American people themselves. It is built on overwhelming financial pressure on other peoples. The rise in the interest rates and the dollar, designed to attract masses of capital to the United States, ruins the economy of many countries, destroys their productive capacities, imposes austerity, if not poverty, on their population.

These policies have a dramatic effect on Third World countries, on their development, worsening the scourges striking them and impeding mutually advantageous cooperation.

Their consequences are also felt in the Europe of the Common Market where, facing a crisis in their system, the leading capitalist forces develop policies oriented in that same direction, participating in efforts aimed at consolidating the dominant position of the United States over the capitalist world. Shaken by the contradictions engendered by policies followed and the people's struggles, European institutions themselves are in a crisis. The headlong plunge toward the path of supranational institutions and expansion would be harmful, only worsening difficulties.

At the same time, the capitalist forces under the leadership of the United States resume the arms race, provoke new international tension, which in the long run can only help worsen the crisis.

This behavior of the capitalist system, although extremely dangerous, is not a sign of strength. If they could do so, capitalist leaders would not hesitate to resort to world war!

The forces exist to expand something on the agenda: the establishment of new solidarity between peoples, between the forces of progress -- to oppose the law of the dollar and gradually move away from its domination, promote and develop suitable, effective cooperation, new policies encouraging employment and growth.

The people's fight for disarmament, which extends to all continents, the opposition to the law of the dollar and the financial system piloted by the big capitalist countries, the will for social progress and independence, are in their diversity so many fruitful signs to which we must pay close attention and give greater support.

In France, every expression of a will for disarmament solidifies the action for security, development and well-being. All financing diverted from speculation and used for employment and winning back the domestic market is a blow dealt to the domination of the dollar. All cooperation with firms or foreign countries to create jobs and wealth in our mutual interest is a factor working against the crisis. This cooperation with all countries is a factor of detente.

Bitter Battle

Our analysis of the crisis and its developments shows that it does not result from any fatal nature. There are causes of and solutions to the difficulties encountered, solutions that are necessary and feasible in France, first of all, for those who live on its soil and based on which we will be in a better position to develop international relations and the situation of our country in the world.

As soon as this crisis is one of the very basis of the current system of domination by capital, then the solutions must necessarily lead to profound economic, social and political transformations at all levels of society, open the way to a change in society, to French-type socialism.

Opening such a path means ensuring the victory of anticrisis solutions with workers on a daily basis. No time can be lost.

The times in which we are living, the society and world in which we find ourselves are marked by essential changes that have occurred in decades past. These changes continue, not without difficulty, in favor of the forces of progress, and new aspirations arise out of the movement of productive forces, human needs and consciences.

The crisis exercises contradictory influence on this movement, these aspirations and struggles. It checks them by virtue of the weight of difficulties it engenders, the multiple social contradictions it sharpens, but at the same time, it renders the demand for basic changes more imperious.

Actually, the way out of the crisis is at the heart of the class struggle. The right and management only want to do away with essential social and democratic gains, moving the country back decades. They want to deprive France of the means of its independence, its capacity for development, subject it to the greater domination of the United States. They pursue a basic political objective: weakening the French Communist Party.

All this would lead to a new and profound aggravation of the crisis. Alongside all those who, like them, want to bring about the failure of the right, resist and try to fight the crisis, the communists intend to propose the means and veritable prospects for emerging from it. These solutions will only make headway through a bitter political and ideological battle.

III. Confirming and Deepening Our Political Orientation

How are we to emerge from the crisis that has struck French society in the times and world in which we live? With its 22d, 23d and 24th congresses, our party has provided a response to that central question: building French-type, democratic, self-management socialism by following a path that is itself democratic. That is our basic political orientation or, as they say, our strategy.

Our Strategy

French-type socialism means meeting aspirations for more justice, more brotherhood, the need for freedom, participation, richer human relations. It means the conquest, by the workers and people, of control over their working and living conditions, the choices that determine their fate and that of their country.

French-type socialism corresponds to the traditions of our country, its own characteristics, our times. It is an entirely new society.

Our proposed society is therefore necessarily based on the needs of the people and the country, by definition, in a sense. Likewise, the approach we propose to reach it is not the result of an arbitrary choice. It is dictated by concrete realities: those of the world today and the France of our time, in a time of crisis of capitalist society.

In the world, the resurgence of aggressiveness of the most reactionary milieux on the planet is on a par with the obstacles they encounter. The forces exist to force them into realism, peaceful coexistence, respect for the will of peoples and nations. This is a decisive dimension of the situation of the world and has been for decades. It is precisely that reality which provides our people with the possibility of moving toward socialism in keeping with an original path. This is an essential element of our strategy. In France in our time, the march toward socialism will come about through a majority people's movement that systematically expands, through its struggles, democratic conquests and positions, with the majority will finding its expression in universal suffrage in every phase.

It was a democratic path on which we basically embarked by giving up the notion of the dictatorship of the proletariat in 1976. Everything leads us to confirm

that essential orientation of our strategy, which makes the march toward socialism, not a remote objective, but an immediate necessity. Far from meaning the abandonment of transforming struggles, it requires a relentless class struggle against the adversaries of change which use all means available to them to deceive, divide, divert and repress, if they can. For the objective is definitely to change society by freeing it in every domain of the domination of exploiter capital.

We therefore cannot passively wait for elections, with successive votes every five or seven years, to mark the progress of an evolution without incident. The French bourgeoisie remains faithful to its long authoritarian tradition. But it is henceforth possible to create ratios of strength that will prevent the bourgeoisie from resorting to violence and force.

The democratic path is therefore both the path of struggle and the path of unity. Struggle and unity are inseparable in order to find and achieve the victory of solutions, in order to achieve the progress of reality and awareness, to advance and create the conditions for success of higher objectives and in order to ensure and guarantee such success.

This democratic path of struggle and union can only be taken thanks to the existence and activity of a revolutionary party that motivates, proposes and drives the diversified struggles of the workers and the people: the Communist Party.

The march toward socialism will come about at the speed of the assumption and achievement of the revolutionary objectives of transforming society in a movement whose conditions, shape and schedule cannot be decreed in advance. Socialism will not be imposed on the people. It is the people who will impose it.

Delay

Our proposed society, French-type socialism, and the path of its construction are democratic through and through. The plan and the approach are completely new. They constitute another way of following policies clashing with preceding concepts, practices and experience rooted deeply in the past.

The evolution of the world and our country called for such responses from the mid 1950's. Steps in that direction were taken several times. This was the case of the Champigny Manifesto adopted in December 1968. But we had to wait for the 22d Congress in 1976 to adopt the approach in all its scope and depth and to lay the foundations of our new political orientation.

We were therefore slow to outline our reflections on socialism for France as distinguished from an outside "model" and to define a perspective adapted to the conditions of our country and our time.

That delay has had consequences on our policy of union.

Thus it was that in 1958, confronted with the Algiers coup and the establishment of a personal government embodying the strengthened domination of capital, we firmly fought for and proposed as the sole perspective the forms of union and action that had been effective in the past.

We made the demand for a common program of government the heart of our activity until it was concluded in 1972, following a long and difficult political struggle.

In the course of that struggle, certain ideas on the crisis and its causes progressed. The pretensions of big capital and the right were relatively checked and certain economic, social and political measures were obtained.

But at the same time, handicaps and obstacles appeared. Difficulties accumulated until we arrived at the situation we have today. All this was contained in the policies of the common program from the very beginning.

Thus it was that we, who had analyzed the crisis in French society as early as 1971, ensured that the common program would contain measures against the domination of big capital. But at the same time, the illusion was nourished that the Socialist Party was determined to break with capitalism. The need for a bitter ideological and political struggle on the problems of the crisis, its causes and the ways out was outlined. One can see this today, when the Socialist Party, having given up its declarations of intention against capitalism, participates in the dissemination of pernicious ideas about the fatal nature of the crisis and its consequences. Furthermore, to reduce everything to the common program hindered the integration of the new aspirations that were emerging and did not enable us to open up an adapted perspective of a change in society. One can therefore understand our difficulty in taking up certain aspects of the great movement of 1968 and in deriving all the political and ideological benefits.

On another level, the common program, as an agreement at the top between the Socialist and Communist parties, nourished the idea that the solution to all problems would come from above and encouraged a passive wait for the solution, while emerging from the crisis demands the broadest possible active and responsible participation of the people in all domains. The social movement has been limited to a role of exerting pressure at the top in order to aid in the conclusion of the program, first of all, and support it later.

Finally, while emerging from the crisis demands the continuing original activity of an influential revolutionary party in order to motivate the development of the people's movement revolving around transforming solutions, conclusion of the common program has led many people to believe that there was no difference between the Socialist and Communist parties regarding the content of change or the desire for unity.

The Socialist Party and Francois Mitterrand in particular understood that they could take advantage of this situation to achieve their fundamental objective: weakening the French Communist Party. This was the meaning of the Epinay Congress in 1971 and the signing of the common program by Francois Mitterrand in 1972.

Consequently, by making maximum use of the institutions and with the election system tending toward bipolarization and feeding anticomunism, Mitterrand and the Socialist Party were able to make use of the theme of rebalancing the left and thus encourage the idea that the strengthening of the Socialist Party at the expense of the Communist Party was necessary. Not defending the idea of the indispensable presence of a communist candidate in the first three presidential elections helped this undertaking.

Naturally, as early as 1972, we could not "lose sight of the underlying nature" of the Socialist Party, which represents "the social democratic trend in our country," its "fear that the working class and the masses might be on the move, its hesitation before the class struggle in opposition to big capital and the tendency to compromise with the latter and class collaboration." We did therefore measure the risks. Through our work and publications and with the drafting at the 22d Congress of a new orientation, we tried to face the trend, but the movement had been launched and we could not swim upstream.

Throughout this quarter of a century, the activity of the French Communist Party has been intense and fruitful. At the cost of many difficulties and sometimes repression, it has courageously faced its duties. It is the only party to have defended the interests and rights of the workers, the only one to have fought the colonial wars, the only one to have fought for national independence and peace. None of the successes won in the fields of social progress, democracy and peace would have been possible without its existence and its fight.

The fact nevertheless remains that the effectiveness and scope of that activity were weakened, that our party has even declined because of the general political context in which it finds itself.

1981-1984 Period

It is in the light of this analysis that one can understand what happened in the 1981-1984 period.

Let us first of all recall the facts.

In 1981, the majority of all voters preferred the choices of Francois Mitterrand to ours. They gave an absolute majority of seats in the National Assembly to the Socialist Party. It was on this basis that we concluded an agreement with the Socialist Party -- to which that party said it was still faithful on 1 December 1983 -- and we took our place in the government in a very minority position. Our decision was in keeping with our fundamental orientation to do, under all circumstances, that which we could to encourage every step forward in solving the country's problems. Given the will expressed by our people, any other attitude would have been unjustifiable and unjustified. We do not regret our decision to participate and we are happy with the fruitful work done by the communist ministers under difficult conditions.

Steps forward were taken -- especially during the first year -- some of which are far from negligible. Naturally, from the very beginning, we were led to pose more than once the crucial question of the means to be used in order to

prevent the indispensable social measures from ending in deficits. But while our action may have contributed to positive achievements, the people's movement turned out not to be capable -- nor could our party -- of imposing the governmental action essential against the waste of capital, the continual losses of the country's resources, and this from the earliest weeks of government. The fact remains that there were accomplishments in which communists participated.

It was in this direction that we called upon the government to persevere, while taking up the grave problems that remained. Unfortunately, we were not heard. During the summer of 1982, the signs of a change in the government's economic and social policy were accentuated. The government then embarked upon a path of giving owners and management more and more money, without guaranteeing its application to the modernization of our industry and the development of employment.

This so-called rigorous policy led to inflated profits. On the other hand, it cost the country dearly. Results obtained in the preceding period were nearly eaten away until they were reduced to nothing: Unemployment began to rise again, purchasing power dropped, inequalities were heightened, harsh blows were dealt to decisive industrial sectors, and capital was increasingly squandered. The assets which the left had given the country -- such as the nationalizations -- instead of being used against waste and in the service of a new economy, were practically sterilized.

Over and over, we warned the government and public opinion to the dangers of such an orientation. Thus, for two years, both in business, Parliament and even in the Cabinet, we did not spare our efforts in behalf of a new policy.

At the time of the European elections of 17 June 1984, given the observation that the 1981 commitments had not been kept -- particularly regarding such crucial questions as unemployment and purchasing power -- millions of men and women who had voted for the left in 1981 expressed their discontent three years later by abstaining from voting.

Insofar as the general reasons leading to the 1981 decline persisted, part of the communist voters included in their disapproval the Socialist Party, solely responsible for the government which abandoned its commitments, and the French Communist Party, which fought with its limited means for proper policies.

Obviously, in order to take this warning into account, one had to reorient government policy in the right direction. That is what we asked for immediately following the election and then again -- and insistently -- when the matter of forming a new government was posed. But it was useless. The prime minister changed, but the negative political orientation that the voters had just sanctioned was maintained, even worsened. Our economy needed and still needs more jobs in order to create more wealth and be able to devote more money to research, training, skills and other investments needed for a real modernization. But instead of moving in that direction, the government opened the way to more layoffs, more reductions in production capacities, more capitalist squandering -- in a word, to plunging the country into crisis.

Finally, the Socialist Party has reoriented government policy in the direction desired by the forces of capital. It no longer conceals its "social-democratic" nature. Continuing along that path could and can only lead to economic and political failure.

Under such conditions, we have been forced to cease our participation in the government, to show clearly that we have no part in the leadership and management of the country's affairs.

Can one consider that the responsibility for this situation belongs to the Communist Party? This would be an unjust reversal of responsibility.

All our activity has been marked since 1981 by a desire to achieve the objectives established in common. We have worked toward that goal with the greatest honesty and loyalty. We have tried to mobilize the people's forces on behalf of these objectives, trying to shed more light on the causes of the crisis and the type of means to be used to emerge from it. Without a doubt, this activity has not been without flaws or inadequacies the analysis of which is useful.

But the essential element is there: Our efforts have encountered the negative tendencies of the policies of the common program -- mentioned previously -- which have continued to be felt, including by the party. For example, we have experienced difficulty in developing action by the people within the framework of governmental participation and even more strongly, a tendency to reduce our political orientation to mere participation in a government of leftist unity, when, as we have seen, emerging from the crisis demands that one challenge the government of the bourgeoisie at all levels, economic, ideological and institutional. More generally, we have had to face the ideas, old habits, the limits of experience and the proposals of the still new policies we recommend. Time is necessary so that the fundamental choices, calling for a profound modification in previous behavior, may make progress, especially without losing sight of the context of the class struggle.

New Situation

Faithful to our political orientation in participating in the government and the majority, as long as it appeared possible to take steps forward, we have also been in accordance with it, refusing to participate in it when government policy was otherwise oriented.

Today, we are entering a new situation. Far from challenging the foundations of the policies defined by our preceding congresses, the evolution in the country's situation and in our party seems to give in strengthened validity because of the deepening of the crisis, the verified harmfulness of the solutions implemented in order to face it -- by the right and by the Socialist Party -- the aspirations and new needs that continue to grow, the rich experience accumulated by the people and the party. Thus, the new bases for future progress exist, without thereby masking the difficulty of the task.

Just as emphasized in the report presented by Georges Marchais and adopted by the Central Committee on 17 September: "How is one not to see that it is a

veritable transformation in which we are involved, a transformation of our policies and practices that we deem necessary in order to accompany and master the mutation in society and change that society itself? How can we not see that that we have to accomplish this task, not in the abstract, in a sterile environment, but within the framework of an extraordinary class confrontation and at a time when the past weighs heavily on the conditions of our struggle today?"

We have decided to confirm and continue our basic political orientation aimed at opening up, by democratic means, the prospect of a French-type socialism for France. On the basis of an attentive analysis of reality, we propose, in that spirit, a new political perspective to the workers and the people of our country, the only truly new and positive prospect that can be proposed to them.

IV. Building a New Majority People's Rally

The French Communist Party has confidence in the future of France and in the capacity of its people to rally and emerge from the crisis imposed by the domination of capital.

It calls on people to build the France of work, justice, freedom and peace, a truly modern France, because it will be fortified by the work offered to each individual and accomplished by everyone in order to develop advanced ideas and techniques: competitive production and effective services necessary to the country and to international cooperation. It will be made just by the possibilities offered to every individual to have a decent life and to develop his personality, to have a wage based on work, personal effort, the utilization of economic potential in the service of the collective interest. It will be free, with workers and citizens having the means and new power to give their opinion, participate in decisions, choose their lives themselves. It will be fraternal, pitting against the law of the jungle solidarity and cooperation between individuals in the nation and between nations in a world serving development and peace.

We say this clearly because we refuse to make promises that we know will not be kept. This prospect calls for effort, courage and struggle, but it deserves them because it is the only way of the future for France.

In order to proceed along that path, we have decided to propose to the country and to place at the center of our action the construction of a broader, more solid, more lasting and more conscious union than what has been achieved in the past, a union capable of bringing about the transformations France needs. That is what the new majority people's rally is.

It is therefore not just a mere repetition of rank-and-file unity that our Party has recommended throughout its history. It represents something new, something we have never done, a form adapted to the needs and possibilities of today. It is new because of the objectives around which we propose to achieve it, by virtue of the scope it can and must achieve, because of the role that must be assigned to it, the demands it will place on the activities of communists.

Objectives

We shall therefore not seek to artificially stick abstract, prefabricated solutions on the French situation. We do not want to impose from above a set of objectives defined in advance, drawn up in all their aspects, once and for all.

Communists are ready to act everywhere, with all those who want to do so, on behalf of objectives defined in common, case by case, whenever those objectives attack the crisis and tend to provide a remedy, however partial or limited. We do not claim to impose all our policies as the basis of the rally to be built. Likewise, we refuse to limit in advance the objectives around which the rally will be built. Emerging from the crisis calls for measures that will break down the positions, privileges, ways of thinking and action of capitalists in management, government and all of social life.

To believe that proposing such measures would be to limit in advance the people's rally is a false idea. Experience since 1981 shows that it is, on the contrary, the insufficiently transforming nature of the policies followed and the inadequate determination in the keeping of commitments that lead to the shrinking of the people's movement and failure.

In the current crisis, facing incredible political and ideological pressure and at a time when socialism is at the heart of this battle of ideas, to rally the people requires advancing ideas and strong, clear and effective solutions to the country's crucial problems.

In order to help the workers, the people concerned about putting together their grounds for action, we propose the following objectives, without their being restrictive:

Putting Employment at the Heart of New Economic Growth

Today, they tell us that future progress of our economy and its modernization necessarily depend on reducing the number of jobs available by eliminating hundreds of thousands of workers who would be excessive, an overstaffing. We reject this absurd and harmful position.

Rather, we propose to start from the creation of jobs and an improvement in their efficiency in order to revive our economy and get it going again. To create jobs and improve efficiency is to mobilize energies sterilized in order to create wealth, making better use of available means. It means creating new markets in order to update and install equipment, facilities, the necessary tools, in order to ensure the training of workers and respond to their new needs in the way of individual and collective consumption. It means providing the means of responding to the country's many needs that are not met. It means orienting our efforts toward the reconquest and development of the domestic market, rebalancing trade by developing mutually advantageous international cooperation.

Only such an orientation makes it possible to bring off true modernization, with the implementation of new technologies. It must be aimed at developing our basic and advanced activities in a diversified and balanced fashion in

industry and agriculture, mastering changes in the type of jobs -- including, if necessary, through voluntary, negotiated mobility -- that does not lead from business to the ANPE but from less skilled jobs to improved training and work.

Such an orientation goes in the direction of new productivity and competitiveness, through a better use of equipment and resources, the development of new cooperation in research, training or production, between enterprises, large and small, public and private, between government enterprises, between enterprises and territorial collectives, based on the need to preserve and improve the environment, an improvement in the skills and training of workers and through an appeal to the initiative and responsibility of all.

Advancing in that direction implies acting for profound reforms that will lighten the financial burdens on production and employment, saving money wasted on speculation, the accumulation of financial profits, and orienting it toward effective investments, training and research. It implies the search for fiscal and banking reforms inspired by the same objectives, in order to advance new criteria of management that give priority to the creation of new wealth and the development of men, conserving means used rather than seeking the financial profitability of capital.

The nationalized industrial and banking sector, both old and new, can and must play a specific role of innovation and promotion in the implementation of all these orientations. This requires that in every enterprise in the sector, the capitalist nationalization characterizing the current situation must be fought against to make way for a true democratic nationalization.

This is the basis for the new growth of our modern, human and effective economy.

Improving Standard of Living in a Spirit of Justice and Effectiveness

Yesterday, we denounced the "modern poverty" that is growing and we were called "miserabilists." Today, one has to yield to the evidence: There are increasing numbers of poor people in this country. Guaranteeing them the minimum income needed to live decently is a national duty. But the solution to this drama mainly depends on the access of each individual to a suitable, secure, well-paying job.

Beyond that, together with a recovery based on the development of jobs and the creation of wealth, the protection and improvement of the purchasing power of wages constitute an urgent need in order to reduce inequalities: lightening the burdens of families, maintaining sufficient markets for the economy, stimulating the acquisition of skills and initiative and therefore productivity.

The same is true of the protection of purchasing power of farm income, especially through price supports, respect for an improvement of community guarantees, lightening the burdens of small and medium-size farmers, and new means to help the young get started.

Improving Training

Finding a way out of the crisis, promoting new, modern, human and effective growth, and mastering the technological changes and the choices they imply require a vast effort of human training.

It is essential that this effort be based on a broad and solid initial training. Consequently, a real transformation of the system of education is necessary. The country needs schools that truly provide equal possibilities of access to knowledge, respecting the diversity of philosophical currents and beliefs, responding to the diversity of aspirations of the young and of parents with regard to training, schools open to life in methods and the content of what is taught. This is a key issue for the future.

This can begin with the resumption of coherent action against school failures and social segregation, particularly in priority areas of education, through better professional training with the framework of the establishment of new relationships between the schools, work and production, through the updating and rewriting of the content of education, enabling scientific and technical training to take its rightful place in contemporary culture, through the development of reorganized academic life; upgrading the status of the teaching profession, the democratization of higher education based on research and in relationship with business and society in the development of high-level training, and through the construction of a great modern public service open to all.

In addition, the rapid evolution of science and techniques, their increasingly direct intervention in production, economy and life, give immediate importance to continuing training. The latter, together with public service, requires the intervention and contribution of diverse partners, particularly in the enterprises. It must contribute, beyond the mere updating of professional knowledge, to the elimination of discrimination, more responsible, qualified and effective work, to the broadening of knowledge in the fields of economy and management, the promotion of men and women, their increasingly conscious and active intervention in economic and social life.

Human Beings: Purpose and Asset of National Recovery

Just as in employment or the standard of living, the current system takes up problems of health, housing, transportation, leisure and security, in terms of costs that must be reduced to the maximum extent, even if this has an adverse effect on the lives of people and engenders increased burdens for the national community. At the same time, our times are witnessing new aspirations and new values in all domains, to the extent that the exercise of all these fundamental rights is properly considered as a dimension of the freedom of every individual. Gradual satisfaction of these rights gives value to the human being and also constitutes the means for new growth of the economy and national renewal.

It is important to categorically oppose all-embracing privatization that gives priority to the narrowest financial profitability, while sharply worsening inequalities by making the size of one's bank account the exclusive measure of the freedoms open.

With respect for pluralism of medical practice, we must defend and promote a modern and effective public health service, social security ensuring equal access to care and social protection that improves as our possibilities improve, powerful action aimed at rebuilding the inner cities within the framework of a policy of developing good-quality social housing. There must be city planning that responds to the rights of all social categories, reducing harmful effects, with better handling of the national space while preserving village life. We must develop rapid and comfortable public transport, the combination of all measures needed to ensure greater security, a better range of services provided so that every individual may freely organize leisure, together with a reduction in the work week, which must be sought. Problems of retirement, in addition to increasing the now inadequate pensions, demand a new approach that takes into consideration the aspirations of workers performing heavy manual labor to enjoy a pleasant retirement before it is too late, along with the aspirations of men and women who, within the framework of their job or retirement, want to pursue activities giving meaning to their lives.

In the same spirit, we view as essential the broadening of the possibilities of each individual to enrich his life, with access to knowledge and the practice of different cultural activities. This is, in addition, one of the conditions for the preservation and development of the French cultural identity, with respect for the free expression of each, pluralism of the schools, the free development of international confrontation and exchanges.

Pursuing Action for Equality of Women

While significant advances have been obtained in recent years, much remains to be done to attain that equality in the life to which women aspire.

Access to work, to professions, training and professional responsibility, respect for dignity, leisure time, freedom to choose one's life, an evolution in thinking, the right to speak out, are all domains concerned. Progress to be achieved requires that one tackle inequalities accentuated by the crisis in the capitalist system, which organizes discrimination, tends to maintain women in a subordinate position and maintains misogamy.

Giving Youth Its Rightful Place in Society

Young people are feeling the weight of the crisis, along with the material and moral harm of unemployment. When the working world and social life are open to them, it is often on a marginal basis.

One cannot modernize France without creating for young people the conditions for access to training, corresponding to our time, to useful, creative jobs, to all the social, cultural and sports activities, without respecting their dignity, without appealing to their spirit of responsibility.

To rally young people to action in order to impose the social and democratic innovations that all this must imply in order to develop new social relationships in our country and new solidarity with the peoples of the world means responding to their deep aspirations and enabling them to make their indispensable contribution to life and the necessary transformation of society.

Broadening the Field of Freedoms

Defending the fundamental rights of the individual and collective freedoms, wherever they are threatened -- and they are in many places in our country -- is for us a continuing line of conduct expressed, in particular, by the creativity and action of the Committee for the Defense of Human Rights and Freedoms in France and the World." But beyond that, confronted with a privileged caste determined to maintain its control over all the levers of society, broadening the field of freedoms and powers opened to the greatest number of people constitutes a fundamental requirement for emerging from the crisis.

This means, for example: guaranteeing and broadening the democratic rights of workers in the enterprises, ensuring their right to intervene in all problems of the life of the enterprise, in everything touching their job and work conditions, excluding any policy of the fait accompli; developing concerted intervention among the various categories of workers in the different enterprises and activities; encouraging the participation of people in the management of local affairs; encouraging the people's intervention in the solution of the problems of the district, residential compound, commune or region; ensuring and pursuing the decentralization of certain prerogatives of the state regarding territorial collectives, while requiring the means indispensable to do so.

One of the basic rights of contemporary man is the right to information. We believe that the major media (television and radio) must provide honest, pluralistic information and offer the possibilities of varied, high-quality creation. In this regard, the situation is steadily deteriorating in France. The fight for this objective calls for new measures. It is an essential dimension of the fight for freedom in our country.

The movement to expand freedoms and democracy must be accompanied by a democratization of the state and institutions, challenging the centralization of powers, the stifling tutelage exercised by the state over public enterprises and the decline in the role of elected assemblies, the elimination of discrimination striking certain political parties and opinion trends in their means of expressing themselves and having access to fair representation. In that spirit, the French Communist Party is for the immediate establishment of the principle of proportional representation in all elections.

It has decided to initiate more general reflection on this great question of the state and institutions in order to present proposals at the proper time.

Building a World Without Weapons and Without War

This ideal, which is our own, is a major priority of our action, for the arms race poses a growing threat to life on the planet and swallows up fantastic sums of money so desperately needed to solve the serious problems of hunger, drought, underdevelopment and economic crisis.

We must cease to stockpile more weapons and embark upon a course of gradual, balanced reduction -- in the East and the West -- particularly with respect to nuclear weapons, with assurances provided for each country. We must move

toward the simultaneous dissolution of military blocs, progress in cooperation and friendship among nations, toward a world of peace and brotherhood.

Our conviction is that in this field as in others, there is nothing inevitable in the current course of events. That is why we have been part and parcel of action taken by millions of women, men and young people in our country and throughout the world. We have done so with the determination to work with all those who share these aspirations to peace and disarmament, in the service of life and development, whatever their political and social affiliations, their ideological and philosophical preferences, and with respect for their own judgment concerning the origins of current dangers. We intend to develop many efforts while persevering along this path.

There is nothing exhaustive about these objectives which we propose for common action. We submit them for reflection and constructive criticism. They fit directly into the vision we have of socialism which, in our opinion, France needs. We consider that the current crisis demands, not outlining in advance the intermediary phases with vague guidelines, but rather, commencing the changes needed in society in the direction of French-type socialism. But we do not dictate these objectives to the different people's forces. We are convinced that the reflection of each individual, the confrontation of analyses and, we do not hide it, our own effort of persuasion, will lead from a common accord to a definition of anticapitalist objectives.

Rally of Unequaled Scope

The forces that can rally together in a vast majority movement to lead France out of the crisis exist.

In recent decades, the face of French society has been turned upside down. Once rural, our country has become industrial, with an active population of 80 percent of all wage earners and with 9 out of 10 French people living in cities. The production processes have evolved as the result of technical progress, bringing about an improvement in qualifications, but also in the framework of the search for profit for stockpiled capital, the eviction from production of millions of men and women reduced to unemployment, the lack of skills of many others, overexploitation, all significant of the current crisis.

The boom in knowledge, the new relationships woven between science and production and between science and society, thanks to discoveries and innovations in fields as diverse as data processing, communications, biology, transforming individual relations with work, and so on, modify lifestyles, exert influence on behavior and ways of thinking, promote demands for social transformations, which themselves make new progress in knowledge possible.

It is clearly apparent that the evolution in productive forces introduces important and new differentiations in the working class and the other social strata. The exploiter class relentlessly plays on these differences in order to pit workers against one another, for example, those who have jobs against those who do not, engineers and blue-collar workers, immigrants and the others, men and women. It seeks to organize a "two-speed" France, using a mass of workers reduced to a constantly precarious situation in order to affect the whole.

Consequently, these changes, while they may have modified the composition and certain traits of the working class, have not challenged its existence. On the contrary, it has increased in number by integrating into the "collective worker" of which Marx spoke all workers assigned to new productive functions. Its place and role in society have been strengthened.

All blue- and white-collar workers, technicians, office workers and sometimes engineers, who are an integral part of it, basically have the same relationship of exploited and exploiter with the person deriving profit from the wealth they create. The evolution of working conditions and lives of millions of other workers: office workers, engineers, management personnel, researchers, teachers, intellectuals from the different disciplines, farm laborers, independent workers, has on the whole brought them all closer together.

We are confronting that complex reality whose analysis we are continuing and shall continue, learning from experience so as to go beyond an alliance linked with our policy of an agreement at the top, which has generally been perceived as an appeal for the rallying of the working class or the search for a cheap compromise postponing the solution of contradictions and basic problems of the crisis and therefore not credible. We propose a new rallying of all working and creative forces, amidst clarity and effectiveness.

This rally will be forged in life, in action, in a multitude of decentralized measures, permitting the mobilization of millions of men, women and young people around problems which in each case concern a certain number of them and leads them to unite, even if they have differences of interest or are driven by different philosophical or religious convictions. Confronted with the problems of life, we address ourselves to all these strata in order to seek our points of solidarity, of agreement around positive solutions permitting common action. Within such a framework, we shall give particular attention to white-collar workers, technicians, engineers and management personnel. We thus envisage a multifaceted, differentiated people's rally with flexible boundaries.

We are convinced that in the current situation of crisis, there will be increasingly broad agreement for common action aimed at measures and reforms attacking the roots of the evil. We can already see how, in a given enterprise, branch of industry, city or region, the problems of employment, the preservation of national potential, the promotion of truly modern growth, there appear the conditions for broad rallies of workers and the people behind anticrisis objectives. Without dictating anything from above, we intend to work in a frank and constructive dialogue leading to mutual discoveries, shedding light on the effectiveness and unifying nature of the objectives we propose, in order to base the different convergencies on the most solid ground.

We therefore do not seek to achieve a heteroclitic rally of discontents. Our goal is a new majority people's rally, providing a policy capable of bringing the country out of the crisis, a rally of such scope that it should go far beyond the political majorities of the left that have existed in the past.

We deem it possible precisely because the crisis confronts millions of men and women with problems to which they must find new responses and because we shall not mutilate our approach in advance by trying to achieve an agreement at the top between the Socialist and Communist parties.

New Role for the People's Movement

The decisive role for bringing France out of the crisis and building an individual type of socialism belongs to the people's movement.

This first of all results from the fact that the democratic path that suits our country is basically -- if it is to necessarily involve the exercise of universal suffrage and the democratic control of state leadership -- the path of the continuing, multifaceted class struggle of the forces of progress against the forces of capital domination.

In addition, emerging from the crisis now requires, for reasons of economic effectiveness and in order to respond to the new aspirations arising out of the movement of society, appealing to the broadest participation, to the most active intervention of workers and citizens, whence the new and broadened role of the people's movement.

One can see how, since 1981, the refusal of the Socialist Party to call on the people's forces and take their proposals into account has weakened the government vis-a-vis the pressures of those who have continued to hold mighty powers at all levels of society, how it has isolated it and bled a large part of reforms adopted of their substance, finally leading to the current difficulties.

One has to move toward the continuing, active participation of millions of men and women in the definition, promotion and implementation of all diversified measures -- gradually fitting into a new policy -- which solving the country's problems calls for. All these men and women must have real capacity for action at all levels and the ability to make themselves heard. They must have real powers.

In saying this, we reject the old conception that transforms the most diverse forms rallying together in a movement whose direction is exercised elsewhere into puppets. It is a conception that limits the people's movement to a mere role as an instrument of pressure before agreement in order to permit its conclusion and of support afterwards in order to promote its application. One can now measure the consequences of such a situation. With this conception, the implementation of a new policy is affected by the decisions of the Socialist Party.

The French Communist Party remains a firm supporter of the leftist union. It is available to act, starting now, in all fields with the Socialist Party and others groups in behalf of any anticrisis measure, to support any government measure moving in the right direction. It is in that spirit that it intends to pursue, in all the elected assemblies where there exists a majority of a union of the left, cooperation in order to keep commitments made to the people. For the future, we have yet to conclude agreements between political groups,

particularly the Socialist Party, whenever such agreements are possible. For the role of political parties whose existence and activity are a dimension of democracy cannot be lost from sight.

With this new conception, such agreements constitute at a given time a proper political expression of the people's movement. But in order to be effective, these agreements must not be substituted for the movement itself or confine it. The creative and dynamic existence of this movement is decisive.

Given the prospect of a self-management socialism, we believe that in such a movement, men and women belonging to the most diverse forces will gain access to new responsibilities at all levels and promote new forms of mobilization and leadership in social life. New ways of "making politics" will thus appear. Starting now, such innovations intervene and can intervene more widely in local life. We do not want to prejudge this movement, confine it in advance to pre-established schemes.

Everywhere Communists With the People

Building such a movement means great demands on communists, along with powerful motivations.

Wherever we are found, we intend to heed and serve the workers, men and women seeking a way out of their difficulties, in order to define together the solutions, the ways and means of common action. We are working to create the conditions for the broadest and most effective rallies. If we want to ensure that what we are and what we propose is respected, then we do not want to impose them on anyone or force anyone to give up convictions that are dear. We formulate no preconditions.

This approach is ours in the action we wage directly with the people throughout the country. It is and will be our own in the many unions, organizations and associations of all kinds in whose life we want to participate, with strict respect for their statutes and programs.

The existence and development of a major trade union movement, of a very rich associative life, are important aspects of social, economic, cultural, democratic progress. This is where the first awareness of the people's interests, of the need for organization and action is often forged. It is also often in the evolution of trade union and associative life that aspirations and new needs emerge. Communists cannot underestimate the importance of their contributions to all these activities that bring millions and millions of people together based on their most sensitive concerns.

In the exercise of their mandate, communist elected officials ask the people, excluding no one, to participate in the management of local affairs. Interesting experiments are underway; it is possible to multiply them.

At the same time, we want to develop an unprecedented effort to draft, disseminate and support the new orientations which emerging from the crisis calls for in all domains. We shall do so based on our communist ideal, on the great

traits of French-type socialism that we propose for our country, which will be enriched in a living confrontation with the reality of the struggle.

Listening, discussing, reflecting while retaining what we hear, proposing and convincing: That is the new political practice which we intend to develop, a political practice that is itself significant of what we propose for the future of France.

V. Our Proposed Society: French-Type Socialism, a Democratic, Self-Management Socialism

The majority rally that we want to help build will be achieved on the basis of anticrisis objectives and within a process whose forms and schedule are determined by the people's movement itself. It is up to us to say clearly within what context we intend to include the rally in order to transform existing society and move toward French-type socialism, a democratic, self-management socialism. In short, we must respond to the question: What are the essential traits of the socialism which France needs and for which we are fighting? They are, as we have said, the responses to the rising demands of our society and whose fulfillment capitalism hinders: social justice, new growth, the development of freedoms and democracy, a rebirth of culture, an independent, peaceful and solidary France.

Each of these orientations is the stakes of a bitter class struggle that calls for continuing intervention by us on the front of ideas and action.

Justice, Equality: New Ideas

Today, they are trying to make us accept the intolerable: continuing, massive unemployment, a worsening of social inequalities.

In the guise of liberalism, they are proposing a society in which the desire for social justice is presented as an attack on differences, hostility toward personal initiative and effort.

They want to accustom us to considering as normal, on the one hand, the existence of millions of unemployed, of workers with jobs that are not secure, discouraged about participating in collective action, and on the other hand, to push those with jobs toward forced individualism dominated by fear for the future. They want to break down solidarity, weaken class consciousness and the desire to fight, leaving the field free to big capital.

The path to French-type socialism is the opposite of this path of resignation and despair. It is the fight for full employment, making the right to work a reality. It means full use of science and technology, the training of men to improve living conditions and purchasing power, meeting the people's needs. It means rejecting inequality and reducing everything to the lowest common denominator as a result of unemployment and low wages.

We are for the right to differences: differences in personality, recognition of differences in competence with a necessary hierarchy of wages, the freedom

to choose one's way of life, and so on. But these differences have meaning only when there is respect for justice and progress for all.

We want equal rights for everyone, a school system with equal opportunity, true access to health care, sports and culture, the right of all men and women, workers of all kinds, men and women, young people and adults, French and immigrants, to equal dignity.

New Growth

In order to achieve the objectives of full employment and social justice, we need new growth.

France does have assets despite the blows dealt by the upper bourgeoisie to its natural resources, its economic, scientific, cultural and human potential. Modernizing means creating, not destroying.

Confronted with those who shout "Long live the crisis!" we say: Growth and the production of new resources constitute a basic and essential requirement. That is what is new and modern: growth that does not come about in spite of men but with them, ensuring training, qualification, a living relationship of the most advanced research and production.

The real modernity is man, which is opposed to capitalist profit.

That is why the economic democracy implied by French-type socialism is based on appropriation by society of the major means of production and trade. It presumes that national enterprises will be managed in a different way thanks to the intervention of the workers and will play a pilot role for production in the service of jobs, training and social needs.

Democratic socialism thus puts an end to the domination of big capital. At the same time, it guarantees the individual or family right to own property such as housing, cars, a second residence, along with other consumer goods now or in the future.

At the same time, alongside the public sector, it ensures the existence of other forms of social property: cooperatives, mutual benefit societies, associations, along with an economic sector based on private property: commerce, handicrafts, farms and small and medium-size businesses.

Within such a context, the operation of the public sector, of social activities and relationships between the public and private enterprises in an original mixed economy are basically different from those under capitalism. The extension of freedoms and powers, the intervention and participation of workers at all levels of decision-making, and cooperation in the national interest make it possible to promote democratic life, greater social effectiveness. The public sector, now thoroughly reorganized, plays a decisive role of promoting economic and social progress. In the private sector, all behavior that promotes the creation of wealth and democracy is encouraged, as long as it respects the rights of workers.

The whole economy is oriented toward meeting needs, jobs and professional training.

More Freedoms and Democracy

For us, democracy is at the heart of socialism. It is both the goal to attain and the means of achieving it. That is why, in the clash between forces of progress and reactionary forces, freedom and human rights are at the heart of an essential political struggle. The men of capital throughout the world who concentrate wealth and power in the hands of a minority try to muzzle nations and men, kill and torture in many countries, are bold enough to present themselves as the champions of freedom.

In France itself, they deprive millions of men and women of the right to work. They systematically exclude workers from decisions. They buy off the press, divert the public service which television is for their profit and shout "Freedom! Freedom!"

We want something completely different. Democratic socialism is conceived as an increase in public freedoms and the advancement of individual freedoms. This means respect for universal suffrage, political alternates, the existence of parties, trade unions, associations, churches, the free circulation of men and ideas, a rejection of all censorship, freedom of information, education, creation and culture.

Communists do not want more government; quite the contrary. We want more initiative, more cooperation, more responsibility, the right for each one to choose his way of living.

French-type socialism means more democracy, more rights and powers for the citizen. It is the decline of centralizing statism. France needs a political democracy, representative government of the people encouraging intervention by the people at all levels and enabling the working class to gain access to the highest responsibilities and to exercise a leadership role. In this spirit, we must fight the concentration and personalization of power, institute proportional voting in all elections, broaden the prerogatives of Parliament and all elected assemblies, and ensure the participation of workers in planning.

Decentralization increases the prerogatives of the territorial collectives. It is a means of increasing the decision-making power of the citizens. It favors concerted action by workers in enterprises and of all services with elected officials at all levels.

Cultural Rebirth

The revolution now coming about in science and technology, the movement of the world toward socialism and the liberation of peoples broaden the horizon of mankind. Serious questions such as that of the nuclear arms race, the environment and genetics are posed. They require a new mastery of the future of men and women. That which hinders their daily lives, prevents them from controlling their lives, is the same as that which limits research, creativity and, more generally, the training of each individual: submission to the law of profit.

That is why we cannot have a narrow, elitist conception of culture. We do not pit the daily life of the people against the accumulated treasures of our civilization. Access of the greatest numbers to culture must go hand in hand with research and creativity that constantly push back the frontiers of knowledge and awareness.

New relations between a reorganized system of education, training, research, employment and production must be created.

Instead of being, as is generally the case today, instruments in an ideological struggle in the hands of reactionary forces, the new media are called upon to become a formidable pluralistic, democratic instrument of culture, leisure and information.

There can be no far-reaching cultural renaissance without the establishment of new human relationships. Everyone observes that as a result of the crisis, human relations are experiencing profound deterioration: Trying to succeed at all costs; scorning the weak, who are blamed for their own distress; withdrawing into oneself and responding to violence with violence; bringing out the hideous spectre of racism: All these detestable practices would be swept away and sometimes even assimilated into new values.

We say no.

We refuse the law of the jungle preached by the capitalist society.

Already, other values exist that can contribute to the formation of a new humanism. The respect for each human being, his personality and his dignity, is not an abstract element, but a requirement that becomes more and more important among the workers with every passing day. Active solidarity with those in the world fighting for freedom, their rights and peace must always be affirmed even more.

Thus, the fight against racism and intolerance, for true solidarity among peoples and communities, must be waged starting now.

The demand for equality of women in all aspects of life can thus lead to human relations of a higher quality for everyone.

Thus there can be true solidarity between generations.

The demand for more responsibility at work and where people live makes it possible to see that it is henceforth possible to shake off authoritarianism, bureaucracy, without thereby choosing outrageous individualism and scorn for others. The cities may be a good place to live for millions of city dwellers, by developing its human, productive and cultural diversity. The deterioration of social life and violence exist, but they must not mask profound aspirations toward positive values.

Developing these values presumes a battle over ideas, but also a specific fight to gain ground so that there may emerge a society in which every man and

woman can live free and responsible, find their fulfillment, gain control over their lives, while ensuring the progress of everyone: a more human civilization. That is the fraternal society that we want.

Independent, Peaceful France, Solidary With All Peoples

We are fighting for a world of human rights, peace, justice, democracy and cooperation. Based on sovereignty and the country's independence, mainly ensured by an effective national defense, France's international action will place the considerable assets our people have in the service of great humanistic goals. It will be determined in complete freedom, under all circumstances. It will act for the right of every people to control their own destiny with freedom and security.

This presumes that, respectful of its alliances and rejecting any alignment with any bloc, it will work for the simultaneous dissolution of the military blocs and for collective security. It will try to play a positive role in keeping with its possibilities and in complete independence of judgment, in favor of dialogue, disarmament, a peaceful, negotiated solution to conflicts. It will demonstrate effective and not selective solidarity with peoples fighting for their emancipation and for human rights, against all foreign domination, against racism and arbitrary rule. It will achieve new cooperation based on equal rights, noninterference and mutual interest, with the countries it wants and will contribute to the construction of a new and fairer international economic order in which every nation can follow its original development path, without interference or outside pressure. It will support international organizations such as the United Nations or UNESCO which, with equal participation of all nations, whatever their social system and size, make it possible to strengthen peaceful coexistence and cooperation and express the spirit of our time.

Movement of the World and Socialist Countries

These are the great traits of the proposed society which underlies the action of French communists for socialism. This action fits into a movement of the world toward justice, freedom, independence of nations. A living reality, socialism constantly diversifies. It is the work of peoples with very different histories and political traditions. Everything relating to this movement of peoples and nations, everything dealing with the socialist countries, has been the object, especially in France, of a continuing campaign of denigration. The latter has not been without its effects, for fundamental reasons.

Today, the crisis exposes the impasse to which capitalism leads. The aspiration to a new society freed from exploitation, to dignity, to national and social liberation, to socialism, takes on a universal nature. In the confrontation between the old and the new, it has become essential for those profiting from the current system to try to deprive their victims of all hope. They should resign themselves to these inevitable evils: austerity, unemployment, the domination of big finance, hunger. The crisis is universal. There are no prospects. Countries that have taken a socialist path have failed and elsewhere, even their socialist nature is challenged by some.

These are basically the stakes of the political and ideological battle that we cannot fail to wage. Socialism is not an abstraction. It is built under specific conditions peculiar to every country. The French people, like other peoples, will build a society rid of capitalism, an original society: French-type socialism.

Concerning socialism, the approach adopted by the 24th Congress must be confirmed and it obviously requires a much more aggressive offensive.

This approach consists of better knowing and disseminating the truth. It means fully appreciating the contribution of peoples building socialism, along with the diversity and current limits of the undertaking.

This completely new experience, undertaken within a historically brief span of time and with an ever increasing variety of situations and forms by a billion and a half men, must be examined forthrightly, without prejudice. It is deserving of serious debate.

Peoples embarked upon the construction of socialism have already built up substantial gains. They are showing their capacity to resolve great questions such as the right to work, hunger, literacy training, social security. They do not know the crisis in which capitalism is wallowing.

We are attentive to the responses that these peoples are providing to the problems they have to face: the primitive starting point for most of them, the consequences of war, the limitations of the international environment, with the effects of the crisis in capitalist countries, the burden of the arms race imposed on them, the need for international solidarity, but also, the problems stemming from the grave errors and mistakes that have hindered the development of socialism, and finally, the new problems arising out of their own development.

In order that these societies may move toward new progress, our 24th Congress observed that they should respond to a triple challenge: mastering economic efficiency, ensuring social progress and developing democratic participation.

The countries that have embarked upon the construction of a socialist society have assets. They are proceeding to new experimentation and innovation in order to respond to the questions asked of them. As the reports of international organizations recognize, they obtain undeniable results in fields of burning interest such as modernization and full employment, research and development. They tend to ensure equal opportunity in education and training, with true access to economic and social rights.

The facts show that socialism is more able than capitalism to enable men to face the questions of civilization posed at the close of the 20th century: advancing toward the mastery of nature, placing knowledge in the service of gradually meeting the aspirations of every individual for a better life.

With the drafting of economic reforms, one is witnessing a growing participation of workers in management, appealing to individual and collective responsibility more and more.

This is accompanied by a better recognition of social pluralism, of the contradictions of socialist society. Thus, reflection is underway. The first measures are taken in the direction of a growing role of trade unions, self-management collectives, elected boards, a modification in modes of elections, institutions, and so on. All this expresses the progress made in the most recent period, even if serious difficulties remain.

The same lucidity we show in facing the problems and accomplishments of these countries leads us not to mask our disagreement, to express our disagreement over the attacks on liberty that we see.

As the 23d Congress of our party already observed, it is a matter of problems linked to a "persistent failure to recognize the universal democratic demands posed by socialism."

At the same time, the masses of people fighting throughout the world for peace and progress, for their independence, for a new international economic order, appreciate the role of the socialist countries. They can verify their constant support for the national and social liberation struggles. The weight and action of the socialist countries have been essential in insuring a peaceful coexistence among nations with different social systems in international relations.

By virtue of its very nature and for the accomplishment of its potential, socialism needs peace. The peaceful initiatives of countries that have embarked upon this path come together with the action of nonaligned states and other great political, social and moral forces and the entire people's movement for peace and disarmament.

VI. The Party

In France today, there is a single party which, confronted with all the preachers of resignation, sacrifice and abandonment, clearly affirms: Let us overcome the obstacles and the crisis. We can break down the domination of capitalism and move toward a new society. A single party is opening the positive prospect for our people: the French Communist Party.

Are the workers fighting for their jobs, their production apparatus? Are women fighting inequalities, discrimination? Are young people expressing their rebellion against injustice and their aspirations toward a more fraternal world? Are people, whoever they may be, defending their freedom, their liberty, their human rights? Are they fighting intolerance, xenophobia, racism? Are they working for the independence of our country, international solidarity, disarmament and peace? Do they want to help build French-type socialism? Are they seeking the path of a broader and more effective rally? They find the Communist Party at their side. This is its originality, its *raison d'être* as a revolutionary party of our time. A party about which they can count, a party that will never surrender in the face of difficulty, that its actions and its words belie its words.

That is why, in return, the people's forces urgently need this party, whose choices bind and enlighten the future of France. They have an interest in seeing it regain its influence and play a major role at all levels of the country. All the lessons must be learned from this situation.

Party of Our Policies

The new majority people's rally against the crisis is the central objective of our action. It will be built and will develop based on the problems and concerns that unite the people. These new policies take shape in a difficult, complex period. The very originality requires an exceptional effort on the part of all members. This must lead us to give new vigor and style to our reflection and political activities, to our mass work. Much depends on the initiative of every communist, of party organizations. This obviously implies making every party and cell resolutely at the heart of all our activity. We must be everywhere and move toward the people, create ties with them, especially those who are active in the social movement. It is a question of uniting them in a whole series of decentralized actions. Every communist, every cell, has an irreplaceable role to play.

In order to play that role, the cell must first of all exist and there must be as many communists as possible in every enterprise, every district, every village. Expanding the party's base, making it an ever greater mass party, is an essential means for making our positions and proposals known, for taking up the countless questions that are posed daily. Since the 24th Congress, because of the decline in the party's influence and a tangible decline in recruiting, our numbers have dwindled. We shall probably end the year 1984 with some 610,000 members. Without minimizing the decline, we can say at the same time that the party has stood up to recent tests. It has considerable forces and great possibilities of increasing our ranks. Today, many men and women are looking to our party for help. Many of them have already taken their places in our ranks. This presumes a bold recruiting effort. It presumes that every communist will propose joining the party, that he will do so in speaking to all those who, whether young or old, white- or blue-collar workers, farmers or intellectuals, have their place in the party, a rightful place, with their ability and their demands, their skills and failings.

It is in the cell that one comes closest to the reflection and problems of the people. It is at this level that one can find them, rally them, help them to intervene. It is at this level that the proper ideological battle is waged. It is at this level that the party's policies are discussed, assimilated and implemented. It is at this level that the party member may at all times give his opinions on anything. It is at this level that our policies are seen as coming closest to reality, where the most complex and most concrete forms of the rally we want to build will be determined. In order to take shape, our strategy has one essential requirement: to have many strong and active cells with good leadership, turned toward the masses. The acuity of the political and ideological battle, the requirement of a new political routine on the part of communists, calling upon decentralized initiative, imply that the party and all its organizations will expand their efforts to implement a rapid.

multifaceted, clear and combative propaganda confronting the adversary, one adapted to the diversified needs for action.

In the battle for honest information and the diffusion of our ideas, the communist press plays an essential role. Its reading is an important element in the democratic life of the party. The development and dissemination of our press is a necessity for every cell. Those of L'HUMANITE will be facilitated by its complete and living adaptation to the changes of our time.

The concept of communist activity in close contact with the people's movement also implies that in order to take the revolutionary everywhere and make it stronger, we must give priority, true priority, to the effort aimed at the enterprises and establishments, beginning with the largest. Those at the forefront of new technologies will receive particular attention.

Having a party always better anchored in the enterprises has always been necessary. The enterprise is in fact the decisive place of the concentration and organization of the working class and other categories of wage earners, meaning the decisive point of mass mobilization.

But this is even more indispensable today because the enterprises, in the perspective we now have, have turned out to be the privileged place of the majority people's rally that must be created and because of the fact that it is in the enterprises that this rally has more obvious, immediate reasons for coming about, but also because any success or defeat has the most repercussions there. The presence, activity and influence of the revolutionary party therefore constitute a cardinal element, absolutely decisive for the move toward French-type socialism.

Democratic Life of the Party

Concerning the internal life of the party, the great question now facing communists is to improve their capacity for initiative and the effectiveness of their intervention.

From this standpoint, the bylaws of our party constitute the precise guarantee that effectiveness, unity of action and democracy will be joined together.

Three main principles characterize democratic centralism: free and thorough discussion, majority decisions, application by everyone. These principles cannot be challenged without questioning the drafting and democratic application of party policies.

Democratic centralism enables every individual to count, thanks to the organization of the party into cells, which actually gives every communist without exception the possibility of expressing himself, of debating problems, of speaking out on all questions. It enables each one to give party reflection the benefit of his own reflection, his own sensitivities, without being catalogued or labeled. It is therefore totally opposed to the system of tendencies that impoverishes political debate, crystallizes discord and degenerates into personal clashes.

Thanks to the exchange of arguments and experiences, democratic centralism is the means of coming to a common will that will be that of the party as a whole.

Democratic centralism prevents paralysis of action, but ensures the implementation of the majority decision, while enabling every communist to preserve his opinion and defend it in the party. Through common experience, the criterion of practice enables us to resolve all problems posed.

In order to perfect democratic life in the party, we must always contribute to the complete information of communists and encourage their free discussion, raise the political and ideological level of the party, intensify the activity of party schools, encourage the development of theoretical research, ensure the circulation of ideas from the top down and from the bottom up.

From the top down, for communists need to be informed of the decisions made by the leadership, but also to know all the reasons for them in order to understand them properly and implement them. At the same time, we must ensure that ideas are circulated from the bottom up in order that the leadership may be well-informed of the reality of the facts and opinions of communists facing that reality, that they may take them into consideration.

Thus, the response of communists to the development of discontent with the policies of the Macroy government should have been perceived better and more rapidly by the party's Central Committee.

It is decisive that section and federal committees, that cadres and leaders at all levels, play their role even better, participating closely in the life, discussions and activities of the cells.

It is also indispensable to practice new forms of work and to exchange experiences when there exists or arises a problem concerning communists or the cells or the sections of a single department or of several departments.

We should always organize meetings of diverse types making it possible to bring communists in a great enterprise, branch, region or a given sector, those concerned by a specific problem, into the necessary reflection and decisions.

The measures taken since the Central Committee meeting held in May 1982 in Saclas must be pursued in order to have solid sections capable of truly leading the party of the workers in their territory, to provide continuing aid in the life and activity of the cells, to create new party organizations.

The section committee is the leadership organization located the most closely to the cells and in direct contact with them. The responsibilities of the section and cell secretaries are therefore important leadership tasks for the life of the entire party.

This is why, with their tasks of political leadership, the federal committees and the Central Committee must devote an essential portion of their activity to daily aid to the cells and sections.

France is going through a difficult period. It is seeking the paths to the future amidst concern. Communists, also facing difficulties, do not intend to fail in their vocation as the bearers of hope. Aware of the conditions and demands of the times, they have decided to promote wide-ranging work among the masses in order to build that new majority people's rally which the country needs in order to emerge from the crisis and move toward French-type socialism.

It is a difficult task. The challenge is a bold one, but there is no other way. The country can count on the French Communist Party.

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GREENS FRUSTRATED AS OLDER PARTIES ADOPT ITS CAUSES

Helsinki HELSINGIN SANOMAT in Finnish 6 Nov 84 p 24

[Commentary by Antti Vahtera]

[Text] Amsterdam--Holland's Green Party is still in its embryonic stage since it began organizing last summer. It is currently in the process of compiling a party program, after which it will begin an active membership drive. At this time, Holland's Greens have only a few hundred members.

However, the fledgling has already tried out its wings. In last summer's "Euro-elections", in the elections of the European Community, Holland's Greens did reasonably well. True, they did not elect one single candidate and the number of votes they received, approximately 70,000 or 1.3 percent, seems to be very modest. However, it must be taken into consideration that the Greens lacked both money and time for mounting a decent election campaign.

Doctor B. Kuiper, who obtained the most votes from among a three-man list of Greens, points out that the number of votes obtained would have won two seats in Holland's parliament. He believes that in the future the party will become a significant factor in Dutch elections once it becomes organized, compiles a program, and acquires a membership.

A Tide of Ideologies

Not everyone, even among those who adopt a positive attitude in principle toward the Greens' objectives and philosophy, is necessarily of the same opinion. Many doubt whether a Green Party is needed at all in Holland.

The country's political structure can already in itself present obstacles to the rise of the party. Holland has 17 different parties, of which many are insignificant small parties. It is not easy for a newcomer to acquire a foothold in the political arena, which is already flooded with various political trends.

On the other hand, it can be noted that in Holland, as elsewhere in Western Europe, the ideas of the Greens have acquired a considerable sounding board among the voters. Perhaps, in Holland more than anywhere else since various environmental groups have been especially active there.

But even this factor does not necessarily play into the hands of the Green Party. Other parties have changed their programs almost across the board and their attitudes have become perceptibly "more Green".

Marijke Brunt, who directs a Dutch environmental cover organization, says that his organization has conducted a comparative study of the election platforms of parties in the 1978 and 1982 elections. It revealed that in the latter elections the attitudes of parties toward environmental questions had become clearly more positive.

A Small Country, Dense Population

F. A. M. Majoor, who deals with international environmental affairs in Holland's Foreign Ministry, considers that political parties in Holland have always paid more attention than the usual to the environment. "In our parliament there are MP's in the various parties whom we know to have very close ties with environmental protection groups," says Majoor.

Holland's social conditions are the basic reason for this protective intellectuality according to Majoor: a small country in which there is a high population density, much industry, and dairy farming. Environmental problems have been seen first hand, they are everything but academic.

"Therefore, I do not believe that the Green Party has many chances for success," says Majoor. "It does not fill a political opening as it does, for example, in West Germany."

The Greens are, naturally, of a different opinion. They do not believe that the established parties have sufficiently radical environmental programs. Or rather: the parties set forth fine goals and talk beautifully about environmental values, but in practice they lack consistency and sincerity.

"The other parties, especially the left-wing parties, are nominally friendly to the environment, but in reality they do not give it the necessary priority," states Kuiper. When a factory is a major contributor to pollution, we demand that it be closed. The other parties say that this is not appropriate since closure would cause unemployment."

"Government Is Indifferent"

Marijke Brunt, whose organization educates and pressures politicians at The Hague in environmental questions as one of its primary tasks, welcomes the Green Party. Brunt does not have too much confidence in the "environmental intellectuality" of the established parties.

Brunt cites the nuclear power question. There are two functioning nuclear power plants in Holland, a large one and a small one. An extensive energy debate, in which approximately 40,000 people participated, was recently arranged in the country. It included a statistical opinion poll, from which one could determine that the vast majority of the Dutch supports solar and wind energy and other renewable energy sources, but opposes nuclear power, particularly new power plants.

"However, the government is still planning new nuclear power plants. This it is doing contrary to democracy just as if no energy debate had been conducted at all. The Christian Democratic Party, one of the ruling parties, said in its last election platform that there is no need to increase nuclear power. Now it has suddenly changed its tune."

Marijke Brunt adds that in Holland, where electricity consumption increases only 1 percent annually and a 25-percent overcapacity prevails in its energy production, only a few new power plants will be needed by the end of this century. In this case, gas-powered power plants would be the most appropriate.

Energy conservation is needed more than anything else, adds Marijke Brunt, in expressing approval of one of the Greens' primary themes.

The Green movement, whether it be a question of a party, organizations, or only public actions, is faced with a difficult uphill battle in a country such as Holland. Even though the environmental movement has won some important victories, many problems are still awaiting a solution and some are even becoming worse.

Waddenzee, the broad littoral zone extending from Holland all the way to Denmark, which is inhabited by hundreds of bird species, is one of the most important objectives of the environmentalists in Holland. An organization established in the small town of Haringen for the purpose of protecting this zone enjoys the respect of official circles and has been able to prevent the worst threats directed against the area.

One of the most difficult problem areas is waste, especially the construction of a hazardous waste treatment plant on land. According to a calculation made by Marijke Brunt's organization, in Holland there are hundreds of dump sites containing toxic wastes or other accumulations of waste, of which some are, indeed, fatal. Dioxin, perhaps the most hazardous of all poison, leaked from a dump located in the vicinity of Amsterdam a couple years ago.

The so-called Lekkerkerk incident was an outright environmental scandal a few years ago. The community in question was built on top of an old dump site, from which leaking toxic gases forced officials to commence demolition work, which turned out to be extremely expensive.

Water Situation Difficult

The Rhine river has become somewhat cleaner in recent years due to the purification plants built in Holland and West Germany, but the water situation is otherwise difficult. Manure originating from the large herds of dairy cows together with artificial fertilizers has caused the eutrophication of the water systems. Many environmental toxins also pose a serious threat.

The Green Party considers that more profound changes in attitude and more forceful actions than what they other parties are capable of or willing to take are needed in order to resolve these and other environmental problems.

The mere existence of a Green movement with its various lines of action is not sufficient to accomplish this according to Kuiper, but direct political contact and influence are needed.

The Green Party is, for the time being, functioning under a collective leadership and most likely will do so even in the future. It is striving to observe the rules of democracy and administrative decentralization more precisely than the other parties: the Greens in the provinces are given the freest possible rein.

10576
CSO: 3617/18

POLL SHOWS RISE IN PSD POPULARITY TO DETRIMENT OF PS

Lisbon SEMANARIO in Portuguese 3 Nov 84 p 9

[Text] An exclusive NORMA/SEMANARIO poll with figures for January of this year revealed the following totals: Socialist Party [PS], 31.9; Social Democratic Party [PSD], 22.8; United People's Alliance [APU] 21.2; Social Democratic Center [CDS], 13.3. Therefore, compared with the "legislative" elections of 1983, the PS had declined 3.1, the PSD, 2.0 and the CDS 0.8, while the APU registered an increase of 0.1.

Although the decline of the socialists at that time appeared to be the most noticeable, it could be thought that the figures did not assume a worrisome aspect. Now, however, (and even with respect to 1983) the APU increases 2.0 (and it is the party which increases the most), the CDS, 0.7; and the PSD holds on to its 24.8, while the PS declines....11.1.

Let us recall that in a similar poll published by us last July, the following were the results revealed: Abstention, 18.5; APU, 20.3; CDS, 15.4; PDS, 23.6; PS, 21.5; Others, 10.1

About Increases

About increases compared to 1983, let us begin with a negative one, that of abstention. It was 19.0 in 1983, today it would be 21.7.

Such an increase shows up almost as a constant in all the target cities of the poll. There is only one exception: Evora. In the capital of Alto Alentejo, (where all four of the main parties decline and there is a steep rise from 2.8 to 21.5 in the sector of "others,") abstention today is less than 3.1. In contrast, abstention acquires a more significant figure in Viseu: 33.7 compared to 23.2 in 1983.

The most significant increases in voting: PCP, from 6.4 to 12.8 in Viseu; the CDS, from 19.8 to 23.9, also in Viseu; the PSD, from 25.7 to 29.1 in Coimbra.

There is no record of any increase for the PS.

With respect to the undecided of 1983, naturally there is no record because all the figures are the results of votes cast. However, there are figures on blank votes and nullified votes and, therefore, if we group the three headings: blank, nullified and undecided, into one, we would find that the largest increase would be in Lisbon (from 2.1 to 9.7).

And the Declines

Bypassing the evidence that with a rise in the number of abstentions, the number of voters automatically declines, we find that the only real decline is that of the Socialist Party. The fact that the PSD, its partner in the present government coalition, at this moment is maintaining the exact percentage of votes it obtained in the 1983 elections, 24.8, is perhaps not irrelevant.

Also significant is the fact of the decline of the socialists in uniform figures: they declined in the six cities in which the poll was taken by figures which range from 5.1 in Vila Real (the smallest) to 13.8 in Lisbon (the largest). Between the two extremes, and in a declining order, we find Viseu (8.8), Porto (9.1), Coibra (9.3), and Evora (10.6).

8908
CSO: 3542/45

FORMER CR OFFICERS SAID TO RECRUIT MERCENARIES FOR ANGOLA

Authorities Investigate

Lisbon O DIA in Portuguese 30 Oct 84 p 1

[Text] Possible involvement of Rosa Coutinho in the recruiting of Portuguese soldiers for Angola is being investigated by Portuguese authorities.

The government and the armed forces requested an investigation on possible activities by military men, who are allegedly linked to the controversial admiral, in the People's Republic of Angola. That decision was motivated by the appearance in the media of reports saying that officers of the armed forces permanent personnel on reserve status are now performing military functions at the service of the Marxist regime of Luanda.

Official sources confirmed that the attention of Minister of Defense Mota Pinto and of the CEMGFA [Chief of the Armed Forces General Staff], Lemos Ferreira, was particularly drawn to the COTECO Company, to whose management Rosa Coutinho is linked. He was given the name of "red" by the revolution because of the favors he did for the communist escalation in Angola. According to undenied reports, COTECO is allegedly responsible for the recruiting and contracting of the aforementioned officers.

Former Officers' Involvement

Lisbon EXPRESSO in Portuguese 3 Nov 84 p 2

[Text] The official announcement that the Portuguese Armed Forces and government requested an investigation Monday on the activities of alleged mercenaries in Angola (to be done by the Judicial Police) was the first intervention by the state since the case was revealed in 1983.

Last 5 April, the agency NP declared that 50 former Portuguese Army officers were training groups of SWAPO [South West African People's Organization] guerrillas on the outskirts of Luanda. The report was based on an Angolan antigovernment source, which placed direct responsibility for that activity on Admiral Rosa Coutinho and Eurico Corvacho, his partner in the COTECO Company, a "technical and commercial cooperation corporation."

Recently the weekly TAL & QUIL also named Lt Cols Gomes de Abreu, Barata and Arlindo Dias Ferreira; Col Delfin Leitao; Maj Gil and Capt Figueiredo as being contracted by COTECO "among a total of 40 Portuguese military men-- all released from active duty, who in recent times went to Angola through COTECO."

The same weekly also declared that Adm Rosa Coutinho was disappointed at the "constant squabbling among his 'mercenaries.'"

However, in this week's edition, TAL & QUIL reported the death of former militia Captain Antonio Manuel Santos Lanca last September as he was giving instructions with explosives to soldiers of the Angolan troops.

8908
CSO: 3542/45

SCENARIOS FOR POST-COALITION GOVERNMENT FALL

Lisbon SEMANARIO in Portuguese 17 Nov 84 p 2

[Article by Marcelo Rebelo de Sousa]

[Excerpt] Theoretically, six scenarios are possible, requiring a tally that starts with the least likely and ends with the most likely: First scenario: PS [Socialist Party]-CDS [Social Democratic Center Party] government. In this unlikely event, PS would replace PSD [Social Democratic Party] with CDS, in a government with majority parliamentary support, and with the first task of avoiding discontinuity in the executive branch and preparing for the 1985 elections. It is an unlikely scenario in view of PS' current dynamics, and CDS' opposing stance, leaving PSD out (multiplying the critical effect of its radicalization against PS) and accentuating, instead of minimizing the ideological and strategic inconsistencies within the government. It is definitely a scenario to be excluded.

Second scenario: PS-PSD government with another prime minister and in different molds. Despite the fact that this scenario has been suggested by responsible PSD politicians, its likelihood is slight. If the agreement between partners in the coalition failed in a matter of days, then it is unrealistic to expect the formula to be revived a few weeks later, because neither Dr Mario Soares and PS nor the current internal situation in PSD would tolerate it. After the overwhelming, publicly discussed breakoffs, the most difficult thing would be to reestablish the formula which failed, even though in a form slightly different from the previous one. This is another scenario to be excluded.

Third scenario: Government of initiative with a presidential base, retaining the present composition of the Assembly of the Republic. In this instance, the president of the republic would take advantage of the crisis in the larger parliamentary majority that always governs; he would not dissolve Parliament, but he would form one or a series of governments on his initiative, which would be repudiated by the Assembly of the Republic, but which could, however, last until the 1985 election period. It is almost as unlikely as the previous scenarios, because 1 year is too long a time for that ploy. The parties, in self-defense, might even respond appropriately to it and the president, owing to his own past profile, would not be very much inclined toward solutions

based on such an initiative. In the realm of probability, it has some, albeit slight chances, despite the opposing arguments, and more potential than the first two scenarios.

Fourth scenario: Government of democratic unity backed from a parliamentary standpoint by PS, PSD and CDS. Presided over by another Socialist (not the secretary general), it would include members or individuals associated with the three parties, aimed at confronting the economic crisis without political cost for any one party in particular, guaranteeing stability, ensuring reinforced impartiality during the pre-election period, and preventing the dissolution of Parliament by the president of the republic. However, it has the flaws of assuming that PS will agree to continue, even on those terms, the government collaboration with PSD after a possible resounding split; that the latter would attempt to remain in the government by force, even after an anti-PS dispute; that CDS would increase its distance from the opposition to embark into the government; and, finally, that this complex scheme would work, without bringing into the executive branch even more instability than there is at present, and without giving PCP [Portuguese Communist Party] the tempting fruit of a monopoly on the opposition in Portugal (and we would not even venture the imaginary suggestion of a government of four, with MDP/CDE [Portuguese Democratic Movement/Democratic Electoral Commission], which would be unacceptable to two of the remaining partners and perhaps even to PS). The fourth scenario has more likelihood than the three already cited, but it is faced with serious obstacles.

Fifth scenario: Dissolution of the Assembly of the Republic by the president of the republic with early legislative elections; making it possible to launch the Eanist party, to groom the presidential candidate (a similar military candidate competing with Eanes?), to erode the present party system and to capitalize on the misfortunes and distress in the government and the majority. When viewed dispassionately, this scenario seems rather unlikely, but let's introduce the emotional factor of the attempt at, and thwarting of other scenarios, the prolongation of the political crisis and General Eanes' use of political time and silence (one of the few skills that he exercises easily), and we shall have a scenario that is more likely than the previous one.

Sixth scenario: Minority PS government with parliamentary support. A different kind, whether it be from PSD alone, or from PSD and CDS, or whether it be a combination of support and tolerance for putting through the respective program. It is the most simple, economical and quick solution, but it has difficulties to surmount, such as the desire of PS to withstand alone the costs of managing the crisis after the central bloc and a painful breakoff, the presidential guerrilla action or even the risk of a refusal of a formula that is considered too weak for the crisis to be confronted and the transfer of the center of power to Parliament, for sluggish negotiations and for almost punctual adjustments; because it is unbelievable that this formula would be accepted by PSD now, as it might have been a year and a half ago (then, it would have been an assured commitment for a set period of time; now, it would be a commitment in

a pre-election atmosphere and after a break with PS). Nevertheless, this scenario does not have fewer chances of occurring than any of the foregoing do.

We have cited only six typical scenarios, for obvious reasons of simplification and clarity.

Some inventive mind would create well over a dozen, combining these and other less plausible hypotheses.

What is important is to make it clear that the more likely scenarios are divided into two groups: the scenarios associated with self-defense of the party system against presidential intervention; and the scenarios associated with a possible presidential initiative, exercised at a time of crisis and discreditation of the parties, specifically, those of the government. Needless to say, PCP would always be pleased to align itself with the materialization of the second group of scenarios.

In other words, a suicide of the government at present lends complete timeliness to a combination that might be thought to have been eliminated or at least minimized: the combination of the leading democratic political parties and Gen Ramalho Eanes, and Eanism, a combination from which CDS and PCP do not escape, the former having to select its own area, and the latter with its area already selected.

The information is on the table for all of us to ponder and draw conclusions regarding the advantages and disadvantages, the positive effects and the costs of this suicide.

2909
CSO: 3542/60

COMMENTS ON MOTA PINTO VICTORY AT PSD COUNCIL MEETING

Lisbon DIARIO DE NOTICIAS in Portuguese 27 Nov 84 p 6

[Text] As had been anticipated a week ago, in the course of the meeting of the PSD district groups in Coimbra, Mota Pinto once again emerged as the winner from the National Council meeting of the Social Democrats. It was, we might add, a clearcut victory, since the majority of the party's sensitive members backed the strategy submitted by the president almost in its entirety. It was, moreover, a personal victory, because it is he who will be responsible for carrying forward that strategy. But, of course, it was also a victory that has its price and will have its consequences. This is what we shall attempt to assess, insofar as possible.

At the outset, Mota Pinto's position before this party meeting was not comfortable, even despite the early support gained in the district elections. Accused of putting PSD [Social Democratic Party] in a secondary position after Socialist interests, and suspected of hampering the launching of an autonomous candidacy through tactical complicity with the PS [Socialist Party] candidacy, the Social Democratic leader had little leeway for giving a response to the challenge hurled at him by Mario Soares regarding the conditions for the continuation of the coalition. Sacrificing to the stability of the central bloc the clearness of a strategy of his own for the presidential elections meant challenging the party and hence jeopardizing the invoked stability. Counting on a candidate of his own and citing the latter's name would mean preparing the break too soon and possibly offering advantages to third parties. Under these circumstances, Mota Pinto had only one course of action: to accept the party's demand expressed by several movements and by the rank and file, to refuse to back someone else's candidate, and requesting of it in return that the selection be the responsibility of the Political Commission and be postponed until the next National Council meeting. Ultimately, when the situation is viewed carefully, Mota Pinto's victory was primarily the victory of those who, from the beginning, wanted to prevent the experience of the present coalition from turning into a test for the formation of a power bloc with a more extensive horizon than the one promised to the legislature.

Nevertheless, such an option on Mota Pinto's part is not devoid of consequences. On the contrary, it is even fitting to say that, starting now, nothing will be as it was before within the coalition; and for several reasons.

First, because, in a certain sense, the correlation of forces has been upset. Actually, up until now Mota Pinto's failure to take a stand was prompting all kinds of speculation, even that of imagining him interested in forcing the party toward an extension of the bloc as a result of the support negotiated for Soares' candidacy. The criticism made of him for an alleged lack of authority in the party came precisely from that reasoning. Now then, at present, the Social Democratic leader has the party on his side. However, to achieve this he ended up adopting the prevailing tendency; and the latter obviously is not going in the direction of extending the alliance with the Socialists. In short, the PS logic presume that the mountain would come to Mohammed. And it was precisely the opposite that happened.

Under these circumstances, Mario Soares is now faced with the leader of the Social Democrats plus the sensitive ones whom he was accusing of being in the opposition and who are clearly interested in hurling the problem of the government's continuation into the arms of PS. Hereafter, it will be up to the Socialists to choose between launching their own candidacy right now, ensuring the cohesion of the government, which would then become the priority space for battle among candidates, and peacefully witnessing the materialization of the PSD strategy which, because of its nature, will be unable to consent to the figure of the prime minister and possible contender. Furthermore, it will be up to the Socialists to decide whether this "sacrifice" on its part is worthwhile, in the hope that, in a likely runoff election in the presidential race, the circumstances will be changed in their favor or whether under such circumstances the coalition ceases to make sense. Finally, it will be up to the Socialists to decide on a strategy for the presidential elections and to find a political context wherein it would be closely associated with the continuation of the government until the middle of next year.

One thing is certain: Almeida Santo's proposal that the presidential elections be shelved for 6 months is precluded unless Mota Pinto succeeds in postponing the selection of his own candidate for that long a time; something that would run counter to everything approved at Viseu. Is it possible that some more certainties will come from the so greatly anticipated summit?

2909
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PSD RAPPED FOR ALLEGED OPPOSITION TO COALITION

Lisbon DIARIO DE NOTICIAS in Portuguese 18 Nov 84 p 10

[Commentary by Francisco Marcelo Curto: "PSD Commits Hara-kiri"]

[Text] I have always been one of those who said it would be difficult to achieve a minimum degree of government stability and balance with a partner like the PSD [Social Democratic Party]. A party intersected by divergent interests and mentalities and without ideological and political coherence, it has always presented a restless and unstable appearance, which might be valid in a search for solutions and in its creativity, if its internal populism could find some minimally stable points of reference, which happened with Sa Carneiro, but around an individual and ideas and programs which were contradictory.

A political accord with this party organization would be and is a continuing surprise, even more so in a period of crisis which demands discipline and restraint, strictness and limits accepted and practiced, instead of agitation, impatience and personal and group rivalries.

The PS [Socialist Party]/ PSD government has not been a model of coherence and rigor, and the errors and omissions have been great enough to warrant the criticism and even the refusal to accept measures that are inept and a threat to the social base of support for a program of the center left, such measures as the internal security law and the supplementary budget deficit of 1984. The financial constraints, the lack of positive and timely political decisions, the failure to define sectoral policies, which are left to the inspiration and good intentions of some ministers, and the passivity and manifest incompetence of other ministers (like the minister of agriculture) are no small factors in the creation of a climate of public skepticism and a deepening loss of hope for better days, if the ineffectiveness of the government and the moral and spiritual degradation which we are witnessing now continues. The government coalition appears to have so much confidence in its comfortable majority that it is neglecting to attend properly to the tasks of government.

It is universally recognized today that a government cannot solve all problems and cannot be held responsible for everything. Still, its share of the responsibility and its capacity for action, unused in the case of the PS/PSD government, is quite large.

Opposition

What is unacceptable is that some PSD members are indulging in a series of initiatives that are clearly in open or veiled opposition to their government. They are apparently indifferent to the fact that they are needling the government and the PS, as if it were a matter of overthrowing an adversary and not of helping to improve the coalition or, for the most severe critics, of maintaining a discreet silence, at least publicly.

More significant, however, is the increasingly strident opposition to Mario Soares, who has just been put up as a presidential candidate. The hunger for a candidate of the Right, and thus indicative of a conservative nostalgia which the AD [Democratic Alliance] expressed and frustrated, is evident in these voices, which are a good illustration of the divergent currents running through the PSD.

In the rejection of Mario Soares there may also be an irrational but persistent fear of the loss of identity, of a diluted party, with the sudden loss of the father figure of Sa Carneiro, never recovered.

Have these currents in the PSD really evaluated the possible consequences of their attitudes for the foreseeable political future? Do they want to dismantle the public sector and demand the support of the government and the nationalized bank for inviable private enterprises and incompetent businessmen? Do they want domestic measures against corruption and a reduction in public spending, and are they hell-bent on filling the posts in the public enterprises, and do they favor cronyism and the sale of profitable undertakings to foreign capital, without rules and without limits?

Before demanding and approving measures, it should be known what projects and methods will be employed to accomplish all this. There is no doubt that drastic, radical and rigorous reforms are needed in our productive apparatus, but it is also necessary to know who has the capacity and competence to draw them up and carry them out.

Childish and Irresponsible

I have always rejected single solutions and saviors. We know all too well the practical meaning of "Who is not with us is against us" and of the imperative of the common good, which always covered for the shameless protection of a parasitic political class and retrograde capitalist interests and the [injustices of] fascism, which left an indelible mark on those who suffered under it and fought against it.

This PS/PSD coalition does not have the only solutions and its principal actors are not and do not even represent themselves as saviors or as irreplaceable.

It would be childish and irresponsible to fire in the dark and destroy the house before allowing ourselves to create and seriously discuss the possibilities for self-reform and an improvement in the results and in the structure of this building which shelters us.

--If for no other reason, so that we don't fall unwarily into the hands of political adversaries, less capable than ours, which only have the power to destroy us, if we give it to them.

FOREIGN MINISTER OUTLINES WORLD POLICY

Luanda DIARIO DE NOTICIAS in Portuguese 20 Nov 84 p 4

[Text] "Portugal must accept itself as a peninsular country and reject the idea that it is an Iberian country," Jaime Gama observed yesterday, explaining the coordinates of Portuguese foreign policy at the Fourth Lisbon International Conference, held at the Castelo de Sao Jorge, in Lisbon

Minister Jaime Gama described the foundations of Portuguese diplomacy at yesterday's final session of the Fourth Lisbon International Conference, promoted by the Institute of Strategic and International studies [IEEI]. The conference is continuing today, again at the Castelo de Sao Jorge, with two topics: the nation's prospects for European political cooperation; and the impact of European integration on trans-Atlantic relations.

"It was an idea that had never occurred to me until now," commented Alvaro Vasconcelos, president of the IEEI, after Jaime Gama's speech, which came about 1/2 hour after Medeiros Ferreira put up for debate the proposition that the countries of the Iberian peninsula are politically sidelined by Europe.

Jaime Gama presented a list of "some useful rules for positioning Portugal properly in the international picture," and he stressed the observation that the maritime component of our civilization "forces us to look not only landward."

An Atlantic country, "without being excessively North Atlantic" (it knows how to look toward Brazil and Africa, the Mediterranean and Arab world and the East); a Western country, but without losing sight of the Third World ("Europe reinforces Portugal's weight outside Europe, but Africa and Latin America also strengthen Portugal's weight in Europe"); a country which cannot forget the Portuguese-speaking world ("this territoriality of spirit that unites us with six other countries"): these are the master lines drawn by Jaime Gama for our foreign policy.

First, however, the minister described the primary objectives of Portuguese diplomacy.

In the first place, Gama noted the question of European integration; the minister hoped that the goal of 1 January 1986 "will be emphasized" at the next round

of negotiations in Brussels at the end of this month. The minister reminded the 20 or so Portuguese and foreign IEEI conferees that "while integration will not be the panacea that will make our own modernization efforts unnecessary, it is a national project which merits the explicit consensus of the vast majority of the Portuguese political forces, excepting the communists." Such a national project would permit creation of a social market economy which would break "with the tutelary spectres of corporatism and collectivism."

The second foreign policy objective is the Atlantic Alliance. "Control of the navigation of the East Atlantic, the entry and exit from the Mediterranean, the Europe-Asia, Europe-Latin America, Europe-U.S.-Canada routes, rapid reinforcement in the event of crisis or conflict in the European Theater or in the Near and Middle East, as well as in the Maghreb and in West Africa, of the containment of the submarine threat to Europe and the United States: in all of these, Portuguese positions offer logistical points of support of incalculable value," the minister explained.

The third objective is that of the relations with Africa and Latin America. Jaime Gama noted that requests for cooperation are beginning to come from linguistic areas outside the Portuguese-speaking countries, citing the cases of Zimbabwe and Francophone African countries.

As the last objective, involving new diplomatic targets for Portugal, Jaime Gama pointed on one side to Japan, China and the industrialized countries of the Far East and, on the other side, to the United States. The minister divulged that a large sum had just been allocated for the operation of a Luso-American Development Fund, the statutes for which are in a final phase of negotiation between Lisbon and Washington.

6362

CSO: 3542/56

JARDIM ADVOCATES CREATION OF 'RADICAL ALLIANCE'

Lisbon DIARIO DE NOTICIAS in Portuguese 22 Nov 84 p 3

[Text] The need to change the political system, the creation of a "radical alliance," encompassing the PSD [Social Democratic Party] and the party forces to its right, and the presidential issue were three of the major topics addressed yesterday by Alberto Joao Jardim at the American Club of Lisbon.

In Jardim's opinion, in December 1985 "the situation will be worse" and the people will be more apt to recognize the need for change, "to understand that if Portugal does not change its political-constitutional system, there is a danger that we will have another Turkey or 'Greece of the colonels' 2 or 3 years from now."

Under the circumstances, it will be up to the PSD to "lead the change in the Portuguese society," which cannot be done by one party alone; hence, he recommends the creation of a so-called "'radical alliance,' which would involve not only the PSD but also the democratic forces to the right of the Social Democrats." Jardim stressed, however, that "this 'radical alliance' has nothing to do with the defunct Democratic Alliance, which was confined to a mere party accord."

The chief of government of Madeira also feels that "the issue of the presidential elections is very important to the survival of the system. Hence the danger that the PSD, because of external and also internal pressure, will be pushed into reaching decisions too early.

Jardim added that "if a presidential candidate were selected too soon, he could suffer from the phenomenon of erosion and jeopardize a decisive political project for change."

Meanwhile, the leader of the Madeiran Social Democrats argued that the PS [Socialist Party]/PSD government must perform its functions until "the presidential elections, to prevent worse evils resulting from presidential initiatives."

6362

CSO: 3542/56

PUBLIC, PRIVATE AGENCIES DISCUSS YOUTH ISSUES

Lisbon DIARIO DE NOTICIAS in Portuguese 20 Nov 84 p 4

[Text] Half the juvenile population of Portugal habitually consumes alcohol and 83,000 young people use drugs. In light of figures like these, several public agencies have taken the initiative of sponsoring workshops on "Youth, Its Integration, What Answers?", which began yesterday at the Calouste Gulbenkian Foundation. The purpose is to coordinate action directed toward youth, which has been scattered up to now.

About 350 specialists are participating in the proceedings, representing the following institutions: Casa Pia; the Center for Study and Prevention of Drug Abuse, of Pedagogic Medicine of Lisbon; the Regional Office of Social Security in Lisbon; the general directorates of Basic Education, of the Minor Guardianship Services and of Secondary Education-Special Education Division; the FAOJ; the Institute for Professional Employment and Training; the Institute for Social Rehabilitation; and the Santa Casa de Misericordia of Lisbon.

Alarming Figures

About half the juvenile population habitually consumes alcoholic beverages and more than a fifth of these abuse them; 8 percent show a clear tendency toward alcoholism.

Almost 5 percent of the 1,694,000 young people between 12 and 22 years of age are occasional drug users; 36 percent of these are habitual users and half of this group uses more than one drug. These figures were cited in the opening address by Joao Gomes, director of the Santa Casa da Misericordia.

Although these figures are alarming, they are not surprising, according to Joao Gomes, because, as the First Congress of Social Psychiatry found, of 0.5 million alcoholics in Portugal, 74.5 percent began to ingest alcohol in their childhood.

In the area of employment, Portuguese youth also face particularly severe problems; 200,000 young people are seeking employment for the first time and it has been estimated that, in the second quarter of this year, jobless youth will account for 16.2 percent of the unemployment in the economically active population.

Regarding education, according to data supplied by the Office of Coordination of Higher Education, this year about half the young people applying to college failed the entrance examination, which meant their automatic exclusion.

Speaking to the group, Mario Soares stressed that, despite the gravity of the situation indicated by the figures, the specific problem of youth unemployment cannot be solved "in a day," but that the Ministry of Labor is going to develop some programs, within the framework of the pre-admission aid granted by the EEC. The problem might be solved, he added, "when Portugal solves its own development problems."

6362
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FIRMINO MIGUEL REPORTED CHOICE OF 'EANISTS'

Lisbon SEMANARIO in Portuguese 17 Nov 84 p 64

[Text] We have learned from a businessman with an important position in the Eanist movement that the Eanist party, forming more rapidly because of the political crisis, is inclined to back Gen Firmino Miguel as a presidential candidate. However, in circles close to Belem there are some who regard such a possibility as unfeasible, putting General Eanes in a complicated situation after the end of his term. In fact, according to an opponent of the Firmino Miguel candidacy, "there is room for only one general in the new party." Should Firmino be the winning candidate, he would be the institutional "leader" of the new party; if he should lose, he would actually tend to hold the top-ranking position, primarily because it is public knowledge that the relations between the two generals are no longer what they were during Ramalho Eanes' first term.

The Firmino Miguel theory is warranted mainly because it would help to correct an excessive leftism which CNARPE [National Commission in Support of President Eanes' Reelection] has been disclosing, and because he is an individual who, in the opinion of his backers, might be acceptable (at least in a runoff election) to the parties right of PS [Socialist Party] and even to part of the Socialist electorate. That proposition does not seem to be accepted by the majority of PSD [Social Democratic Party].

On the other hand, it is not certain that Gen Firmino Miguel would agree to be a candidate with the exclusive support of the Eanist party, despite the fact that his availability, under certain conditions, for accepting his presentation to the electorate, as he himself admitted to the newspaper EL PAIS a few months ago, is well known.

2909
CSO: 3542/60

POLITICAL

PORUGAL

BRIEFS

PS EXPELS PORTO 'EANISTS'--The PS [Socialist Party] District Federation of Porto announced yesterday that it has "withdrawn its political confidence" from two Socialist members of the provisional secretariat of the Eanist movement in the northern capital. The members in question, Jose Maria Dias de Carvalho and Joaquim Gomes Carneiro, both PS representatives to the Porto Municipal Assembly, are accused of "having joined a movement opposing the Socialist Party without assuming the responsibility of resigning and definitively declaring their political objectives." However, during the recent national meeting of the Eanist movement in Espinho, both of these politicians had made public their intention of withdrawing from the PS. Gomes Carneiro was a deputy to the Assembly of the Republic in the previous legislature, at that time being linked to the wing of the "former Secretariat." Dias de Carvalho, a member of the board which presided over the Espinho meeting, performed the role of leader of the Socialist bloc in the Municipal Assembly of Porto during past months. [Text] [Lisbon EXPRESSO in Portuguese 3 Nov 84 p 1] 8908

CSO: 3542/45

SUBMARINE CONSTRUCTION FACILITIES AT CHERBOURG

Paris COLS BLEUS in French 15 Sep 84 pp 4-9

[Article by the Cherbourg DCAN engineers]

[Excerpts] The Cherbourg DCAN [Naval Weapons and Shipbuilding Directorate] is the [national] Shipbuilding Directorate's third largest establishment in terms of workforce. Its main purpose is building the French Navy's submarines, to which it devotes three-quarters of its production capacity. The remaining quarter is distributed among study activities, ammunition servicing and upkeep for the Channel-based Surface Fleet, and outfitting jobs for shore operations.

At the beginning of the 20th century, the DCAN was the only big industrial concern in Nord-Contentin. While that is no longer the case nowadays, since the fabric of local industry has been augmented, the dependence of the city of Cherbourg and its nearby surrounding areas on the [Cherbourg Naval] Dockyard is still marked. The DCAN provides more than 5,000 jobs--about one-quarter of the urban community's workforce. Its workload schedule is very full up until the end of the present decade, and even beyond, and is one of the major elements of stability in the economy of Nord-Contentin . . .

Distinguishing Features of the Submarine-Building Concern

The submarine as a particular type of vessel has several characteristics which have a direct impact on the way it is built.

- Its hull has to resist submersion pressure and its openings have to remain watertight. It is blind, and must compensate for its blindness by having a keen sense of hearing; and in order not to lose the advantage conferred by its being invisible, it must be quiet.
- It is imperative that its density be equal to one, which means an unequalled compactness of interior fittings. By way of comparison, the density of an automobile is on the order of 0.25. Since a submarine is in equilibrium with the surroundings in which it moves, the slightest mishap--even a minor

leak, rudder damage--can have serious consequences. Therefore, the seawater cooling lines are treated so as to make it almost impossible for them to break. The steering equipment and engine machinery meet reliability requirements found nowhere else except for aircraft. Finally, nuclear propulsion--which from now on is the way all our submarines being built are going to go--brings with it many special problems and security procedures inherited from the civilian nuclear power industry.

These specific problems make it necessary for the Cherbourg DCAN to bring resources (which are themselves specific ones) into operation covering the areas of studies, component testing, and actual construction.

The most typical aspect of the studies area is studying installation accommodation. The complex entanglement of the various equipments with the layers of cable and piping makes it impossible to make do merely with blueprints. In order to provide physical assurance that it is possible to achieve planned accommodations, most of the spaces in the submarine under study are modelled on a 1:1 scale. This process, which involves close collaboration between designers and modellers, make certain operations possible which could not otherwise be carried out before the building of the first vessel. Such is the case for the operation of checking certain pieces of equipment, and especially for looking at the biotechnology of watch stations. Lastly,--and this is not merely of slight benefit--thanks to this "wooden submarine" the studies department can at any moment give consideration to modifications judged essential during construction or during the ship's lifetime.

For outside fittings, including valves and piping, the hostility of the environment in which a submarine moves is indicated first of all by the coupled force of pressure and corrosion. Since the stresses are specific to this type of vessel, the DCAN has been provided with a specialized testing institution, CETEC--the Cherbourg Center for Technical Tests and Evaluations. Its main tasks are equipment certification (valves and fittings, pressure tankage, pumps, etc.) and improvement of technologies (fluid lines) and implementation methods (welding, glass-resin complexes, anti-corrosion protection, etc.). CETEC has just been provided with resources and test beds for studies relating to noise and equipment vibration reduction--one of the important items in coming years. CETEC is equipped with a team of engineers and technicians skilled in areas as diverse as electricity, mechanical engineering, chemistry, electrochemistry, metallurgy, welding, material strength, and electronics: it has a set of resources available which are unique in France. Let us mention the pressure test caissons used for strength testing submarine hull models and for testing various equipment and even small diving apparatuses.

The hulls of the French Navy's attack submarines "Griffon" and "Licorne" were tested at CETEC. At the end of the year CETEC's resources are going to be augmented by the installation of a new large-capacity caisson designed to operate at even greater pressures.

Bringing all the center's resources into play is benefiting both the studies, through the evaluation tests of equipment, and construction, through improvement of welding methods and the application of test methods to deliveries of standard equipment.

With regard to construction per se, the specific characteristics of submarines include three major items: the construction of the pressure hull, the constraints stemming from the cramped space environment of the vessel, and the effect of nuclear propulsion on work methods and construction substructures.

A submarine's pressure hull is made out of quite thick steel plates with great tensile strength. The steel's characteristics are due to its chemical composition and also to the heat treatment it undergoes after being produced. In order not to ruin the effects of that treatment, the hull elements must be cold-worked with great precision, since their dimensions preclude any regenerative heat treatment. To do the cold work, the "Iron Structures" workshop has a unique set of presses and rollers:

- a 2400-ton horizontal roller with a working width of 7 meters
- a 3000-ton vertical roller with a working width of 3.5 meters
- two gooseneck presses, one 2000-ton and one 4000-ton

Machinery-wise, the size of certain machine-welded elements--and, in particular, the machining of frames 10.5 meters in diameter--requires machines with exceptional capabilities. The frames lined up and set on the mounting cradles are the mold on which the hull sections are made. Extreme precision is needed so that two adjacent sections have exactly the same perimeter, an essential requirement for joining them.

Among its large-capacity machines that do machining, DCAN uses one boring/milling machine for 60-ton castings 8 meters long and 3 meters high, and a boring/milling machine with a turning platform for 15-ton castings 12.5 meters in diameter.

Nuclear propulsion has had a considerable effect on construction methods. In fact, meeting the rigorous safety standards and striving for the very high quality required for the flawless operation of some piece of equipment

vital to a submarine--a piece of equipment on which any activity during operation is practically precluded--entail special work and testing methods. During half of the period of time it takes to build a submarine, which is about 3 years, work in the boiler compartment is done "clean zone"; the compartment is isolated from the rest of the ship and connected by a lock chamber to a workshop, itself clean, and work is carried out in boilersuits and white gloves. This cleanliness requirement results in enormous movable lock chambers being deployed around the reactor compartment of the ship when after it is started up is put into drydock for final work. These lock chambers are connected to their own modular workshops and have "safeguarded" handling equipment for maneuvering pieces weighing in the tens of tons with the extreme precision required in the final assembly of the nuclear boiler components.

Lastly, to conclude this overview of aspects of construction peculiar to submarines, let us mention the consequences of the ship's cramped environment: the impossibility of having groups of workmen with different occupational tasks together in the same space because of lack of room, the required sequence of different work phases, and very extensive planning of construction with data processing methods. Thus, the work schedule for an SNA [nuclear-powered attack submarine] comprises thousands of tasks and also involves tens of thousands of parts. Sticking to the timetable is an obsession for the yard boss. Any delay on one item is difficult to make up, because one cannot appreciably increase the number of persons aboard or dare to bring additional people into adjacent spaces.

In order to partly get over these obstacles, the yards being built at DCAN are designed with a view toward "sectional" construction of future ships up until a time near to the final stage. A complete opening up of the ship will ease the movement of workforce and equipment and will limit the obstacles stemming from overcrowding.

The Change in Industrial Infrastructures

A submarine builder's main job has required and will continue to require adaptation of industrial equipment to the change--which has been rapid--in technologies and also in the features of submarine programs.

The recent past has seen the development and modernization of industrial infrastructures around the docks doing completion phase work on the SNLE's [nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines] and SNA's during the carrying out of those two programs. In 1981 there was the grouping of machinery resources in a new workshop in the northern part of the Naval Dockyard near the docks doing completion phase work. Also in 1981 and 1982 electronics and electrical workshops went into operation.

The major business nowadays is the remodelling of the Construction sector. It is drastically changing the face of the Naval Dockyard, at least the southern portion, and will be stretched out over a period of about 10 years.

The Construction Resources

The construction of a modern submarine involves two major stages:

- The first stage is carried out on an inclined slipway, assembling the elements making up the hull and the installation of some large components.
- The second stage involves work related to equipment and finishing work, as well as initial trials, and it is carried out in a dock.

The launching operation, with its spectacular aspect and the many constraints it imposes on the building process, marks a distinct boundary between those two stages.

For the first stage, the Naval Dockyard has two inclined slipways (Numbers 3 and 4; Numbers 1 and 2 are not used any more), and their support facilities, particularly for the assembly of nuclear boiler rooms, and in upstream operations the "iron structures" workshop.

Those facilities date back for the most part to the first half of the 19th century, and since then they have had a number of expansions and modifications. Slipway 3, built in 1813, was lengthened by 27 meters and made 5 meters higher in 1957 for the "Le Redoutable"-class SNLE program.

Slipway 4, where the "Rubis"-class SNA's are built, dates from 1812. In spite of all the improvements made since then, this industrial block no longer suits modern industrial requirements very well. But above all, it will no longer be sufficient for the new family of SNLE's which will start to be built in Cherbourg starting at the end of the decade. Indeed, it is not just that the hulls of future vessels will be thicker and making them will require more powerful means of shaping, machining and hoisting, but also the size of future submarines will exceed the capacities of existing slipways.

The necessary adaptation will take into account improvement in work conditions and will lead to achieving gains in productivity.

Content of the Remodelling

The following general principles are determined:

- construction of submarines on a horizontal plane and no longer on an inclined slipway, then setting them in water by means of canal lift;
- advanced prefabrication;
- construction and outfitting of the hull by subassemblies, "sections," with a view to easy access; and,
- reduction in completion phase work in dock.

Within this general framework, the remodelling of the Construction sector involves two aspects:

- rebuilding or building of workshops suitable for constructing hull elements; and
- construction of the "yard," which is to include two bays for heavy prefabrication and assembly, and gear for putting the submarine in water; also construction of transfer facilities for horizontal movement of "sections" and the submarine itself when it is set into the water.

The building of the "workshops" portion, which is underway, has required reclaiming more than 5 hectares from the sea through refill. The most impressive workshop will be the "hull workshop," which will occupy the largest portion of the land reclaimed from the sea.

The "yards" portion is still being sketched out, since all the final decisions have not yet been made. That is the situation for ground transfer facilities. On the other hand, the mechanism for putting submarines into water is now defined in broad outline: it will be made up of a dock and submersible platform. The submarine is first transferred onto that platform which is locked into an upright position, and then it is floated by upward movements in water level, brought out of the dock and led to the berth for completion work. The yard will be situated on the land currently occupied by the "Iron Structures" workshop and the prefabrication areas. One of the difficulties with this major business is that the building of the workshops and yards must not disrupt the building of the current SNA series, which means programming precisely the operations of building new workshops and tearing down and dismantling old ones.

This major infrastructural activity mobilizes a large part of the capacity of the Cherbourg Maritime Work Directorate and DCAN's considerable study resources. It is the largest of the DCN's [expansion unknown] undertakings in upcoming years; financially it will use up a large part of investment resources. This special effort has been authorized in order to provide the Naval Dockyard with high-performance industrial equipment, as of the end of the decade, adapted to construction programs for future submarines. The size of this effort is a reason for having confidence in the future for the Cherbourg Naval Dockyard.

9631

CSO: 3519/512

PAPER WARNS HIGH WAGE DEMANDS COULD HURT ECONOMY

Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 12 Nov 84 p 8

[Editorial: "Wage Framework Ready"]

[Text] To the number of good messages recently on the economic development was last week added the balance of payments figure for the third quarter. The deficit amounted to 2.5 billion kroner. That is half the deficit of the previous quarter, though twice the deficit of the third quarter of last year. There is now much to indicate that the total balance of payments deficit for the present year as a whole will amount to 15-16 billion kroner. The fear that the figure might exceed 18 billion seems to have been dispersed.

The reason why the message is noted with such great satisfaction is the uncertainty which arose in the late summer in connection with the trends of the economic development. At the time there were fears that a too sharp increase in the consumption was taking place and that intervention against the magnitude of the private consumption might become necessary. Such intervention might be conceived of as poison for a reasonable outcome of the impending collective bargaining. Several figures now show that the fears were unfounded. It is primarily the investment trends which influence the magnitude of the domestic demand, and this must be regarded as the necessary prerequisite for eliminating the balance of payments deficit permanently.

Prime Minister Poul Schluter has taken the opportunity to establish that there is no basis for intervention against the consumption. Such intervention may only become topical if the collective bargaining next spring will not result in a wage agreement at a sensible level. Unless the leaders of the organizations, guided by the poor experience of many years, now realize the necessity of restraint in connection with the collective bargaining of the spring, the consequences are well known. Wage increases to a level which is not sensible will be made 'sensible' through increases in direct and indirect taxes, which will reduce the increase in the private consumption to a level which is compatible with the balance of payments. Elimination of the balance of payments deficit by 1988, at the latest, is still given first priority in arranging the economic policy. This cannot be changed. Unfortunately, unreasonable wage increases also lead to increases in costs within the trades and industries with fewer jobs as a result. A consequence which the leaders of the organizations will have to bear in mind now that an important

objective for the policy of restoration has been specified once more.

There can be no doubt at all that the objective of the present government is to put a check on the annual borrowing abroad. The economic policy will for the time being be prepared in such a way that this objective and this promise will never be lost sight of. The framework for the wage increases resulting from the collective bargaining of the spring has thus actually been fixed. It is many years since the goals of the economic development have been defined as clearly and strongly by a government and the majority of the Folketing. The framework for the collective agreements of next spring has thus also been determined.

7262

CSO: 3613/34

ECONOMIC

FINLAND

BRIEFS

INCREASED FOOD EXPORTS TO USSR--Finland is already delivering large quantities of foodstuffs to the Soviet Union this year. This week there were talks in Helsinki, and according to the authorization issued by the cabinet, export plans for this year can be adjusted to reflect the new deliveries. Beef exports will total 4 million kilograms, while 1.5 million kilograms of sausage, 687,000 kilograms of canned meat, 2 million kilograms of powdered milk, and 2 million kilograms of Edam cheese will be exported. [Text] [Helsinki HUFVUDSTADSBLADET in Swedish 20 Oct 84 p 5] 11798

CSO: 3650/40

LOW PROFIT RATES OF NATIONAL BANKS ALARMING

Lisbon SEMANARIO in Portuguese 3 Nov 84 p 60

[Article by Rui Teixeira Santos: "Grim Picture of the Portuguese Banking System"]

[Excerpt] The analysis of results is frightening: No national financial institution has a profitability higher than 0.1 percent (ratio of the results of deposits minus own capital). The least solid bank of Italy (Banco Nacionale Agricola) has own capital sufficient for covering 3.2 percent of the deposits handled. The most solid bank in Portugal has a ratio of 4.1 percent, and only two nationalized commercial banks exceed that ratio. Of the credit granted by the banking system, 23.2 percent comes from the General Savings Bank. In exchange, the Savings Bank has 19.8 percent of the total deposits of the financial system (not counting the Bank of Portugal).

These figures were prepared on the basis of official reports and accounts for 1983. However, those figures are cooked and optimistically tempered by financial tricks, which hide the negative profitability of the system. The crisis for once and for all affected the Portuguese banking system, which will soon see new authorized agents operating in its market (the SPI, Chase Manhattan Bank and Hanover Trust Co) and others to be authorized (Portuguese Commercial Bank, Banque Nationale de Paris, Societe Generale des Banques and Citibank).

National Ranking

The tables we are now publishing are an x-ray of the system. In terms of size (counted on the basis of the deposits handled in millions of contos), the largest Portuguese bank is the Banco Portugues do Atlantico with more than 385 million contos, followed by Banco Pinto e Soto Mayor and Banco Espirito Santo & Comercial de Lisboa. This is in terms of commercial banks, since the largest Portuguese bank continues to be the General Savings Bank with a total volume of 740.4 million contos.

In the second table, we estimate the solidity of the bank institutions which operate in Portugal on the basis of the ratio of the percentage of own capital over deposits handled, it being understood that own capital means reserves and risk and miscellaneous provisions. The least solid banks are, in declining

order: Banco Nacional Ultramarino, Fonsecas & Burnay, Uniao de Bancos Portugueses, Banco Pinto & Sotto Mayor and Totta e Acores. The most solid is systematically the General Savings Bank. Of the foreign banks operating in Portugal, the solidity of the Banco de Brazil is outstanding, and as a matter of fact, all of them are at a peak of financial stability.

The third chart represents the profitability of our banking system based on the ratio between own capital and the results of the fiscal years. The banks in the worst situations are the BNU [Banco Nacional Ultramarino], UBP [Union de Bancos Portugueses], Banco Fonsecas & Burnay and Totta e Acores. Their profitability rates (We have already said it) despite everything created by accounting procedures, given the weight of financial fictions and risky loans, are lower than those of any European financial institution.

In these terms, to try to merge these institutions, far from resolving their problems would only aggravate the situation. To put together some genuine financial holes would only aggravate things more and create a larger hole. Moreover, if own assets (increases in capital) are not injected into the banking system quickly, we run the risk of seeing the financial system collapse overnight. Finally, analyzing the amounts of credit granted by the banking system, it is confirmed that there is a limited growth in monetary terms, which means in real terms (considering inflation); that investment has declined substantially in recent years, at the same time that the state sector/private sector credit ratio is changing in favor of the state.

As far as deposits are concerned, their increase has not accompanied inflation either, which means a decline in the volume of business by our commercial banks. However, above all, the weight of demand deposits has been increasing by comparison with time deposits, which seriously affects the profitability of banking activities (costs are greater for the banks) and mainly it says much about the trend of the Portuguese toward change from free economic agents to consuming economic agents.

8908
CSO: 3542/46

MEMBERSHIP IN EEC CRITICIZED BY POLITICAL EXTREMES

PCP: Membership Not Irreversible

Lisbon AVANTE in Portuguese 31 Oct 84 p 3

[Excerpt] "In the long and varied story of the plans for joining the EEC, the ridiculous episode of the euphoric signing of a document without any legal worth and institutional effectiveness by Prime Minister Mario Soares comes to place in full view the fact that the country has before it a mere political operation totally opposed to national interests," says a note of the SIP [Communist Party information and propaganda sections] last 25 October, a few hours after the beginning of a great publicity campaign, particularly through RTP [Ratiotelevisao Portuguesa], about the signing of the so-called "certificat d'accord."

However, neither one (the signing) nor the other (the campaign) "alter what there is with respect to the real difficulties remaining in the process of negotiations, the matter of dates, or the areas of great importance such as agriculture, fishing or budget problems."

Criticism and Reservations

The SIP note continues: "The prime minister could well continue to repeat the same generalities, superficialities and futilities with respect to joining the EEC, with which he has been dealing with this serious question for 7 years."

"However, despite the fact that a real national debate has not been promoted on this subject, despite the fact that the Portuguese have been subject to an incessant bombardment of sophisms, lies and falsehoods on this subject for a long time, the truth is that today there is a much sharper awareness of the very serious problems and negative consequences that the joining of the EEC by Portugal would bring, and the criticisms and reservations that it arouses are much greater, even in circles where for political reason they supported such a plan."

These facts contain something new only for the inattentive. Actually, what has taken place in this respect in recent years, and which some now trumpet as if they had discovered gunpowder, the PCP had already foreseen, specifically in its IX Congress (1979) and in the Conference "Portugal and the Common Market" (1980), warning that joining would have the fundamental consequences emphasized in the SIP note:

"destruction of vast sectors of the national economy, affecting small and medium companies in particular, and causing an increase in unemployment; preventing development and causing recession or the absorption of basic sectors of the Portuguese economy;

the cancellation of great transformations accomplished by the 25 April revolution in socioeconomic structures (nationalizations, agrarian reform, workers rights) and the restoration of monopolistic capitalism with the liquidation of the democratic system consecrated in the constitution;

the accentuation of the submission of Portugal to imperialism;

the transformation of Portugal into an instrument of the neocolonialism policy of imperialism;

a low standard of living for Portuguese workers as a forcible characteristic of the Portuguese economy within the Common Market."

Political Objectives

Therefore, the problem is far from being exclusively economic because the consequences of joining would have an obvious political sense essentially aimed against the democratic Portugal emerging from 25 April. The SIP note says:

"It is well to remember that membership in the EEC has been invoked by successive governments of the right as a pretext and motive for a very great number of destructive offensives, for a long list of crimes committed against the national economy, and for many attacks on the rights of the workers and on the freedoms of the citizens."

National Disaster

It can be said with good reason that membership in the EEC would mean a real national disaster for our country. Saying this is not making a senseless statement; that is well known by those who systematically hide or distort the reasons on which the PCP [Portuguese Communist Party] bases itself for its position.

The SIP note emphasizes the membership of our country, summarizing known theories of the PCP in this respect:

"Far from bringing the Portuguese closer to the so-called 'European standards of living,' its economic consequences would have social repercussions so negative that they would truly lead to a greater degradation of the living conditions of the population.

"Far from encouraging the proclaimed 'modernization' of the national productive machinery, it would lead to the destruction of vital sectors, to a greater anarchy and irrationality in economic life, and to the crushing of the national economy by the competing economies of the developed capitalist countries of the EEC.

"Far from representing a safe path for national development, it would be a considerable strengthening of all the factors of economic and political dependence which are in large measure historically responsible for the economic and social backwardness of the country, and would lead to the corresponding abdication of any prospects of independent development with a basis on national resources, work and effort."

Just Demand

In conclusion, the SIP note also says:

"Contrary to what Mario Soares and his government proclaim, membership by Portugal in the EEC cannot, and should not, be considered irreversible, not only because it is foreseeable that difficulties and contradictions existing within the EEC will also lead, not only to new postponements of dates but also the impracticability of joining, but basically because such a plan does not serve the interests of the Portuguese people and Portugal.

The noisy publicity on the signing of the so-called 'certificate of agreement' should not deceive anyone. It is basically another operation of deception at the service of the ambitions of Mario Soares and the overall objectives of the policy of the right.

Opposition from the Right

Lisbon O DIABO in Portuguese 30 Oct 84 p 9

[Article by Miguel Teixeira e Mello: "Another Proof of the Irresponsibility of the April Regime"]

[Text] What is the real significance of the "constat d'accord" signed in Dublin last week by Dr Mario Soares?

To believe the official version, spread by the state-managed subservient news media, Portugal has obtained a formal commitment from the present EEC members for our membership to become effective in January 1986.

This means that whatever may happen, from now until that date, Portugal's entry into the Common Market will take place inevitably on the first day of that year (1986).

However, it will be necessary for negotiations to be concluded by the end of 1984. Some doubts and questions must be raised around this point.

The document in question points to the "dossiers" on which agreements were already possible and points to those in which identical points of view have not yet been reached. It then declares the irreversibility of the process of joining and demonstrates the existence of a firm desire that it take place on 1 January 1986.

Now, if there are "dossiers" on which there is no agreement and if that date is the deadline for negotiations, it must be asked who is going to give in and to what degree will he have to do so during the course of the negotiating process that begins as of now?

Given the begging pressure the Portuguese Government exerted on the EEC in recent weeks, keeping in mind the need for favorable factors for their domestic policy which Portuguese rulers do not have, it does not appear difficult to conclude that the one who is going to give in this time also is naturally going to be the weakest party, that is, Portugal.

It is strange that after 1986 there will still be a transition period of 10 years.

It is worthwhile asking, therefore, what reason is there for such happiness at a marriage "that will only become fully effective in 1996 after 10 years of prenuptial experience?" From the political point of view, the certificate is worth nothing except a statement of intent, in addition to being merely repetitious in view of previous verbal statements.

Dr Mario Soares sought the signing of a letter of intention of political scope, which in fact he did not obtain.

Remember also that since the beginning of summer when Francois Mitterand came to Lisbon, nothing has changed in the status of negotiations. In these terms, the document now signed rests on something which was agreed upon a long time ago between the negotiators of both sides. Indeed, nothing difference could be expected from a government such as that headed by Dr Mario Soares, nor from a political system such as the present one which is responsible for the hardest and most serious crisis of identity we have ever suffered.

Moreover, the 1 January 1986 date was established taking only the domestic objectives of Dr Mario Soares and the Portuguese Socialists into consideration.

By forcing the signature of a document without relevance in this fashion, Dr Mario Soares performed one more sorry service to the country where, to the misfortune of all he was born. The Portuguese negotiating position, which was never very good, is now seen as being considerably weakened. Perhaps it is not correct to continue speaking about negotiations. In fact, if the present zeal to enter the EEC at any price continues until the beginning of 1986, the concessions by our country will have to multiply in order to satisfy the interests of the European countries.

8908
CSO: 3542/46

GOVERNMENT ADMONISHED ON INSUFFICIENT AID TO UNEMPLOYED

Lisbon DIARIO DE NOTICIAS in Portuguese 4 Nov 84 p 8

[Excerpt] The official unemployment rate in Portugal is 10.8 percent. In absolute terms it is a figure similar to that recorded in almost all countries of the EEC, for which reason, apparently, it should not lead to excessive concern. The only thing is, as we all know but do not all admit, that there are two factors which basically change the problem: the inexactness of the figure and the unemployment law.

The 10.8 percent is the number of registered unemployed and that number does not cover all those in Portugal who are looking for work, specifically women and the young who are looking for their first job. Both arrive in the job market in large numbers every year, where they stand at the doorstep for a long wait. With respect to the law under which the unemployed live among us, it would be enough to say that only 10 percent of those registered in the Unemployment Fund receive their respective and unreliable subsidies. The remainder survive, "subexist" with the support of friends and parents, in a humiliating and insufficient dependence for those who receive it, and unsustainable for those who provide it.

That is not the way the unemployed live in the countries of the EEC to which we already proclaim to belong.

The picture presented to us here in Portugal is quite different. Up to now this year, 12,000 young people were rejected by the university. It would be unrealistic to suppose that they found employment. What awaits them in terms of the present and the future? What roads, what detours? How many possibilities, how many talents, how many assets are being prodigally wasted in this country, which has in its population its greatest wealth? And what does public opinion know about the creation of new jobs? Nothing.

The Unemployment Fund we have provides subsidies for 10 percent of the unemployed, which means nearly 60,000 persons. It subsidizes them badly, little and badly. It does not have the money to do more, it argues. However, it is in the Unemployment Fund that the government seeks part of the money it needs to cover budget deficits. It is known that 52 million contos were requested for that purpose. It is known that the minister of labor refused. It is known that 17 million contos are about to be budgeted for 1985. How many of the unemployed will be able to receive the pension to which they have the right, and for which we all work, from those 17 million contos?

A tax destined for the Unemployment Fund is imposed on any remuneration received in Portugal. That fund, created with the money from all of us, which should mandatorily return to the workers in trouble, has been chronically misrouted for purposes which could be justified but have nothing to do with the initial and original objectives which led to its creation.

At a time when pockets of poverty grow in the country; when there are declared cases of hunger and public appeals to national solidarity, the proper use of the Unemployment Fund money is an undeniable ethical need.

8908
CSO: 3542/46

ECONOMIC

PORUGAL

BRIEFS

EXPORTS TO USSR--Portugal will sell 10,000 pairs of shoes and 25,000 suits of clothing to the Soviet Union, following the signing of two additional contracts signed during the visit of a Soviet mission to Portugal. [Text] [Lisbon DIARIO DE NOTICIAS in Portuguese 23 Nov 84 p 5] 6362

CSO: 3542/56

ENERGY CONSERVATION MEASURES GAIN WIDE SUPPORT

Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 15 Nov 84 Sect IV p 2

[Article by Helge Moller]

[Text] Even if the energy subsidy for insulation has been reduced, Danes are still saving energy.

For the first time in many years, the inclination to save energy is particularly pronounced among tenants of apartments and not as previously owners of single-family homes. Also the elderly section of the population who used to be fairly difficult to interview have become noticeably more energy conscious.

This appears from the annual study performed by Scan Test and the analysis institute AIM for the Energy Savings Committee. The study has been carried through in the same way since 1977 to measure the efforts of the population to save energy. The study has been carried through via a nation-wide omnibus of AIM and has covered a section of the population of 1,442 persons above the age of 13.

The main results which show that the Danes are very conscious of energy are supported by a report from the International Energy Agency, which talks about a Danish world record. The report establishes that Denmark is the nation among the 22 nations involved in the IEA cooperation which has carried through the most comprehensive and effective energy savings measures.

It appears from the study on the energy savings habits of the Danes that more than half, viz. 55 percent of all dwellings, are now provided with energy saving measures. In an average of 83 percent of all single-family homes the so-called basic measures have been undertaken.

That is to say insulation of ceilings, walls, windows and floors. As far as owner-occupied apartments and apartments occupied by tenants, 47 percent has been provided with the basic energy saving measures, whereas the figure is only 30 percent when it comes to all of the energy-saving measures. However, the increase in investments this year has primarily taken place among apartments.

Last winter, approximately every fourth household undertook some form of investment for the purpose of saving energy. That is less than the previous

year, but the explanation, no doubt, is that many feel that they have reached the realistic level for energy savings in the household.

It also appears that more people today take showers than filling up the bathtub. Many save on hot water, and they are increasingly reluctant to use a number of electrical appliances.

Vast Knowledge of Subsidies

The knowledge of public subsidies is great, and 25 percent of those who have heard of these possibilities have, indeed, availed themselves of them. Also the knowledge of the energy consultant arrangements has increased markedly. Especially among owners of homes and apartments. Twice as many have used the arrangement as in 1983.

The energy-conscious attitudes which otherwise mark the population do not apply when it comes to natural gas. Only 29 percent state that they agree that introduction of natural gas improves the Danish economy. However, a little more than half of the respondents find that the introduction of natural gas is a solid safety net for Denmark in case of another oil crisis.

Those who live in apartments save especially by keeping the temperature down, closing for the heat in individual rooms, by saving on electrical light and by limiting the use of electrical appliances, while homeowners take showers instead of baths and altogether save on hot water.

In spite of the increase in the daily savings, we tend to have begun to keep temperatures a little higher.

It is especially homeowners who have raised their temperatures.

Whereas there has been an actual increase in the number of tenants of apartments who keep the temperature below 20 degrees Celsius.

Contrary to previously, there is now an equally large percentage of owners of apartments as of homes who keep the temperature in their rooms below 20 degrees Celsius.

If one looks at the reasons why those who are not energy-conscious have not availed themselves of the energy subsidies, the two main reasons are that people have not had a need for it, and that they are tenants, and that it, therefore, is the concern of the housing society.

The reasons reveal that it is only among people who live in apartments that there is still a dislike of energy-saving measures.

This dislike may not be personal, but the feeling is that if one is a tenant, insulation is the concern of the owner or the housing society and not the concern of the individual person.

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OFFICIAL URGES STATE MONOPOLY HAVE ROLE IN OIL SEARCH

Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 15 Nov 84 p 11

[Article by Holger Lavesen, chairman of the board of Danish Oil and Natural Gas]

[Text] There has of recent years been some public and political debate as to whether it would be appropriate for the state-owned Danish Oil and Gas Production (DOPAS), which is a subsidiary of Danish Oil and Natural Gas (D.O.N.G.), to have the possibility of operating on-shore and off-shore drillings.

The decision whether this will happen will, of course, have to be made by the political authorities, by government and parliament. It will probably be one of the three subjects which will be debated today, when the annual report of D.O.N.G. on its activities is under debate in parliament together with the report prepared by the minister of energy on the company.

Exploration and production of oil and gas in the Danish subsoil take place according to principles which largely correspond to the principles applying in most places of the Western world. Permission to drill in the subsoil is normally granted to a group of companies which have joined forces to perform the task. Such a group of companies, a consortium, most often consists of three to six participants. In Denmark, the state is represented in all new consortiums through DOPAS.

The agreement among the individual companies in a consortium stipulates the share of each participant. The share of DOPAS is normally 20 percent during the exploration. That share may increase to around 50 percent if profitable finds are made. Like other state-owned oil companies, DOPAS will not incur any expenses for its share in connection with the exploration for oil and gas, apart from its own operating costs. These are conditions which the other companies in the consortium will have to accept in order to be allowed to drill in the Danish subsoil. If a find is made, and production is deemed to become profitable, DOPAS subsequently pays its share of the far larger costs of oil production on an equal footing with the other companies.

In practice, the exploration and production of oil and gas take place in such a way that one of the companies of the consortium is in charge of the practical implementation of the drilling operations, etc. That company is called the operator. The task of the operator is to arrange the tasks, conclude the necessary contracts with firms which will be contributing to the exploration, and to undertake the daily management of the very drilling operations. All of these things take place according to guidelines fixed by a steering committee in which all companies within the consortium are represented. The company which is the operator during the exploration usually continues as operator also in the technically and economically considerably more interesting situation where finds are made which it will be worthwhile producing. The company which becomes operator will have its expenses covered in connection with the work but usually derives no profits from its operatorship.

My position is that it will be sensible from the point of view of business and the society to aim at making it possible for DOPAS to become operator both in on-shore and off-shore drillings if adequately equipped for it from a technical point of view. Two circumstances support this view:

First, the operatorship gives a considerable insight into the technical and economic aspects of oil and gas activities. This knowledge is of business value for D.O.N.G., Inc.'s other activity. It is furthermore valuable for the society as a supplement to the knowledge which the administrative authorities in the area of energy possess. The membership of DOPAS in the consortia drilling for oil and natural gas in itself provides useful knowledge.

That knowledge, however, becomes considerably strengthened if DOPAS in addition as operator gets the responsibility for the technical and commercial leadership of some of the consortia and thus, in practice, carries through the exploration and production processes.

The transfer of knowledge and experience thus taking place to the company of the state will, in the long run, reduce the country's dependence upon foreign oil companies, and it will, furthermore, improve the basis for DOPAS' participation in the other consortia.

Second--and that is a viewpoint which is at least as important--an operatorship safeguarded by DOPAS will improve the possibilities for Danish industry of getting a bigger share of the tasks arising in the areas of oil and gas. The task of DOPAS--whether or not the company is operator--is to ensure that Danish enterprises will get the possibility on an equal footing with others of being considered in connection with exploration and production tasks. This task may be solved most effectively if DOPAS is operator. That means that the company itself works out the invitations in connection with tenders, concludes contracts with enterprises, etc. By this means, it will become possible to utilize the experience and the knowledge acquired by D.O.N.G. in connection with previous tasks involving the development and operation of the oil and gas system.

As is well known, a company within the A.P. Moller concern is operator of the consortium (DUC) [Danish Underground Consortium] which, at present, produces oil and gas in the North Sea. This has certainly had the effect that Danish enterprises have been given a larger share in the tasks in the North Sea than would otherwise have been the case should the task of operator have been solved by one of the foreign oil companies in the consortium. It is a question of quite big investments. The total investments of DUC in the North Sea are close to 30 billion kroner.

It, therefore, is important for DOPAS to be operator in some of the explorations and not least in connection with subsequent production, if any. Danish enterprises will thus be ensured of competing on an equal footing with foreign companies. It may be particularly difficult for Danish enterprises which have not previous been working in this field to enter into the market. Operators who have carried through drillings in the North Sea outside the Danish area and have had a satisfactory cooperation with, for example, British or Norwegian commercial enterprises will be inclined to continue with the same enterprises rather than taking a Danish firm which has no experience in the area. The task of DOPAS in this connection is to ensure that Danish enterprises will be given a real opportunity to participate.

The discussion on the possibilities of DOPAS for participation as operator in the consortia is often confused with the possibility of/risk in connection with D.O.N.G.'s production if finds are made which will yield big profits.

It is important to establish that this is another question.

If DOPAS becomes operator, the company will have its direct expenses in this connection covered, neither more nor less. The profits in connection with the production of oil and gas will be distributed among the participants in the consortium on the basis of their share in the consortium and regardless of whether a company is operator or not.

If new finds are made in the Danish underground, it becomes a political question whether the profits shall remain within D.O.N.G. or be transferred to the Danish treasury. These problems have occasioned the big political dispute in Norway on the activity of the Norwegian state-owned company, Statoil. The big profits from the oil finds have made Statoil a dominant factor within the Norwegian business community and society. It is the profits from the oil finds and not the profits from the operatorship that have created Statoil's position. As far as I know, there is political agreement in Norway that Statoil must have the possibility of being operator.

Last spring, the minister of energy achieved a broad political agreement on the future of the natural gas project. That has created a calm atmosphere in connection with the work on the natural gas project of D.O.N.G. and the regional natural gas companies. Gas sales have now developed to the extent that we may look at the future with reasonable optimism.

It will be of great value for D.O.N.G. if broad political agreement may also be achieved on the role of the company in connection with exploration and production of oil and gas. An involvement in this area requires long-term planning and long-term investments. A solid political basis for the work is therefore required.

ENERGY

PORUGAL

BRIEFS

SUBSIDIZED GAS SALES—"Lisbon gas consumers benefit from an annual subsidy of 3 million contos, while in the rest of the country, bottled propane gas is sold at cost price," reported Delgado Domingos, professor at the IST [Higher Technical Institute] and an expert on energy issues. Domingos was speaking at the closing session of a symposium on the program to introduce natural gas into the Portuguese energy picture. The Lisbon symposium was attended by Portuguese and foreign specialists. Stressing that he is "not against natural gas," Domingos noted the "risk that a poorly planned investment, without taking into account the potential already installed, could in 10 years turn into another dead weight." According to the IST professor, the present capacity for propane production, which is underused, should be joined to the prospect of the future use of natural gas. He recommended that a "regulation should be passed immediately, providing for the installation of gas lines in houses under construction, to create a potential market for natural gas throughout the country and not just on the coast." [Text] [Lisbon DIARIO DE NOTICIAS in Portuguese 23 Nov 84 p 5] 6362

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BRIEFS

TERRITORIAL WATERS INCREASE--Now that 9 years have elapsed since decolonization, Portugal is preparing to enlarge its national territory, this time in the maritime area. In fact, a new system for measuring our territorial waters and the Exclusive Economic Zone is awaiting approval from the Council of Ministers, and will increase the interior waters by nearly 5,000 square miles. With respect to Madeira alone, the new measurement system, already adopted by countless countries during the 1970's, will expand the territorial waters in the Exclusive Economic Zone by 600 square miles, and the interior waters by 1,025 square miles. The new process consists of measuring the territorial waters, not on the basis of the coastline, but rather in accordance with straight base lines drawn considering coast apexes. [Text] [Lisbon SEMANARIO in Portuguese 17 Nov 84 p 18] 2909

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INDUSTRIES IN MANY COUNTRIES USE NORTH SEA AS DUMP

Helsinki HUFVUDSTADSBLADET in Swedish 28 Oct 84 p 15

[Article by Sigyn Alenius]

[Text] Copenhagen--Waste, both dangerous and not so dangerous, is being dumped and incinerated in the North Sea. The air is being polluted with smoke and gases, and it is all perfectly legal. But now it is going to stop: a meeting on the subject will be held in Bremen on 31 October at the initiative of the West Germans. The Danes are actively involved. The purpose of the Bremen meeting is to reach a political decision to keep the North Sea clean.

For years the North Sea has been used as a kind of dump for industrial waste which the surrounding countries could not get rid of any other way. Over the past 5-year statistical period, 700,000 tons of waste have been incinerated in the North Sea. Waste is dumped all around in the North Sea and the Atlantic Ocean, and waste is also incinerated on barges. The most dangerous waste is incinerated.

In Denmark, Minister of Environment Christian Christensen has drawn attention in a report to the danger of collision and of other shipping accidents that always exists. He mentions the "Mont Louis" accident off the Belgian coast, which is, the minister says, a good example from recent times. The danger of collision always exists. He points out that PCB waste is especially dangerous because it is absorbed by living organisms.

More Effective Rules

The purpose of the meeting in Bremen is not to write a new convention, because conventions already exist. The purpose, instead, is to make them more active and effective. The Danes themselves, who together with the West Germans and Swedes have been very actively involved, neither dump waste nor discharge sewage into the North Sea, and they feel that others should not do so, either. The Danish minister of environment put it this way the other day: "What is taking place is quite simply highly dangerous in the long run. It must be stopped."

The two main conventions governing conditions in the North Sea are the London Convention (about 50 countries, including Finland) and the Oslo Convention (which comprises all the North Sea coastal states, with Finland having observer

status). By virtue of the existing Baltic Sea Convention (to which Finland has acceded), the Baltic is completely protected. It is what is called in international terminology a "special area"--that is, one in which ships are totally forbidden to jettison anything. Efforts are being made by the Danes to give the North Sea the same status.

Great Britain is the country that is currently putting up the strongest resistance to cooperation in keeping the North Sea clean. Formally and in principle, the British are indeed in agreement, but in practice, it is difficult to lock them into strict regulations quite simply because their own industry is not yet modern enough for the technical purification facilities to work as they should. The British have long been experiencing big economic problems that hinder expensive investments in the environment.

Everyone "in Agreement"

The participants in the Bremen meeting, which will last 2 days--31 October and 1 November--are all the countries bordering directly on the North Sea--that is, France, Belgium, Holland, Great Britain, the FRG, and the three Nordic countries Denmark, Norway, and Sweden.

In principle, all the participants are in agreement: the North Sea should not be a dump for the industries all around it. Sewage discharge, industrial discharge, and shipborne and airborne pollution should be prevented. Environmental technology should be developed. The only question is where the line should be drawn between industry's need to get rid of its waste and the sea's legitimate need to be kept free of such waste.

The North Sea states disagree on three important points. The first concerns oil-containing discharge from ships. The second concerns standards for the purification of land-based discharge, and the third concerns dumping.

Since 1973, the so-called Marpol (Marine Pollution) agreement among the North Sea states (revised in 1978) has contained rules for limiting the discharge of waste oil into the sea. The Danes, West Germans, and Swedes support the idea that the North Sea should be converted into the same kind of special area as the Baltic: water used to clean ship's tanks should not be dumped into the North Sea any more than waste oil should. Everything should be drained into special tanks that the ports would be required to make available. This regulation is supported in principle by the other countries as well, but it is considered difficult to implement in practice.

What Kind of Measurement?

Land-based discharge--sewage and industrial waste--should be purified. Everyone also agrees on that in principle, but the countries do not agree on how clean the matter discharged into the sea should be or on the way to measure cleanliness. Two possibilities exist: one can measure the degree of cleanliness in the stream through which the discharge is made or the cleanliness of the discharged matter itself. The most rigorous countries are calling for measurement of the discharged material, which is the strictest rule, while the others feel

that it is enough to measure the cleanliness of North Sea water at regular intervals.

Lastly, the North Sea states disagree among themselves on dumping. According to the rules now in effect, North Sea states can discharge their waste directly into the North Sea or dump incinerated waste (the incineration takes place on floating incineration stations in the North Sea). The states are required only to observe certain rules classifying waste and stipulating what can be dumped without prior incineration, what must be incinerated, and what cannot be discharged into the sea at all. The latter includes, for example, highly radioactive waste. The West Germans and Danes, with Swedish support, do not want to allow any form of waste dumping at all.

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